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To the Reader 
The world of corporate finance and financial reporting is changing rapidly. Traditional means of 
entrepreneurial financing like bank loans and venture capital are being supplemented by innova-
tive mechanisms such as crowd-sourced financing. However, the key economic challenges to 
corporate finance, adverse selection and moral hazard, remain.  
From the perspective of a financial accountant, this begs the question as of how information flows 
on these innovative asset markets need to be structured so that the wisdom of the crowd can 
actually materialize. How should the demand for information by investors be balanced with the 
direct and indirect costs of transparency? How do information and market design aspects interact? 
Do crowdinvestors demand the same information like retail investors in established equity mar-
kets? What is their information acquisition and investment behavior? Do institutional investors 
exist in these markets and if they do, how do they differ from retail investors in their behavior?  
Many exciting issues, for sure. I congratulate Nader Hemaidan for identifying this research area. 
Although he does not settle all of the above issues with his work (who could?), he provides fas-
cinating insights into the world of equity crowdfunding. Collaborating with Companisto, a leading 
German equity crowdfunding platform, he explores the equity crowdfunding universe. He studies 
the heterogeneous investors that make crowdinvesting an exciting new market. Using unique data, 
he is able to document the determinants of their investment decisions. Also, he is using Google 
Analytics data to study their information acquisition behavior in more detail. In his final project, 
which is still ongoing, he explores the financial literacy of crowdinvestors and whether online 
financial education tools affect their investment and information acquisition behavior.  
Taken together the findings of these studies help us to understand the developing equity crowd-
funding market better. Equity crowdinvestors appear to be relatively financially literate. Retail 
crowdinvestors use information differently compared to institutional investors. Overall, they do 
not seem to exhaust the available information. All these insights are to a large extent new to the 
literature. Thus, the work of Nader Hemaidan contributes to the academic debate by providing 
genuinely new and relevant results that will help mapping the crowdinvesting landscape. I hope 
that his studies will be widely read and used. 
Berlin, January 29, 2018 
Joachim Gassen 
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Abstract 
English: This cumulative Ph.D. thesis investigates the role of information and financial literacy in the 
German crowdinvesting market. Using proprietary investor-level data from Companisto, one of the 
largest German crowdinvesting portals, the first paper explores how the magnitude of start-ups’ dis-
closures on Companisto is associated with crowdinvestors’ investment behavior. For this purpose, I 
develop five indices that capture the extent of start-ups’ different types of voluntary disclosures. My 
findings suggest that the investment decisions by both retail and institutional crowdinvestors are pos-
itively associated with the magnitude of start-ups’ voluntary disclosures. However, while start-ups’ 
‘soft’ disclosures seem to play a role in the decision-making of (inexperienced) retail investors, they 
appear to be irrelevant for the investment decisions of institutional investors. My second thesis paper 
uses investor-level Google Analytics data to explore investors’ actual information acquisition prior to 
investing. My results indicate that crowdinvestors tend to neglect a substantial fraction of start-ups’ 
disclosures before investing. Moreover, I show that investors’ information acquisition varies with their 
demographics, their level of crowdinvesting experience as well as their (average) investment amounts. 
My findings further suggest that investors acquire less information in the presence of potential signals 
of start-up quality and (thus) in cases where the investment appears to be less risky. In my third paper, 
which is co-authored by Joachim Gassen, I study the causal effect of online financial training on 
crowdinvestors’ information and investment behavior by conducting a field experiment on Compa-
nisto. While the experiment is still ongoing, the interim report included in my thesis motivates the 
overall research question and explains the research design. Our preliminary results indicate that, com-
pared to survey samples representative for the overall population, crowdinvestors exhibit a signifi-
cantly higher level of ‘basic’ financial literacy. 
Deutsch: Diese kumulative Dissertation untersucht die Rolle von Informationen und Finanzkompe-
tenz im deutschen Crowdinvesting-Markt. Die erste Studie erforscht den Zusammenhang zwischen 
dem Umfang der von Start-Ups auf Companisto veröffentlichen Informationen und dem Investitions-
verhalten von Crowdinvestoren auf Basis von proprietären Nutzer-level Companisto-Daten. Zu die-
sem Zweck entwickle ich fünf Offenlegungsindizes, die den Umfang der publizierten Unternehmen-
sinformationen erfassen. Meine Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass die Investitionsentscheidungen von 
privaten und institutionellen Investoren positiv mit dem Ausmaß der freiwillig von Start-ups publi-
zierten Informationen zusammenhängen. Während (unerfahrene) private Investoren auch „weiche“ 
Informationen im Rahmen ihrer Investitionsentscheidungen zu berücksichtigen scheinen, haben diese 
scheinbar keine Entscheidungsrelevanz für institutionelle Investoren. Meine zweite Studie untersucht 
das tatsächliche Informationsverhalten von Crowdinvestoren im Vorfeld von Investitionen auf Basis 
von Nutzer-level Google Analytics-Daten. Meine Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass Investoren einen 
Großteil der von Start-ups bereitgestellten Informationen im Vorfeld von Investitionen ignorieren. 
Darüber hinaus zeige ich auf, dass das Informationsverhalten von Investoren mit den demografischen 
Merkmalen, der Crowdinvesting-Erfahrung und den (durchschnittlichen) Investitionsbeträgen von In-
vestoren zusammenhängt. Meine Ergebnisse deuten zudem darauf hin, dass Investoren beim Vorlie-
gen potentieller Indikatoren für die Qualität eines Start-ups bzw. bei weniger riskanten Investitionen, 
weniger Information akquirieren. In meiner dritten Studie, welche ich gemeinsam mit Joachim Gassen 
durchgeführt habe, untersuche ich den kausalen Effekt einer Online-Finanzschulung auf das Informa-
tions- und Investitionsverhalten von Crowdinvestoren im Rahmen eines Feldexperiments auf Compa-
nisto. Während das Experiment nach wie vor läuft, motiviert der in dieser Dissertation enthaltene 
Zwischenbericht die zugrundeliegende Forschungsfrage und beschreibt das Forschungsdesign. Unsere 
vorläufigen Ergebnisse zeigen auf, dass Crowdinvestoren im Vergleich zu repräsentativen Stichpro-
ben der Gesamtpopulation, welche vergleichbaren Studien zugrunde liegen, ein signifikant höheres 
Maß an finanzieller Grundkompetenz aufweisen. 
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 1 
An Introductory Summary 
In today’s global economic ecosystem, innovation constitutes a key determinant of sur-
vival (Audretsch 1995). Over the past decades, the ideas of a few visionaries that, particularly 
in Silicon Valley, have been rapidly translated into economic reality have gradually changed 
the economic landscape and social life around the world. Technological innovations like Ap-
ple’s iPhone, for example, that have triggered the abrupt downfall of blue-chip industry leaders 
such as Nokia have significantly increased pressure on businesses and economies, respectively, 
to strive for technological leadership and innovative edge (Vuori and Huy 2016). Consequently, 
the establishment of a political and economic environment in which innovative ideas can be 
turned into successful ventures has become one of the main objectives of the world’s political 
leaders.1 Nevertheless, a key obstacle to innovation continues to be the limited availability of 
early-stage financing. Despite all political aspiration and increased public funding, restrictive 
loan policies and relatively high costs of going public still prevent many entrepreneurs from 
realizing their ideas (Bradford 2012). 
In recent years, however, alternative forms of financial markets have emerged that are 
widely considered to exhibit the potential to (at least partially) close the financing gap for early-
stage ventures (Bradford 2012; Mollick 2014; Colombo et al. 2016). One prominent example 
is crowdinvesting. This relatively novel form of internet-based crowdfunding allows entrepre-
neurs to finance their ventures by collecting relatively small individual contributions from a 
relatively large number of individuals (Bradford 2012; Mollick 2014). In return for their con-
tributions, crowdinvestors typically obtain a right in the future cash flows of the start-up. Due 
                                                     
1  For example, on February 25, 2014, then U.S. President Barack Obama in a speech at the White House declared 
that “keeping America at the cutting edge of technology and innovation is what is going to ensure a steady 
stream of good jobs into the 21st century” and continued to describe innovation as “the single most important 
thing about American economy”. 
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to its internet-based and thus easily accessible nature and the usually small minimum invest-
ment amounts, crowdinvesting is particularly attractive for retail investors (Hornuf and 
Schwienbacher 2016). 
As it combines highly risky start-up investments and retail investors, the long-term suc-
cess of crowdinvesting will depend on regulators’ ability to find the right balance between in-
vestor protection and their objective to “cut away the red tape that prevents too many rapidly-
growing start-up companies from raising capital and going public”.2 Among other things, leg-
islators must decide on a minimum level of disclosures (investor education material) that start-
ups (so-called crowdinvesting portals) must provide to investors. Naturally, the optimal level 
of regulation should account for crowdinvestors’ actual information behavior and their ability 
to identify and process potentially relevant financial information (Mäschle 2012; Cumming and 
Johan 2013). 
My thesis adds to this topic by investigating (1) the role of start-ups’ disclosures for 
crowdinvestors’ investment behavior, (2) the extent and determinants of crowdinvestors’ infor-
mation acquisition, and (3) the effect of online financial education on crowdinvestors’ infor-
mation and investment behavior. For all three projects that constitute this thesis, I collaborate 
with Companisto3, one of the largest German crowdinvesting portals which allows me to use 
proprietary (anonymized) investor-level data for my analysis.4 
                                                     
2  On September 8, 2011, then U.S. President Barrack Obama addressed Congress in a joint session about jobs 
and the economy. 
3  The (English version of the) Companisto webpage, i.e., the setting and a large proportion of the data that I am 
using for my three thesis projects, can be accessed through https://www.companisto.com/en.  
4  As all three studies constituting this Ph.D. thesis investigate investor behavior in crowdinvesting (on 
Companisto), there are certain, and in some cases inevitable, similarities in the structure and contents of these 
studies. Specifically, as the order of the papers presented in this study reflects the chronology of their first 
drafts, my second (and third) study build(s) up on my first (and second) study. These similarities are particularly 
pronounced in the discussion of the related literature [pages 89 to 90 (151 to 152) of the second (third) paper 
build up on pages 12 to 13 and pages 23 to 29 of the first (and pages 89 to 90 of the second) paper], the 
description of the institutional environment [pages 91 to 97 (153 to 154) of the second (third) paper build up 
on pages 17 to 23 of the first (and pages 91 to 97 of the second) paper], and the (discussion of the) variables 
used in the empirical analysis [pages 98 to 103 of the second paper build up on pages 31 to 38 of the first 
paper]. As all three studies have not been previously published, for the scope of this dissertation, I generally 
abstain from self-quotations. However, in places, I discuss the results of my prior studies or name them as 
examples for prior findings. 
 3 
The first paper of my thesis, titled The Role of Disclosure in Crowdinvesting: Investor-
Level Evidence, explores how the extent of firms’ voluntary and typically unaudited disclosures 
on Companisto is associated with crowdinvestors’ investment behavior. For this purpose, I de-
velop two indices that capture the magnitude of firms’ voluntary disclosures related to (1) fi-
nancial information and (2) the attributes of the managing team. In addition, I account for firms’ 
‘soft’ disclosures by including the length of the pitch video as an additional disclosure measure. 
The usage of investor-level data allows me to explore how the association between firms’ dis-
closures and crowdinvestors’ investment behavior varies with investors’ characteristics (e.g., 
their demographics and investment experience). Specifically, based on investors’ profile infor-
mation on Companisto, I am able to differentiate between retail and institutional investors. Con-
sistent with the evidence provided by research on traditional capital markets (see Beyer et al. 
2010 for an overview), research on peer-to-peer lending (Michels 2012) and crowdinvesting 
(e.g., Ahlers et al 2015; Moritz et al. 2015; Block et al. 2016), my findings suggest that the 
likelihood of investments by both retail and institutional crowdinvestors is increasing in the 
magnitude of start-ups’ voluntary disclosures on Companisto. Specifically, I find that crowdin-
vestors are more likely to invest in start-ups that provide higher levels of forward-looking fi-
nancial disclosures and more information on the managing team. My results indicate that these 
associations are more pronounced for institutional investors. While my findings suggest that 
start-ups’ ‘soft’ disclosures (i.e., the pitch video) play a role in the decision-making of (inexpe-
rienced) retail investors, they appear to be irrelevant for the investment decisions of institutional 
investors. In line with these findings, I additionally show that not only the decision to invest but 
also the investment amount is increasing in the extent of start-ups’ voluntary financial disclo-
sures. 
In my study, I use large-scale investor-level data to empirically investigate the determi-
nants of crowdinvestors’ actual investment decisions. I thereby add to a series of papers that 
 4 
examine the drivers of ‘crowdinvesting success’ (e.g., Ahlers et al. 2015). Specifically, by ex-
ploring how crowdinvestors’ investment behavior is related to start-ups’ attributes (e.g., their 
disclosures) and by showing how these associations vary with investors’ demographics 
(i.e., age and gender), their level of sophistication, and crowdinvesting experience, I add to this 
stream of literature. 
My second thesis paper, titled Crowdinvestors’ Information Acquisition: An Analysis of 
Investor-Level Google Analytics Data, is closely related to my first project as it explores 
crowdinvestors’ information behavior. For this purpose, I use investor-level Google Analytics 
data that allows me to track down investors’ actual information acquisition on Companisto. 
Given that I am the first to use this relatively novel type of data in an investment context, my 
study does not only contribute to related research in crowdinvesting (Moritz et al. 2015; Bern-
stein et al. 2017), but also adds to a series of papers that use aggregate Google searches (Drake 
et al. 2012) or the download activity on EDGAR5 (e.g., Loughran and McDonald 2017) to 
provide direct evidence on investors’ information acquisition. Given the obvious constraints 
regarding the availability of investor-level data, prior research on investors’ information behav-
ior is largely based on survey (e.g., Elliott et al. 2008) or experimental evidence (e.g., Freder-
ickson and Miller 2004) (see Cascino et al. 2013, 2014 for an overview and a more detailed 
discussion). While it is not clear to which extent my results are representative for investors that 
engage in traditional capital markets, the crowdinvesting setting bears several advantages from 
a research perspective. Given the typically low legal disclosure requirements and relatively 
short operating history of early-stage start-ups, firms’ disclosures on crowdinvesting portals 
typically reflect a large fraction of their overall information environment (Bradford 2012; Mi-
chels 2012). More importantly, due to the internet-based nature of crowdinvesting, firms’ dis-
closures as well as investors’ information and investment behavior can all be observed on the 
                                                     
5  Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system.  
 5 
crowdinvesting portal. This allows for an investor-level analysis of crowdinvestors’ actual in-
formation behavior prior to investing. 
My results indicate that crowdinvestors tend to neglect a substantial fraction of start-
ups’ disclosures before investing. Specifically, I find that prior to only about 50 percent of all 
investments, investors access firms’ financial forecasts. Moreover, I show that investors’ infor-
mation acquisition varies with their demographics, their level of crowdinvesting experience as 
well as their (average) investment amounts. My findings are further consistent with investors 
acquiring less information in the presence of potential signals of start-up quality. Specifically, 
in line with related survey evidence (Moritz et al. 2015), I find that investors decrease their 
information acquisition following professional investments that are made and publicly dis-
closed during the crowdinvesting campaign. Moreover, my results indicate that investors’ in-
formation acquisition is negatively associated with the stage of the funding round with this 
association being more pronounced for more experienced crowdinvestors. Finally, my findings 
suggest that investors acquire less information for firms that hold patents and (thus) for less 
risky investments. 
The third paper of my thesis is co-authored by Joachim Gassen and titled Financial 
Education in the Crowdinvesting Market: Preliminary Evidence from a Randomized Field Ex-
periment. The overall objective of the project is to study the causal effect of online financial 
education on crowdinvestors’ information and investment behavior by conducting a field ex-
periment on Companisto. It therefore directly builds up on the evidence provided in my first 
and second project. While the experiment is still ongoing, the interim report included in my 
thesis motivates the overall research question and explains the research design. The report fur-
ther comprises an analysis of the determinants of program enrollment, participation, persistence 
and performance.  
 6 
The contents of the randomly administered online education program were designed in 
collaboration with Companisto to teach basic and start-up-related investment knowledge. Dur-
ing the treatment period, a randomly selected group of investors (our treatment group) was 
invited to participate in the online education program. The program contained a so-called Entry-
level-Test (ELT) that subjects were required to take before they obtained access to the education 
material which allowed us to measure the pre-treatment level of financial literacy of all enrolled 
individuals and to compare their level of financial literacy with levels of financial literacy doc-
umented in prior research. Consistent with related evidence (Krische 2014), we find that, com-
pared to survey samples representative for the overall population, (crowd)investors exhibit a 
significantly higher level of ‘basic’ financial literacy.  
Our results further indicate an overall positive association between program enrollment 
and investors’ crowdinvesting exposure. Furthermore, we find that very inexperienced 
crowdinvestors are also more likely to enroll, suggesting that our education program reaches its 
targeted audience. In line with this evidence, our findings further suggest that investors who 
assess their financial educational background to be weak are more likely to participate in finan-
cial literacy interventions and more persistent in their program attendance. Consistent with re-
lated research on the determinants of financial advice-seeking (e.g., Bachmann and Hens 2015), 
our results, however, indicate that overall, higher levels of financial literacy are also related 
positively to the likelihood of program participation and persistence. Finally, we document a 
positive association between program performance and participants’ advanced level of financial 
literacy and their investment skills.  
Once the experiment is completed, the project will further contribute to related research 
on the effects of financial literacy interventions (see Fernandes et al. 2014 for an overview) as 
we will be the first to provide evidence on the causal effect of financial education on individual 
information behavior.
 7 
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Abstract 
This study examines the role of disclosure for investment decisions in the crowdinvesting market. Using 
proprietary investor-level data from Companisto, one of the largest German crowdinvesting portals, I 
investigate how firms’ voluntary disclosures are associated with crowdinvestors’ investment decisions. 
More importantly, I show how this association varies with investors’ demographics, their level of so-
phistication and crowdinvesting experience. My findings are consistent with both retail and institutional 
investors being more likely to invest in start-ups that provide higher levels of forward-looking financial 
disclosures and more information on the managing team, with these associations being more pronounced 
for institutional investors. However, in contrast to institutional investors, the decision-making of (inex-
perienced) retail investors seems to be also influenced by start-ups’ ‘soft’ disclosures (i.e., the pitch 
video). The results of an additional analysis further reveal that not only the decision to invest, but also 
the investment amount is increasing in the extent of firms’ voluntary financial disclosures. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years6, crowdinvesting (CI)7 has emerged as an alternative source for external 
financing for early-stage entrepreneurial ventures (Bradford 2012; Mollick 2014; Mortiz and 
Block 2016)8. CI is a special form of internet-based crowdfunding (CF), in which so called CI 
portals (CIPs) take on the role of financial intermediaries, allowing start-up firms to offer debt 
and equity(like) securities to the general public. By advertising issuances on their portal 
webpage and via newsletters to their investor networks, CIPs enable firms to raise capital by 
collecting relatively small individual amounts from a relatively large number of investors (i.e., 
the crowd) over the internet. In return for their investments, crowdinvestors receive a claim in 
the future cash flows of the firm (Klöhn and Hornuf 2012; Mollick 2014; Hornuf and Schwien-
bacher 2016a,b, 2017). 
Compared to other forms of crowdfunding (e.g., lending-based crowdfunding) the mar-
ket volume of crowdinvesting is still relatively low (Massolution 2015). This is partly driven 
by the fact that crowdinvesting is subject to securities regulation (Bradford 2012; Klöhn et al. 
2016). In the U.S., for example, crowdinvesting has been restricted to accredited investors until 
May 2016 when Title III of the JOBS Act (i.e., the “Crowdfunding Act”) came into effect (Hor-
nuf and Schwienbacher 2016b). In many European countries, however, CIPs have a longer his-
tory in offering equity(like) securities to retail investors (Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016b, 
                                                     
6  As all three studies constituting this Ph.D. thesis investigate investor behavior in crowdinvesting (on 
Companisto), there are certain, and in some cases inevitable, similarities in the structure and contents of these 
studies. Specifically, as the order of the papers presented in this study reflects the chronology of their first 
drafts, my second (and third) study build(s) up on my first (and second) study. These similarities are particularly 
pronounced in the discussion of the related literature [pages 89 to 90 (151 to 152) of the second (third) paper 
build up on pages 12 to 13 and pages 23 to 29 of the first (and pages 89 to 90 of the second) paper], the 
description of the institutional environment [pages 91 to 97 (153 to 154) of the second (third) paper build up 
on pages 17 to 23 of the first (and pages 91 to 97 of the second) paper], and the (discussion of the) variables 
used in the empirical analysis [pages 98 to 103 of the second paper build up on pages 31 to 38 of the first 
paper]. As all three studies have not been previously published, for the scope of this dissertation, I generally 
abstain from self-quotations. However, in places, I discuss the results of my prior studies or name them as 
examples for prior findings. 
7  This form of crowdfunding is also referred to as investment-based crowdfunding, equity-based CF or securi-
ties-based CF (Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016b, 2017). 
8  Note that the descriptions in the entire following paragraph are based on Klöhn and Hornuf (2012), Mollick 
(2014), and Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2016a,b, 2017). 
 12 
2017). According to the European Alternative Finance Industry Report (2016), the European 
crowdinvesting market (excluding its biggest market, the UK) reached close to 160 mil-
lion Euro in volume in 2015 accounting for 16 percent of the total crowdfunding volume in this 
region. While, compared to established capital markets, the market size is still relatively low, it 
shows significant growth. In 2015 the volume of the European market increased by roughly 
80 percent (European Alternative Finance Industry Report 2016). 
Due to the combination of risk-capital investments, a prevalence of retail investors and 
severe information asymmetries, the emergence of CI has naturally attracted the attention of 
both regulators and scholars (Agrawal et al. 2014). While the former must handle the balancing 
act between investor protection and the exploitation of CI’s potential to fill the gap in early-
stage financing (Bradford 2012), to scholars CI offers a fruitful setting for research on retail 
investors. An important question in this setting is the question as to what drives the decision of 
crowdinvestors to invest in a specific start-up firm. To shed more light on this topic, I examine 
how firms’ voluntary disclosures are related to the investment behavior of different groups of 
crowdinvestors. 
In recent years, a growing body in the academic literature has examined the determi-
nants of fundraising success (i.e., the amount and frequency of contributions) in other forms of 
CF (see Belleflamme et al. 2015; Moritz and Block 2016; Wallmeroth et al. 2017 for an over-
view of the literature on CF). However, there is still relatively little empirical evidence on CI. 
Prior findings generally suggest that attributes of the managing team (e.g., Ahlers et al. 2015; 
Bernstein et al. 2017), investments by others (e.g., Kim and Viswanathan 2016; Vismara 2017a) 
and information updates by the firm (e.g., Block et al. 2016; Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016b; 
Dorfleitner et al. 2017) are related to the investment behavior of crowdinvestors. However, 
many prior studies on CI focus on the behavior of accredited (i.e., wealthy and/or sophisticated) 
investors, which might not be representative for the ‘general public’ (i.e., the crowd). Other 
 13 
studies use publicly observable data on individual investments. As this data is typically not 
matched on the investor-level, a differentiated analysis that exploits heterogeneity in investor 
characteristics is not possible. A recent exemption represents a study by Wallmeroth (2016) 
who uses hand-collected data from Companisto that he matches on the investor-level for a se-
lected sample9 of investors to analyze the likelihood of “unsuccessful investments” (i.e., invest-
ments in start-ups that went bankrupt) for different investor groups that he categorizes based on 
their number of investments and average investment amounts. Thus, by investigating how 
crowdinvestors’ investment propensity as well as their investment amounts are associated with 
firms’ voluntary (and forward-looking financial) disclosures and by using investor-level data 
to show how these associations vary with investors’ demographics (i.e., age and gender), their 
level of sophistication and crowdinvesting experience, I add to this stream of literature.  
Given that in many jurisdictions CI-specific regulations are lax or not yet in effect10, the 
structure of global CI markets and hence the disclosure requirements in the scope of CI offer-
ings are often shaped by existent national securities laws (Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2017). In 
Germany, for example, most CIPs have adopted investment models that neither require regis-
tration with the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) nor meet prospectus require-
ments (Klöhn and Hornuf 2012; Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2017).11 In consideration of the 
                                                     
9  As investors can hide their names and other information, for some investors, it should be hard if not impossible 
to reliably identify them based on the publicly available information (i.e., investment history of each crowdin-
vesting). Also, in case of multiple investments of one investor in a start-up, the aggregate investment amount 
is presented at the time of the first investment. As crowdinvestors’ decision to hide personal information might 
be related to their (other) characteristics and behavior, analyses based on self-constructed investor samples 
might lead to biased results. 
10  For an overview of the regulation of CI markets in selected (European) countries, see Hornuf and Schwien-
bacher (2017). 
11  On July 10, 2015, the German Retail Investor Protection Act (Kleinanlegerschutzgesetz) came into effect. 
However, as the sample period of my study ends in January 2015, this regulation had no effect on the data used 
in the scope of this study. Moreover, the act does not affect the exemption from prospectus requirements for 
the sale of certain forms of mezzanine financing (e.g., subordinated participation loans) if they are sold in a CI 
funding round and the total amount that the issuer offers on the CIP does not exceed 2.5 million Euro. However, 
the Act introduced increased disclosure requirements for start-ups that seek financing through crowdinvesting. 
See Klöhn et al. (2016) for a discussion of the novel regulation. 
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generally low legal disclosure requirements for small-sized firms, the magnitude of (non)finan-
cial information that fund-seeking firms must provide in the scope of CI listings is low and 
primarily set by CIPs (Mäschle 2012; Cumming and Johan 2013). Taking further into account 
the lack of operating history and hence the absence of (audited) financial statements, the (as-
sumptions underlying the) financial information disclosed on CIPs is typically not subject to 
documented third-party verification (Mäschle 2012; Michels 2012; Cumming and Johan 2013). 
Furthermore, in contrast to firms listed on established capital markets that normally use multiple 
channels to disclose their private information (e.g., conference calls, MD&A, management fore-
casts, etc.), for fund-seeking start-ups, CIPs typically represent the primary channel to com-
municate with potential investors (Michels 2012).12 Therefore, compared to most prior studies 
on voluntary disclosure, CF settings allow for a more complete measurement of the overall 
level of voluntary disclosure (Michels 2012). In addition to the information provided on Com-
panisto, for 10 (out of 33) firms in my sample, legally mandated (but unaudited) historical 
financial statements (i.e., an abbreviated balance sheet and notes) are publicly available during 
the funding period through the online-platform of the Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger).13 
While a large fraction of the disclosures that firms provide on CIPs are made voluntarily, 
their degree of reliability differs across content types. On Companisto, the financial information 
                                                     
12  Aside from the information presented on the CIP, entrepreneurs typically use the corporate webpage as well as 
their (private) social network channels to communicate with their personal network and other potential inves-
tors, respectively.  
13  For firms classified as “small” in accordance to the German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB), the 
disclosure requirements comprise an (unaudited) abbreviated balance sheet and notes, which must be filed with 
the Federal Gazette within 12 months after the fiscal year end. Access to firms’ financial information is pro-
vided through an online platform and usually free of charge. However, on December 14, 2012 the German 
Micro-Entities Amending Accounting Law (Kleinstkapitalgesellschaften-Bilanzrechtsänderungsgesetz, Mi-
croBilG) was passed, introducing an additional size category for “micro enterprises” (paragraph 267a HGB). 
Firms that fall below a certain size threshold can, instead of publication, deposit their financial statements. 
Deposited financial statements cannot be found through the search engine of the Federal Gazette, but can only 
be accessed through the German Company Register (Unternehmensregister) for a charge of five Euro. For one 
(nine) firm(s) in my sample, deposited (published) financial statements were accessible during the funding 
period. 
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provided is mostly forward-looking and therefore ex ante unverifiable by nature.14 Taking fur-
ther into account that no competent third-party audits (the consistency and plausibility of) the 
information, it is not clear whether investors regard entrepreneurs’ disclosed private infor-
mation as sufficiently credible as to consider it in the scope of their investment decisions (Left-
wich 1983; Blackwell et al. 1998; Mercer 2004). Analytical research on disclosure indicates 
that managers’ unverifiable disclosures can be credible in certain scenarios (Gigler 1994; 
Stocken 2000). However, whether these models are applicable to CI markets is unclear (Michels 
2012). Consequently, whether firms’ unaudited (and forward-looking financial) disclosures are 
associated with crowdinvestors’ investment decisions is an empirical question. 
An important feature of my setting is given by the fact that, at registration, investors on 
Companisto must select whether they use their account for “private” investments or as a “com-
pany”.15 Given that many “company” accounts belong to Venture Capital (VC) firms (i.e., in-
stitutional investors), I can differentiate between two different groups of investors that should, 
on average, differ with regard to their level of sophistication. A large body of empirical capital 
market research indicates that the usage and choice of information systematically varies with 
                                                     
14  Naturally, the specifics of the investment forms as well as the available set of information (i.e., the (mandated) 
content and structure of start-ups’ disclosures on Companisto) are subject to constant change (e.g., as a result 
of regulatory changes). The information presented in the remainder of this paper is therefore not necessarily 
representative for Companisto’s investment forms and the available set of information for the time after my 
sample period (see Gassen and Hemaidan 2017 and Hemaidan 2017 for a description of the investment forms 
and information requirements on Companisto as of September 30, 2017). Also, the disclosure requirements 
discussed in this paper do not consider firms’ contractual post-funding information obligations on Companisto. 
15  Investors with (“company“) “private“ accounts are required to provide information on their (firm’s registry 
and) tax identification number before investing. This information is used by the start-ups to deduct the capital 
gain tax from potential dividend payments. This process is coordinated with local tax authorities and requires 
the correct tax ID of each investor. As this study only considers investors whose portfolios comprise at least 
two start-ups, it is unlikely that the sample includes retail investors that falsely register as “companies” and 
vice versa. However, I cannot rule out that some of the “company“ accounts are used by private company 
owners. Nevertheless, as the full investment history for each listing is publicly disclosed on the CIP (including 
(firm) names), I can trace many publicly disclosed investments made with account names that indicate institu-
tional investors back to small VC firms. However, given that investors can hide their name, based on the pub-
licly available data, I am not able to assess the share of “company“ accounts that are used by professional risk 
capital providers. For “company“ investors that reveal their names (i.e., that can be identified as a firm), the 
mean (median) value of total assets amounts to 358,489 (115,159) Euro (at the time this analysis was conducted 
which, for some investors, deviates significantly from the time of their last investment on Companisto) with a 
minimum (maximum) amount of 762 (4,303,052) Euro. In turn, it is likely that some “private“ accounts belong 
to professional investors (i.e., business angels). Generally, both previously discussed cases should work against 
me finding significant (predictable) differences between the two types of investors. 
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investors’ level of sophistication (e.g., Elliott et al. 2008), suggesting that less sophisticated 
investors tend to ignore relevant information (e.g., Coram 2010; Bhattacharya et al. 2012) (see 
Cascino et al. 2013, 2014 for an overview and a more detailed discussion). Furthermore, as 
institutional investors, i.e., investors that do not invest on their private account, might – in com-
parison to retail investors – be requested to rationalize their investment decisions, they might 
place more weight on comparably reliable and/or objective information (e.g., Mason and Stark 
2004). More closely related to this study is the evidence on the behavior of capital providers in 
peer-to-peer lending markets which suggests that unverifiable disclosures are associated with 
lending decisions (Michels 2012; Duarte et al. 2012). However, given that equity and debt pro-
viders differ in their information requirements (Cascino et al. 2013, 2014) and since the deci-
sion to invest in a firm should be driven by more complex and ‘harder’ factors (e.g., future 
financial performance, business model, etc.) than the decision to lend money to another indi-
vidual, it is not clear whether this evidence generalizes to the investment behavior of (different 
groups of) crowdinvestors (Ahlers et al. 2015). 
To shed some light on this topic, I develop four measures for the magnitude of firms' 
voluntary disclosures. The first measure (fin_discl) is an index that captures the extent of (se-
lected) financial information (e.g., breakup of the (expected) revenue and costs, cash flow in-
formation, etc.) included in start-ups’ disclosures. Building up on related evidence on the se-
lection process of risk capital providers, suggesting that the attributes of the managing team are 
key decision criteria for VC investors and Business Angels (BA) (e.g., Mason and Stark 2004), 
I construct a second index that captures the extent of information provided on the managing 
team (team_discl). As additional proxies, I include the length of the pitch video (vid_length) 
and the total number of words included in firms’ narrative disclosures (overall_discl). 
Consistent with related evidence (e.g., Ahlers et al. 2015; Moritz et al. 2015; Block et 
al. 2016; Polzin et al. 2017), my findings suggest that the likelihood of investments as well as 
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the investment amount, for both, retail and institutional investors, are increasing in the extent 
of selected voluntary (forward-looking financial) disclosures that firms provide on Companisto. 
Compared to retail investors, institutional investors seem to place less (more) weight on rela-
tively ‘soft’ (‘hard’) information. Specifically, I find that the length of the pitch video is posi-
tively associated with the likelihood of (high) investments by retail investors, while not being 
associated with the investment propensity and the investment amounts of institutional investors. 
However, this finding varies with retail investors’ demographics and their level of crowdinvest-
ing experience. For crowdinvesting experienced investors aged 30 and above, for example, my 
results suggest that, analogous to institutional investors, there is no association between the 
likelihood of investment and firms’ soft disclosures (i.e., the length of the pitch video). My 
findings further suggest that, compared to female investors, forward-looking financial (team) 
disclosures are relatively less (more) important for male investors’ investment decisions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional 
background. Section 3 outlines related research and develops hypotheses. Section 4 describes 
the data and the research design. Section 5 discusses the main results and additional analyses, 
whereas Section 6 concludes. 
2 Institutional Background 
2.1 Defining Crowdinvesting 
As there is no common legal definition of crowdfunding, I follow Belleflamme et 
al. (2010:5) who describe CF as a form of fundraising that “involves an open call, essentially 
through the Internet, for the provision of financial resources either in form of donation or in 
exchange for some sort of reward (…)”. The literature typically identifies four major categories 
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of CF, which differ in the form of compensation that backers receive in return for their contri-
butions (Klöhn and Hornuf 2012; Ahlers et al. 2015; Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016a,b).16 
The donation-based model where individuals support a project without expecting any form of 
direct compensation (i.e., out of intrinsic motivation) is the most common form of CF. A prom-
inent example for a donation-based CF portal is Betterplace.org, which allows people to donate 
money to charitable projects (e.g., donation campaigns after natural disasters). In the reward-
based model on the other hand, backers are promised a non-monetary reward in return for their 
contributions. This type of CF is particularly popular in the financing of art projects and video 
games through platforms such as Kickstarter where backers usually receive the product (e.g., a 
music album) in exchange for their contribution. More recently, two different forms of CF, 
crowdlending and equity-based crowdfunding, have evolved. In these two models, contributors 
obtain a financial compensation in return for their investments. In crowdlending markets capital 
providers receive fixed interest payments and repayment of principal. A prominent example of 
a crowdlending portal is the peer-to-peer loan marketplace Prosper.com where borrowers ob-
tain loans directly from other individuals as a result of a reverse auction. Crowdinvesting typi-
cally describes the financing of early-stage ventures through online portals (i.e., CIPs). CI of-
ferings normally involve the sale of equity, debt or mezzanine securities and are therefore sub-
ject to securities regulation. In return for their investments, crowdinvestors usually receive a 
residual claim in the future cash flows of the firm, which is the reason why this form of CF is 
often referred to as equity-based CF (Klöhn and Hornuf 2012; Ahlers et al. 2015; Hornuf and 
Schwienbacher 2016a,b). 
2.2 Crowdinvesting Market Structure 
Despite structural differences across countries (e.g., Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2017), 
CI markets generally involve three key agents: 1) crowdinvesting portals, which take on the 
                                                     
16  Note that the descriptions in the entire following paragraph are based on Klöhn and Hornuf (2012), Ahlers et 
al. (2015), and Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2016a,b). 
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role of financial intermediaries, 2) fund-seeking start-up firms and 3) (mostly retail) investors 
(see Figure 1). Crucial for the emergence of CI as an alternative form for external financing for 
start-up firms are the services provided by CIPs (Hornuf and Schiwenbacher 2016a). By taking 
on the role of internet-based financial intermediaries, CIPs enable firms to raise capital by col-
lecting relatively small individual amounts from a relatively large number of investors (i.e., ‘the 
crowd’) over the internet (Mollick 2014; Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2017). Specifically, by 
handling all investment-related transactions, including the offer of standardized financial con-
tracts and the management of payments, CIPs allow entrepreneurs to fund their ventures at 
relatively low transaction costs (Bradford 2012). Furthermore, as in Germany most CIPs have 
adopted investment models that neither require registration with the Federal Financial Supervi-
sory Authority (BaFin) nor meet prospectus requirements (Klöhn and Hornuf 2012; Hornuf and 
Schwienbacher 2017), the information requirements that the issuers must meet, and thus, the 
direct costs of raising capital are relatively low (Bradford 2012; Mäschle 2012; Cumming and 
Johan 2013). Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2016a) further point out that aside from financial 
services, CIPs usually provide marketing and guidance to the entrepreneur and offer an investor 
network by advertising the securities on the portal webpage and via newsletters. In return for 
their services, they typically charge a predetermined commission of up to ten percent of the 
funded amount. Consequently, for start-up firms the direct costs of raising capital through CI 
only arise in case of successful funding (i.e., if the predetermined funding threshold is reached). 
If the required amount is not raised within the funding period, investments are typically returned 
to the investors.17 In many countries, it is common for CIPs to channel all financial transactions 
through a trust that earns up to two percent of the transaction value (Hornuf and Schwienbacher 
2016a).  
                                                     
17  As of January 2015, all funding rounds that were conducted on Companisto have passed the funding threshold. 
As of July 2017, three funding rounds that were conducted on Companisto were not successful (did not reach 
the funding minimum of 100.000 Euro). 
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[Figure 1 about here] 
The funding of a firm on a specific CIP is typically the outcome of a multi-layer selec-
tion process. If, for example, entrepreneurs’ decision to engage in CI is mainly driven by their 
incapability to convince traditional risk capital providers (i.e., VCs, BAs and banks) of their 
business idea, the ‘quality’ of start-ups on CIPs should, on average, be relatively low. However, 
given that many firms that conduct a crowdinvesting (e.g., on Companisto) have already re-
ceived ‘traditional’ venture capital before their crowdinvesting campaign, firms’ decision to 
engage in (i.e., select into) CI might rather lie in the fact that CI provides not only financing, 
but also public attention and a market signal regarding the demand for their product (Agrawal 
et al. 2014). Additionally, as in some countries (e.g., Germany) CIPs differ with regard to their 
investment models and information requirements, the decision to seek funding through a spe-
cific CIP might also be taken strategically.18 Taking further into account that CIPs selection 
criteria might favor specific types of start-up firms19 and are likely to vary across CIPs, empir-
ical evidence based on CIP data (i.e., the results of this study) might not generalize to other CI 
markets (Belleflamme et al. 2015). 
2.3 Crowdinvesting on Companisto 
Given that a CI-specific regulation had not been in effect in Germany until July 201520, 
the local CI-market has evolved within the scope of the existing national securities laws. The 
German Securities Prospectus Act (WpPG, Wertpapierprospektgesetz) which requires the prep-
aration of a prospectus for all security issuances that exceed 100,000 Euro within a 12-month 
                                                     
18  Naturally, CIPs also differ in size (i.e., the investor base and number of (simultaneous) issuances). As a high 
number of simultaneous issuances on a CIP might negatively affect the funding amount of each individual 
issuance, fund-seeking firms might, ceteris paribus, favour a CIP with a relatively small number of simultane-
ous fundings (Belleflamme et al. 2015). 
19  On its portal webpage (as of January 2015), Companisto, for example, provides rather general information on 
the criteria based on which it decides whether to host an issuance. It explains that it generally searches for 
“innovative and scalable start-ups (…) whose business model distinguishes them from competitors because of 
its new ideas and unique selling points. Also, the project should be beyond the concept stage.” 
20  See footnote 11. 
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time interval (Section 3 (2) Sentence 1 No. 5 a.F. of the WpPG), has long prevented offerings 
above this threshold. However, starting in 2012, the largest German CIPs (including Compa-
nisto) switched from silent partnerships (stille Beteiligungen) to financial contracts that do not 
meet the legal definition of a security.21 Specifically, by offering subordinated profit participat-
ing loans (partiarische Nachrangdarlehen), they managed to bypass the securities laws which 
allowed them to offer unlimited amounts within the scope of a single funding round (Klöhn and 
Hornuf 2012; Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2017)22. In this form of mezzanine financing, inves-
tors (do not) participate in the profits (losses) of a firm for a pre-defined holding period. Addi-
tionally, if the firm is sold within the holding period, investors receive a pro rata share of the 
acquisition price. In case that the firm has not been sold at the end of the participation period, 
the contract can be terminated by both parties, the start-up or the investors. Either way, investors 
receive a compensation that corresponds to their share in the re-evaluated firm value. The same 
procedure is followed in case of an exit after the end of the holding period (e.g., the sale of a 
pre-specified share of the start-ups’ equity). However, in contrast to equity shares, investors do 
not obtain any voting rights (Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016b). 
[Figure 2 about here] 
[Figure 3 about here] 
The (financial) information that Companisto requires fund-seeking firms to provide to 
potential investors includes general information on the product and the business model, which 
is presented in the “Overview”-Section of each listing. In addition, firms must create a pitch 
video in which the members of the managing board typically introduce themselves and the 
                                                     
21  As almost all investments in the form of silent partnerships took place in 2012, in my empirical analysis, I find 
that the respective year dummy is highly positively correlated with the indicator variable that differentiates 
between the two different financial contracts (Bravais-Pearson correlation coefficient: 0.84). Moreover, as its 
inclusion does not significantly affect the main regression results (Table 8) in direction or statistical signifi-
cance, I exclude the variable from my analyses. 
22  Note that the descriptions in the entire previous [following] paragraph are based on Klöhn and Hornuf (2012) 
as well as Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2017) [Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2016b)]. 
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firm’s business model. Moreover, Companisto requires each member of the managing team to 
provide a short profile with information on her (professional) background (see Figure 2). Fur-
thermore, firms must provide (a discussion of the assumptions underlying) selected financial 
information (e.g., EBIT forecasts) in the “Financial Data”-Section of each listing (see Figure 3). 
Start-ups that seek funding on Companisto are further required to determine a lower and upper 
bound for the capital sought in the scope of a funding round. The lower bound represents a 
threshold that must be reached for the funding to be successful. If the upper bound is reached, 
the funding round ends. Both, the lower and upper bound, are displayed to potential investors. 
This is also the case for the firm value, which is estimated by Companisto23 and used as the 
basis for the calculation of the participation rate24 (i.e., the share of equity that investors obtain 
per five Euro invested). Additionally, Companisto encourages firms to provide regular news 
updates and timely responses to investor questions on the bulletin board.25 In addition to firms’ 
disclosure, each listing contains a separate section, in which all prior investments by other in-
vestors (i.e., the investment date and amount, etc.) are disclosed. 
                                                     
23  On its portal webpage (as of January 2015), Companisto explains that it conducts the valuation of the start-up 
firms on its own and that this process “is influenced by a multitude of factors, which (…) [it has] developed in 
cooperation with corporate finance experts. These factors include, but are not limited to, the scalability of the 
business concept, the qualification of the management, the business plan, the market potential, the competitive 
situation, etc.”. However, Companisto has since changed its respective procedure in the sense that each start-
up must now self-assess the value of its equity. Based on this valuation, Companisto negotiates with the start-
up the lowest company value at which the start-up is willing to conduct a crowdinvesting.  
24  On Companisto, for example, firms generally offer five Euro tickets to investors (the minimum investment 
amount on Companisto has been raised to 100 Euro in June 2017). If the (pre-funding) value of the firm is 
determined to be 1,000,000 Euro and the maximum funding amount is set at 250,000 Euro, an investment of 
five Euro generally corresponds to a right on at least 0.0004 (5 / (1,000,000 + 250,000) percent of the future 
cash flows of the firm (Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2016b). Consequently, the effective participation rate de-
creases in the amount that has been funded in the scope of the issuance. However, the general terms are set by 
the start-up and are typically specified in the participation contract of each listing. 
25  It is important to note that messages on the issuance-specific bulletin boards do not automatically become 
public on Companisto. Instead, a firm can decide whether to make a request (and its own response message) 
visible to all investors. However, if the firm does not answer within a three-day window, the message automat-
ically becomes public. Firms might take this decision strategically in the sense that they choose (not) to publish 
any form of (negative) positive information (e.g., Verrecchia 1983). Consequently, the requests that are pub-
licly visible on a listing’s bulletin board should only represent a (biased) selection of all requests made in the 
scope of a funding round. Moreover, firms might use this private communication channel to disclose additional 
(potentially proprietary) information to certain investors that they may not want to share with the general pub-
lic.  
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In contrast to many other countries, where only accredited investors are entitled to invest 
on CIPs26, in Germany, CIPs are also open to non-accredited investors. Moreover, while mini-
mum investments on other German CIPs typically start at 250 Euro, on Companisto, the mini-
mum investment amount is five Euro.27 This allows all investors to engage in crowdinvesting 
(Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016b, 2017)28. 
3 Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Despite CF being a relatively novel phenomenon, there already exists a large body of 
empirical evidence on factors associated with fundraising success (i.e., the amount and fre-
quency of contributions) in different forms of CF. However, most studies focus on donation or 
reward-based CF, where contributions are mainly driven by an intrinsic motivation and/or the 
promise to receive the product to be developed (see Moritz and Block 2016 for a more detailed 
discussion). More closely related to this study is the evidence on the behavior of capital provid-
ers in crowdlending (i.e., peer-to-peer lending) markets, which suggests that objectively unin-
formative disclosures are associated with lending decisions (Duarte et al. 2012; Michels 2012). 
Specifically, the findings of Duarte et al. (2012) indicate that the interest rate that borrowers 
must pay is decreasing with their perceived trustworthiness. Of particular interest with regard 
to the focus of this study is the evidence provided by Michels (2012), who shows that voluntary 
and unverifiable disclosures made by borrowers in the scope of their loan listings on Pros-
per.com are negatively (positively) associated with the interest rate (the number of bids), indi-
cating that lenders consider these disclosures when making lending decisions.  
                                                     
26  In some countries [e.g., the U.S. where Title III of the JOBS Act (i.e., “the Crowdfunding Act”) has recently 
been adopted] start-up investments on CIPs are [were long] restricted to accredited investors (see SEC 2015, 
for an overview of the new regulation and Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2017 for a discussion of country-specific 
CI regulation). 
27  The maximum investment amount is individually set by each start-up and therefore varies across issuances. 
See Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2016b) for an overview of the specific business models applied by CIPs in 
Germany. 
28  Note that the descriptions in the entire previous paragraph are based on Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2016b, 
2017). 
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 The first study to empirically investigate the determinants of success of CI funding 
rounds is Ahlers et al. (2015). Using data from the Australian crowdinvesting site ASSOB, the 
authors show that firm (e.g., the presence of a financial roadmap) and management attributes 
(e.g., the share of board members that hold a MBA) are related to fundraising success, i.e., the 
funding amount, the number of investors and the duration of financing rounds. This is consistent 
with the findings of Bernstein et al. (2017), who conduct a randomized field experiment in 
which they find that information on the founding team plays an important role in the selection 
process of accredited (crowd)investors. Other studies provide ambiguous evidence for the ex-
istence of behavioral biases (i.e., herding) in the CI market (e.g., Hornuf and Schwienbacher 
2016b; Kim and Viswanathan 2016; Vismara 2017a). Closely linked to my study is the evi-
dence provided by Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2016b), who use unmatched investment data 
(i.e., individual anonymous investments that cannot be matched on the investor-level) gathered 
from three German CIPs to examine factors associated with the frequency and amount of in-
vestments. Their results suggest that the investment frequency increases after information up-
dates and the investment by other investors. In line with this evidence are the results provided 
by Block et al. (2016) who find a positive association between funding success and the extent 
of information updates. Using hand-collected data from Companisto, the authors find that this 
effect varies with the content of the updates. Consistent with these findings is the evidence 
provided by Polzin et al. (2017). Using survey data, the authors find that the information pro-
vided in different types of crowdfunding campaigns is generally considered by funders in the 
scope of their investment decisions. For a small sub-sample of crowdinvesting-related invest-
ments, their evidence further indicates that the relevance of start-ups’ disclosures varies with 
investor demographics and the investment amount.  
Analytical disclosure research (see Beyer et al. 2010 for an overview and a more de-
tailed discussion of the analytical disclosure literature) suggests that in the absence of (direct) 
costs of disclosure, investors are likely to ignore managers’ unverifiable disclosures as they 
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consider them untruthful (Stocken 2000). However, Gigler (1994) shows that if the provided 
information is proprietary and its publication therefore costly, firms’ voluntary disclosures can 
be credible. For early-stage ventures, whose distinct feature usually lies in an innovative busi-
ness idea, specific information on the business model and its profitability should be proprietary 
in nature. Moreover, Stocken (2000) shows that in repeated cheap-talk games, firms can have 
incentives to build up a reputation for truthful disclosure (Beyer et al. 2010)29. On Companisto 
it is not uncommon for firms to repeatedly raise capital in the scope of several distinct funding 
rounds.30 As their forward-looking financial disclosures are typically at least partially verifiable 
(in an ex post sense), firms might have an incentive to report truthfully (Belleflamme et al. 
2015). In addition, the unaudited disclosures related to the background, education level and 
professional experience of members of the managing board can be to some extent verified be-
fore investing through an internet inquiry (e.g., by examining the information provided on their 
private social media profiles). However, as the acquisition of information (additional to the 
disclosures made on the CIP) creates costs, it is not clear whether investors are always (e.g., 
when they invest small amounts) willing to spend the required amount of time and money to 
conduct a due diligence (Agrawal et al. 2014; Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016a). Nevertheless, 
in CI, where investors can share information through bulletin boards and the social media chan-
nels of the entrepreneurs and their firms, information acquisition becomes a collective effort. 
Building up on Surowiecki (2004), who refers to the underlying phenomenon as ‘the wisdom 
of crowds’, it would be sufficient if only one investor acquired and shared the respective infor-
mation (Bradford 2012; Schwienbacher and Larralde 2012; Agrawal et al. 2014; Mollick and 
Nanda 2015). Moreover, as there is no secondary market for shares acquired on Companisto, 
investors have no clear incentive to withhold this information. Given that it is not unlikely that 
members of the personal networks of the entrepreneurial team screen the information provided 
                                                     
29  Note that the discussion in the entire previous paragraph is based on Beyer et al. 2010. 
30  As of January 2015, from the 37 listings on Companisto, two represented second funding rounds of already 
listed firms.  
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on Companisto, misreporting might be detected and made public. As this should hurt the repu-
tation of the entrepreneur(s) and the firm, misreporting should be costly (i.e., negatively affect-
ing the funding amount). Entrepreneurs should therefore have an incentive to report truthfully 
(e.g., Stocken 2000). 
The empirical research on disclosure suggests that market participants consider unveri-
fiable (Price 2000; Leone et al. 2007; Michels 2012) and (thus) unaudited (e.g., Hodge 2001; 
Mercer 2004) information in their decision-making. However, most empirical studies on (the 
capital market effects of) voluntary disclosure traditionally focus on firms publicly listed on 
established capital markets (Beyer et al. 2010; Michels 2012). Building up on Michels (2012), 
I argue that due to the systematic differences between (firms listed on) major stock exchanges 
and (firms listed on) CIPs, it is not clear to what extent this evidence relates to the results of the 
empirical analyses in the scope of this study. One reason for potential differences lies in the fact 
that due to the extensive mandatory disclosure requirements, voluntary information typically 
represents a relatively small fraction of the information environment of firms listed on regulated 
stock exchanges. Due to their lack in operating history and thus the absence of audited financial 
statements, the voluntary unaudited disclosures that firms provide on Companisto should, in 
contrast, reflect a large fraction of their overall information environment and should therefore 
be more relevant to potential investors. Moreover, while firms listed on established capital mar-
kets normally use multiple channels to (voluntarily) disclose their private information (e.g., 
management calls, forward-looking report), in my setting, the CIP represents firms’ primary 
channel to communicate with potential investors. Compared to many prior studies, this allows 
for a more complete measurement of firms’ overall level of voluntary disclosure (Mi-
chels 2012)31.  
                                                     
31  Note that the discussion in the entire previous paragraph is based on Michels (2012), who conducts a compa-
rable analysis in the peer-to-peer lending market.  
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Empirical research on the capital market effects of disclosure suggests that firms’ vol-
untary disclosures reduce the degree of investors’ estimation risk, which, under certain condi-
tions, increases the likelihood of investments (i.e., liquidity) (Beyer et al. 2010). However, 
given the structural differences compared to traditional capital markets (e.g., the absence of a 
secondary market), in CI markets, the effects of disclosure might follow a different mechanism. 
Moreover, it is not clear whether investors generally regard firms’ voluntary disclosures as suf-
ficiently credible as to consider them in the scope of their investment decisions. Therefore, my 
first hypothesis (in alternative form) is: 
H1: Crowdinvestors’ investment decisions are associated with the extent of firms’ volun-
tary disclosures 
The selection criteria of risk capital providers, i.e., venture capitalists (VCs) (McMillan 
et al. 1985, 1987; Hall and Hofer 1993; Kollmann and Kuckertz 2010) and business angels 
(BAs) (e.g., Mason and Stark 2004; Maxwell et al. 2011), have been extensively studied. Since 
historical information on firm performance is usually unavailable, risk-capital providers must 
often rely on signals of quality (e.g., the ability and personal characteristics of the management 
team) when evaluating start-up investments (Agrawal et al. 2014; Vismara 2017b). With the 
emergence of CI, non-professional retail investors are facing similar investment decisions as 
VCs and BAs (Mollick 2013).32 As on most German CIPs, any full-aged individual with a 
working internet connection is just a few clicks away from an investment, crowdinvestors 
should, on average, be less sophisticated than business angels and venture capital investors, 
respectively (Fink 2012; Schwienbacher and Larralde 2012; Agrawal et al. 2014; Heminway 
2014; Macht and Weatherston 2014; Kim and Viswanathan 2016). However, Mollick (2013) 
finds that capital providers in crowdfunding markets for technology entrepreneurships trust in 
similar quality signals as VCs (e.g., entrepreneurial quality). Furthermore, the results of Mollick 
                                                     
32  Note that the discussion in the entire following paragraph is based on Moritz and Block (2016). 
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and Nanda (2015) support the notion that there is a high degree of congruence in the evaluation 
processes of ‘the crowd’ and (‘industry’) experts. In their study, the authors conducted a survey 
in which 30 theater experts were asked to evaluate theater projects that had been previously up 
for funding on Kickstarter. The results were then compared with the actual funding decision of 
the crowd (see Moritz and Block 2016 for a more detailed discussion of the crowdfunding lit-
erature).  
Capital market research generally suggests that investors systematically differ in their 
information behavior (see Cascino et al. 2013, 2014 for an overview and a more detailed dis-
cussion of the literature on the information behavior of different investor groups). A large part 
of this evidence stems from survey data suggesting that investors’ usage and choice of infor-
mation varies with their level of sophistication (e.g., Ernst et al. 2005, 2009; Elliott et al. 2008). 
Experimental evidence further suggests that less sophisticated investors tend to ignore relevant 
information (e.g., Coram 2010; Bhattacharya et al. 2012). Nevertheless, there is only little mar-
ket-based evidence on the association between the quality of (non)financial information and the 
investment behavior of individual investors. Despite the high interest of both regulators and 
scholars in this field of research, the limited availability of investor-level trading data has long 
prevented researchers from directly addressing this question. A notable exemption is a study 
conducted by Lawrence (2013) who uses discount brokerage data on individual investors’ trad-
ing behavior and demographics to show that retail investors invest more and obtain higher re-
turns in firms with more concise and better readable financial disclosures and that these asso-
ciations are less pronounced for investors with a professional background (Cascino et al. 2013, 
2014)33. 
In sum, the empirical evidence on investors in traditional capital markets indicates that 
retail and institutional investors differ in their information preferences and ability to process 
                                                     
33  Note that the discussion in the entire previous paragraph is based on Cascino et al. (2013, 2014). 
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information. To investigate whether these findings can also be observed in the crowdinvesting 
market, my second hypothesis (in alternative form) is: 
H2: Retail and institutional crowdinvestors differ with regard to the relation between their 
investment decisions and (the extent of) firms’ voluntary disclosures 
4 Data and Research Design 
4.1 Data 
The dataset used in this study comprises information on the demographics (e.g., age, 
gender, place of residency) and investments (including the date and amount) of 10,027 crowdin-
vestors registered at Companisto as of January 2015. The sample includes all investments 
(28,768) made on Companisto between June 2012 and January 2015 in the scope of 37 funding 
rounds of 35 unique firms.34 Firms’ narrative disclosures on Companisto are typically available 
in several languages. However, as some firms provide certain information (i.e., the pitch-video) 
exclusively or differently in the German version of the CIP, I only include investments from 
German-speaking countries (i.e., Austria, German or Switzerland). To exclude investments 
made by individuals, who are friends or family members of a fund-seeking entrepreneur, I ex-
clude investors whose portfolio on the CIP comprises less than two distinct firms. If their pri-
mary motivation for registration is to support a friend or family member, it is likely that the first 
investment decision of friends and family members is taken independently from the information 
disclosed on Companisto (e.g., Agrawal et al. 2014, 2015). Moreover, even if they are solely 
profit-oriented, investors that are part of the personal network of an entrepreneur are likely to 
have private information about the entrepreneur and/or the firm and are therefore excluded.  
                                                     
34  Naturally, the number of crowdinvestings has increased since January 2015. However, I limit my sample to 
the crowdinvestings presented in Figure 5 because, for my sample period, the information environment on 
Companisto remained more or less unchanged. The subsequent crowdinvestings included several videos (“EBS 
Technologies” and “Freygeist”), no information in the “Team Section” (“EBS Technologies”) or reflected the 
sale of fixed-interest (debt) securities which were issued to finance a movie (“Wie Männer über Frauen 
denken”). Finally, in April 2015, the German Retail Investor Protection Act (Kleinanlegerschutzgesetz) which 
significantly increased information requirements for crowdinvesting was passed. On Companisto, the increased 
disclosure requirements were already implemented before the new legislation came into effect in July 2015.  
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[Table 1 about here] 
The main empirical analyses of this study are conducted on the transaction level with 
each observation representing a transaction in t that involves investor i and firm j. This allows 
me to explore differences across firms, individuals and time. As the main objective of this study 
is to examine the association between firms’ disclosures and the likelihood of investments by 
crowdinvestors, my main dependent variable (invested) is coded binary with the value one in-
dicating that investor i is invested in firm j. Since I cannot observe the decision of an investor 
not to invest in a firm, I am confronted with the problem of generating transactions (i.e., inves-
tor-firm pairs) that reflect cases in which investors actively (i.e., after screening the disclosed 
information) decide not to invest in a specific start-up. A straight-forward (naïve) approach to 
generate non-investments, i.e., transactions for which the value of invested equals zero, would 
be to take each case in which an investor did not invest in a firm that was funded after she 
registered on Companisto. However, as it is possible that she was simply not active (anymore) 
during the funding period and did not receive or read the newsletter, I follow an alternative and 
more restrictive approach.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
[Figure 5 about here] 
As illustrated in Figure 4, I generate a non-investment for investor i and firm j, if inves-
tor i does not (i.e., neither before nor after her investment in firm k) invest in firm j, which is 
being funded at the same time as she invests in firm k. As there are typically more than two 
open fundings at a given point in time (see Figure 5), an investment in one firm can generally 
trigger the generation of more than one non-investment. To make an investment, investors must 
be logged on to Companisto. As the number of simultaneously funded firms does not exceed 
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five listings, the likelihood that investor i crosses and maybe even screens the information re-
lated to the funding of firm j is higher than in the naïve approach. Following this rationale, the 
date at which investor i invests in firm k is adopted as the transaction date for the non-invest-
ment of investor i in firm k. Thus, following this methodology, 26,081 non-investments are 
generated. 
In a next step, all transactions related to the sale of debt securities are excluded. More-
over, as the first offering on the portal was conducted by Companisto itself, all related transac-
tions (i.e., investments and non-investments) are eliminated. Finally, all investor-firm pairs as-
sociated with second funding rounds of firms already listed on Companisto are excluded as the 
decision (not) to invest in these firms could be related to the first funding round. The final 
sample comprises 26,968 investor-firm pairs (i.e., transactions) that represent combinations of 
3,900 unique investors and 33 firms, including (11,173) 15,795 (non-)investments. 
4.2 Measuring Firms’ Disclosure  
To investigate the association between firms’ voluntary (and mostly forward-looking) 
financial) disclosures and crowdinvestors’ investment decisions, I develop two indices that cap-
ture the extent of firms’ disclosures related to financial information (fin_discl) and related to 
personal information on the managing team (team_discl). Additionally, to account for the over-
all level of firms’ (narrative) disclosures, I control for the total number of words included in 
firms’ narrative disclosures (overall_discl).35 Building up on survey evidence suggesting that 
the pitch video plays an important role in crowdinvestors’ decision-making (e.g., Moritz et al. 
2015), I further include the length of the pitch video (vid_length). The video typically contains 
                                                     
35  Firms regularly provide information updates, which are not accounted for in the scope of this study as their 
disclosure might be affected by the funding-process (e.g., the frequency and aggregated amount of investments, 
etc.) Nevertheless, as some studies show that the number and frequency of information updates by the firm is 
positively associated with crowdinvesting success, I run additional (untabulated) regressions including the 
number of updates at the investment date. However, as the number of updates is highly positively correlated 
with %funded (Bravais Pearson correlation coefficient: 0.72) and my main regression results (Table 8) do not 
significantly change in direction and statistical significance, I do not consider this variable in my analyses. 
 32 
information on the managing team and the business model. Moreover, it provides investors with 
a personal impression of the entrepreneurial team (Moritz et al. 2015). Given that evidence 
from peer-to-peer lending indicates that appearance-based judgments are related to financial 
decisions (Duarte et al. 2012; Ravina 2012), the pitch video might be of particular relevance 
for those investors whose investment decisions are rather based on their gut feeling than on an 
extensive due diligence (Moritz et al. 2015; Guenther et al. 2015). All four disclosure variables 
are measured at the beginning of the crowdinvesting campaign.36  
4.2.1 Financial Disclosure Index (fin_discl) 
On Companisto, the requirements with regard to financial disclosures have been rela-
tively constant over time (i.e., across listings) and comprise selected financial items (e.g., fi-
nancial ratios) that are presented in a standardized form in the “Financial Data”-Section of each 
listing (see Figure 2). This further includes the firm value as estimated by Companisto.37 Addi-
tionally, firms are required to provide forecasts of revenues and expenditures (and hence EBIT 
and return on sales forecasts) for the current and the four years subsequent to the funding round 
along with a discussion of the underlying assumptions.38 However, there are no specific re-
quirements regarding the contents of these disclosures.  
All additional financial information is provided on a voluntary basis and mostly for-
ward-looking in nature. These disclosures are not subject to any form of documented third-
party verification.  
[Table 2 about here] 
                                                     
36  While firms provide regular information updates, they do normally not change the initial disclosures during 
the crowdinvesting campaign. 
37  See footnote 23. 
38  Depending on the timing of the crowdinvesting campaign, the first-year estimates might (to some extent) have 
already been realized at the beginning of the crowdinvesting and therefore do not (fully) reflect forward-look-
ing information. 
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To test the association between these disclosures and crowdinvestors’ investment deci-
sions, I develop a financial disclosure index (fin_discl), which grades each listing with regard 
to the presence of selected financial information [e.g., information on the application of the 
funds, key performance indicators (KPIs)39, etc.] that is provided in addition to projected in-
come and/or cash flow statements. For this purpose, I build up on accounting research on the 
quality of forward-looking disclosures of firms listed on established capital markets (e.g., Mars-
ton and Shrives 1991; Wang et al. 2008; Barth 2009) to generate an initial list of items that are 
assumed to be decision-relevant for potential investors in my setting. In a next step, I drop all 
items on which all firms provide information. The final list comprises seven items for which at 
least one firm in the sample provided disclosures (see Table 2). One point is awarded for each 
presented item. The disclosure score (fin_discl) is then calculated on the firm-level as the 
(equally weighted) sum of all points.40 Table 3 shows the summary statistics of (each compo-
nent of) the financial disclosure index.41 
[Table 3 about here] 
4.2.2 Team Disclosure Index (team_discl) 
Aside from a picture and links to their personal social media channels, the profiles of 
the board members typically include information on their demographics, their level of education 
and professional experience. However, as there are no requirements with regard to the structure 
and specific contents of these disclosures, the magnitude and depth of information provided in 
this section strongly varies across board members and firms, respectively (see Table 3). 
                                                     
39  This also includes non-financial KPIs.  
40  As there is no information on the relative information preferences of crowdinvestors, I use equal weights on 
all items included in the calculation of fin_discl. Some related studies that look at investors on traditional capital 
markets (e.g., Barth 2009) weight disclosure items, for example, based on survey evidence on the information 
preferences of different capital market participants (i.e., analysts and investors). 
41  For a correlation matrix of the different disclosure items, see Panel A in Appendix A2.  
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Analogously to the development of fin_discl, I generate a team disclosure index 
(team_discl) which grades each listing with regard to the presence of voluntarily disclosed in-
formation on members of the management board. One point is granted for each item disclosed 
that is related to the general interests, the level of education (i.e., degree, place, and field of 
study) and the professional experience (i.e., employer, industry and duration employed) of a 
board member. The total number of items (i.e., the maximum score) is seven. For each firm, 
team_discl is then calculated as the (unweighted) average disclosure score per board member.42 
4.3 Control Variables 
Building up on prior research (Ahlers et al. 2015; Moritz et al. 2015; Hornuf and 
Schwienbacher 2016b; Block et al. 2017; Vismara 2017a), I further control for selected issu-
ance attributes and funding dynamics.   
As historical information on the performance of start-up firms is generally rare, signals 
of quality play an important role in reducing information asymmetries and overcoming market 
failure, respectively (Agrawal et al. 2014). Related evidence on the selection process of profes-
sional risk capital providers suggests that the attributes of the entrepreneurial team are key de-
cision criteria for VCs and BAs (e.g., Mason and Stark 2004).43 Hence, the business skills of 
the firm’s board members (e.g., the ability to prepare consistent and reasonable financial fore-
casts) and their understanding of corporate law (e.g., legal form, contract design, etc.) should, 
ceteris paribus, positively affect the development of a start-up firm. As this should hold irre-
spectively of a firm’s industry, I include a binary variable that takes on the value one (zero) if 
at least one of the board members holds a degree in business or law (team_buslaw). Moreover, 
as industry-specific knowledge and/or work experience of a start-up’s board members should, 
                                                     
42  For a correlation matrix of the different disclosure items, see Panel B in Appendix A2. 
43  Note that the discussion in the entire following paragraph is based on Miloud et al. (2012) and Ahlers et al. 
(2015). 
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ceteris paribus, increase the likelihood of its future success, I further include an indicator vari-
able that takes on the value one (zero) if at least one (no) member of the management board has 
already gained industry-specific experience at funding-start (team_industry_exp). Additionally, 
it might be helpful if at least one of a start-up’s board members has already gained work expe-
rience (either as a founder or as an employee) related to early-stage ventures and might therefore 
be familiar with the key success and risk factors of early-stage ventures as well as key players 
in the (local) start-up community. I therefore include a binary coded variable that takes on the 
value one (zero) if at least one (no) member of the managing board has already gained start-up-
related work experience (team_start-up_exp) (Miloud et al. 2012; Ahlers et al. 2015).44  
Additionally, I include the ratio of the maximum funding amount and the sum of the 
firm value as calculated by Companisto and the maximum funding amount (%eq_offered). In-
vestors might consider %eq_offered informative with regard to the firm’s (expected) capital 
requirements (i.e., investment opportunities). A high value of %eq_offered might thus be per-
ceived as a positive signal with regard to the managing board’s expectation regarding the firm’s 
growth potential. However, a high value of %eq_offered could also raise concerns as to whether 
the managing board can efficiently employ the collected funds. Furthermore, the higher the 
value of %eq_offered, the lower the percentage of equity retained by the entrepreneurial team. 
A high value of %eq_offered could therefore also be regarded as a negative signal with regard 
to the managing boards’ future commitment (Ahlers et al. 2015)45. 
Following Ahlers et al. (2015), I further control for the number of employees (#staff). 
A high value of #staff might be anticipated as an indicator of high (expected) revenues and/or 
a high capital base, which both should positively affect investors’ assessment of the firm’s 
quality. Moreover, a high number of employees suggests that the entrepreneurial team managed 
                                                     
44  Several studies document that the (industry) experience and track record of the managing team represent im-
portant investment decision criteria for professional risk capital providers (see Maxwell et al. 2011 for an 
overview).  
45  Note that the discussion in the entire previous paragraph is based on Ahlers et al. (2015). 
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to convince many people of the firm’s potential. However, a clear prediction with regard to the 
association between #staff and the investment propensity is not possible. The same holds for 
the number of years that a firm has been in business (years_i_b)46, which could be anticipated 
as an indicator of the entrepreneurs’ commitment. Nevertheless, in combination with other firm 
attributes [e.g., a high (self-assessed) number of years to break even, etc.] a long operating 
history might also be anticipated as a bad signal regarding a firm’s quality. In the absence of 
any prior investments from banks and/or other risk capital providers, a high value of years_i_b 
could further suggest that professional investors consider the firm as a bad investment. Conse-
quently, for crowdinvestors that follow this line of thought, the share of capital provided by 
third parties should be positively linked to their investment propensity (Ahlers et al. 2015)47. 
Furthermore, as risk capital investors often provide not only financing, but also business advice 
(e.g., Sapienza 1992), monitoring services (e.g., Gompers 1995) and access to their business 
network (e.g., Barry et al. 1990), professional investments might generally be regarded as a 
positive signal by investors. I therefore control for the share of equity held by VCs, BAs and 
other third parties at funding start (%held_by_third) (Ahlers et al. 2015). In addition, as the 
information based on which Companisto evaluates the firm might partially be proprietary and 
therefore not publicly disclosed, the assessed firm value should incorporate private information 
of the firm’s management and should therefore be informative for investors. Hence, I control 
for the value of the firm as estimated by Companisto (value). Consistent with related evidence 
on the selection criteria of professional risk capital providers (e.g., Häussler et al. 2012), I fur-
ther control for another potential signal of quality, the presence of at least one patent (patent) 
(Ahlers et al. 2015). 
                                                     
46  It is important to note that the number of years in business that is disclosed on Companisto (and thus the 
duration used in this study) relates to the number of years that a firm has been operating under its legal form 
(e.g., limited liability company) as of the start of the funding round. The actual number of years in business 
might therefore be larger.  
47  Note that the discussion in the entire previous paragraph is based on Ahlers et al. (2015). 
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Another aspect that might affect crowdinvestors’ investment decisions is whether firms 
grant non-monetary rewards for investments above or equal to certain pre-defined thresholds. I 
therefore include a binary coded variable (rewards) with one indicating that rewards are granted 
in return for investments, which applies to 13 firms in the sample.  
Apart from firm attributes, I account for potential effects of the funding dynamics on 
crowdinvestors’ investment decisions. Behavioral biases such as herding, for example, whose 
presence has been extensively documented in finance research (e.g., Scharfstein and Stein 1990; 
Sias 2004), might be of particular relevance in CI markets, where firms have a generally low 
overall information environment. However, while this phenomenon seems to be present in the 
scope of peer-to-peer lending (Herzenstein et al. 2011; Lee and Lee 2012), the evidence in 
crowdinvesting markets is ambiguous (Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016b; Kim and Viswana-
than 2016; Vismara 2017a). To account for the effect of prior investments on crowdinvestors’ 
investment propensity, I include %funded, which represents the ratio of aggregated fundings on 
the investment date and the total funding amount.48  
Given that investors’ wealth and time is limited, the propensity of an investment in a 
firm should be negatively associated with the opportunity set on the CIP. I therefore control for 
the number of open fundings on the investment date (opp). Capital market research further in-
dicates that limited attention affects the investment behavior of retail investors (e.g., Hirshleifer 
and Teoh 2003). However, whether this phenomenon is present in CI markets, in which the 
number of simultaneous fundings and the frequency of information events (i.e., information 
updates, new fundings, etc.) are relatively low, is questionable.  
Lastly, I include a binary coded variable (hist_fin_stat) with one (zero) indicating that, 
at the investment date, historical financial statements of the firm are (not) publicly available 
                                                     
48  My main regression results w.r.t. the different disclosure measures (Table 8) remain unchanged in direction 
and statistical significance if I use the ratio of accumulated investments and the maximum sought capital as a 
proxy for the funding process.  
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through the online-platform of the Federal Gazette. Given the fast-changing nature of early 
stage firms’ financial situation and the fact that small firms have up to 12 months after the end 
of fiscal year to file the required disclosures, the balance sheet information might not be very 
informative with regard to the current financial situation of the firm. Still, it might give an 
insight into firms’ capital structure, i.e., the (relative) amount of debt, information that is typi-
cally not included in firms’ financial disclosures on Companisto. Although the financial state-
ments do not have to be audited, they are legally mandated and must be prepared in accordance 
with the German Commercial Code (HGB). The information should therefore be considered as 
more reliable to potential investors than firms’ unaudited (and mostly forward-looking) volun-
tary financial disclosures provided on the CIP. Nevertheless, compared to the financial (state-
ment) information on the CIP, firms’ historical financial statements are typically outdated and 
might therefore be regarded as less relevant (i.e., less informative with regard to the future 
financial position of the firm) by investors. However, the historical balance sheet information 
might be used by investors to assess of the assumptions underlying firms’ financial forecasts 
on Companisto (see Hand 2005 for a related discussion).  
4.4 Model 
The focus of this study lies on the association between invested, the dependent variable, 
and the four disclosure measures (i.e., overall_discl, fin_discl, team_discl and vid_length). 
Model (1) tests H1’s prediction that there is an association between firms’ voluntary disclosures 
and the investment propensity of crowdinvestors:49 
investedi,j,t = β0 + β1 overall_disclj + β2 fin_disclj + β3 team_disclj + β4 vid_lengthj 
+ β5 hist_fin_statj,t + β6 oppt + β7 %fundedj,t + β8 %eq_offeredj  
+ β9 %held_by_thirdj + β10 valuej + β11 years_i_bj + β12 years_2_bej 
+ β13 patentsj + β14 rewardsj + β15 team_buslawj  
+ β16 team_industry_expj + β17 team_start-up_expj + β18 #staffj + ɛi,j,t  (1) 
                                                     
49  See Appendix A1 for a definition of the regression variables. 
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To control for the effect of firm attributes and funding dynamics on the investment pro-
pensity, I include all variables introduced in the previous section as controls. I conduct the 
analysis on the transaction-level with each observation representing a transaction in t that in-
volves investor i and firm j.  
5 Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
5.1.1 Investor-Level 
Table 4 reports the sample composition (investor attributes) by investor type (as of Jan-
uary 2015). As shown in Panel B, 67.49 percent of the retail investors are aged between 20 and 
39 years.50 Only a small share of investors (1.90 percent) are registered as a “company“. Sum-
mary statistics of investor attributes (see Table 5) show that the mean (median) age of retail 
investors is 36.30 (34.22). Most retail investors (89 percent) are male (= 1). As of January 2015, 
the average (median) duration that investors have been registered on Companisto (exp) amounts 
to 74.07 (72.57) weeks. The mean (median) portfolio size (pfsize, i.e., the number of unique 
firms in the portfolio) is 4.72 (3.00). Both, Pearson and Spearman correlations for age and 
Øamount are statistically significant and positive for retail investors (see Table 5, Panel B). 
Analogously, the evidence presented in Panel B of Table 4 shows that the share of investments 
equal to or above 500 Euro is increasing in the age of retail investors. The average amount 
invested by institutional investors (1,274.25 Euro) is more than three times as high as the aver-
age amount invested by retail investors (438.18 Euro). 
[Table 4 about here] 
[Table 5 about here] 
                                                     
50  Calculated as the sum of investors aged between 20 and 39 years (2,582) divided by the total number of inves-
tors (3,900). 
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5.1.2 Firm-Level 
Table 6 reports summary statistics and correlations for firm attributes. The mean (me-
dian) value of fin_discl is 3.70 (4) with a standard deviation of 1.79. The (lowest) highest score 
is (0) 6 out of 7. In contrast, team_discl has a mean (median) of 4.26 (4.33) with a standard 
deviation of 0.80. The (lowest) highest score is (2.33) 5.67 out of 9.  
[Table 6 about here] 
There are strong correlations among several of the disclosure measures (see Table 6, 
Panel B). Using a two-tailed test, I find that for fin_discl, the estimated Bravais-Pearson corre-
lation coefficients with overall_discl (0.540) and vid_length (0.424) are positive and statistically 
significant, while team_discl and hist_fin_stat are both not correlated with the other disclosure 
measures.  
5.1.3 Transaction-Level 
Panel A in Table 7 reports summary statistics for all regression variables on the trans-
action-level. Specifically, only investments (i.e., transactions with invested equal to one) are 
included to illustrate differences in portfolio-weighted [i.e., by using the relative investment 
amount as a weight for each investor-firm pair (i.e., investment)] firm and transaction attributes 
between investments made by retail and institutional investors. Consistent with H2, the table 
shows that, in comparison to retail investors, institutional investors invest in firms that, on av-
erage, disclose more narrative disclosures, provide more information on selected financial items 
and on the managing team and have longer pitch videos. For these variables, mean differences 
are statistically significant at the 0.1 level (or lower) using two-tailed tests.  
[Table 7 about here] 
Panel B in Table 7 reports Bravais-Pearson correlations of the main variables of interest 
on the transaction-level. The correlations between invested and overall_discl, vid_length as well 
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as hist_fin_stat are statistically significant (p < 0.1), with the association being negative for 
overall_discl (-0.115) and hist_fin_stat (-0.051). In contrast, for fin_discl and team_discl, I don’t 
find a statistically significant correlation with invested. Conversely, the correlations between 
the investment amount (amount) and the disclosure measures are statistically significant 
(p < 0.1) and positive for overall_discl (0.015), fin_discl (0.040) and vid_length (0.049) and 
negative for team_discl (-0.012). For hist_fin_stat, I find no statistically significant correlation 
with the investment amount. 
5.2 Regression Results 
5.2.1 Main Analyses 
[Table 8 about here] 
To test H1, I run OLS regressions51 of different specifications of model (1) that vary 
with regard to the employed explanatory variables and fixed effects structures (see Table 8). 
The results for specification (1) which solely includes the different disclosure measures, suggest 
that there is no strong association between crowdinvestors’ investment decision and start-ups 
disclosures on Companisto (Column 1). While I find a negative and statistically significant as-
sociation for the overall magnitude of narrative disclosures (in almost all specifications), the 
estimated coefficients on the other disclosure measures are not statistically significant. How-
ever, once I include the previously introduced set of control variables along with country- and 
year-fixed effects (see Column 2), I find stronger support for H1 as the estimated coefficients 
on fin_discl, team_discl and vid_length are all positive and statistically significant. Consistent 
with related evidence (e.g., Ahlers et al. 2015; Moritz et al. 2015; Bernstein et al. 2017), my 
results suggest that crowdinvestors are more likely to invest in firms that provide more infor-
mation on selected financial items, more background information on the managing team as well 
                                                     
51  I estimate OLS regressions rather than Logit or Probit models to avoid incidental parameter problems given 
the extensive use of fixed effects.  
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as longer pitch videos. The negative association between invested and the overall magnitude of 
narrative disclosures (in almost all specifications) indicates that, consistent with Lawrence 
(2013), crowdinvestors’ investment propensity is decreasing in the complexity (i.e., length) of 
firms’ disclosures.52  
In a next step, I further extend model (1) by introducing an indicator variable (type) that, 
in specifications (3) and (4), takes on the value one (zero) for “company“ (“private“) investors. 
To account for differences between retail and institutional investors in the association between 
invested and the disclosure measures, and thus to test H2, I interact type with all explanatory 
variables (Column 3).53 In addition, to control for the effect of all other time-invariant investor 
attributes on the investment propensity, I re-estimate the fully interacted model including in-
vestor-fixed effects (Column 4). Consistent with H2, I find that both retail and institutional 
investors are more likely to invest in firms that provide more financial information and more 
information on the managing team with the two associations being more pronounced for insti-
tutional investors. However, while the statistically significant estimated coefficient on 
vid_length remains positive, the negative and statistically significant estimated coefficient on 
the interaction of type and vid_length suggests that this association is less pronounced for insti-
tutional investors.54 Taken together, the empirical evidence suggests that both retail and insti-
tutional investors’ investment propensity is increasing in the magnitude of selected (and mostly 
forward-looking financial) information that firms provide on Companisto. More importantly, 
compared to retail investors, institutional investors seem to rely more (less) on ‘hard’ (‘soft’) 
information when making an investment decision. My findings therefore support both H1 and 
H2.  
                                                     
52  For the full regression results (including the estimated regression coefficients on the control variables), see 
Appendix A3.1. 
53  This allows the association between firms’ information environment (i.e., all types of information that firms 
disclose on the CIP) and crowdinvestors’ investment decisions to vary with investors’ sophistication level. 
54  In an additional regression, I find that, for the sub-sample of institutional investors, there is no statistically 
significant association between invested and vid_length (see Appendix A4.2). 
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To exploit differences in retail investors’ attributes that potentially affect their invest-
ment behavior, I first drop transactions related to institutional investors and then employ type 
as an indicator for retail investors that, at the time of (non)investment in firm j, have already 
invested in equal to or more than five distinct start-ups55 on Companisto (= type equal to one; 
zero otherwise). This allows me to investigate the extent to which the level of crowdinvesting 
experience (on Companisto) affects retail investors’ investment behavior. The results of this 
regression are presented in Column 5 (Table 8). While I don’t find differences regarding the 
association between the investment propensity and the magnitude of financial (fin_discl) or 
team disclosures (team_discl), my results indicate that the pitch video seems to be less relevant 
for the investment decisions of more experienced retail investors, indicating that the weight that 
crowdinvestors place on rather ‘soft’ information decreases with their level of crowdinvesting 
experience. This is consistent with the evidence provided by Bernstein et al. (2017), who find 
that investors’ information preferences vary with their level of crowdinvesting experience. 
Finally, to test whether retail investors that, on average, invest higher investment 
amounts differ with regard to their investment behavior, I use type (= one) as an indicator for 
investors that invest equal to or more than 500 Euro on average (zero otherwise). Although I 
cannot observe the personal wealth of each investor, the idea is to distinguish between transac-
tions that represent profit-oriented investments from contributions that follow another motiva-
tion (e.g., support for a team and/or an idea).56 The regression results (Column 6) indicate that 
investors with high average investment amounts rely relatively more on financial information 
than investors that invest less than 500 Euro on average. In contrast, the estimated coefficient 
for the interaction of type and vid_length is statistically insignificant indicating that the role of 
                                                     
55  The regression results presented in Appendix A3.2 show how my results vary with different cutoffs of pfsize.  
56  In Appendix A3.2, the regression results for varying cutoffs of Øamount are presented.  
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‘soft’ information in retail investors’ decision-making does not vary with their average invest-
ment amounts.   
Taken together, the results presented in this section indicate that both retail and institu-
tional crowdinvestors consider firms’ unaudited voluntary disclosures in their decision-making. 
Compared to retail investors, institutional investors seem to rely less (more) on relatively ‘soft’ 
(‘hard’) information. For the sub-sample of retail investors’ investment decisions, my evidence 
is consistent with the relevance of ‘soft’ information (financial information) to be decreasing 
(increasing) with their level of crowdinvesting experience (their average investment amount).  
While there are differences across specifications, the evidence presented in Table 8 fur-
ther indicates that the presence of publicly available historical financial statements 
(hist_fin_stat) is negatively associated with crowdinvestors’ investment decisions.57 
5.2.2 Retail Investor Demographics 
[Table 9 about here] 
To explore how retail investors’ investment behavior varies with their demographical 
characteristics, I drop all transactions related to institutional investors. In a first step, I run a 
regression in which I use type to differentiate between investments by male (type = 1) and fe-
male (type = 0) investments (see Table 9, Column 1). While the investment decisions of both 
                                                     
57  As the presence of legally mandated historical financial statements might affect crowdinvestors’ usage and 
assessment of firms’ voluntary disclosures on Companisto, I exclude all transactions related to firms with 
historical financial statements available through the online-platform of the Federal Gazette and re-estimate the 
different specifications of model (1). Columns 3 and 4 in Appendix A4.1 report the pooled sample results for 
the fully specified (interacted) model. In contrast to the results for the full sample (Table 8, Column 4), the 
estimated coefficient on team_discl is not statistically significant. The same holds for the estimated coefficients 
on overall_discl, fin_discl and team_discl in the retail investor sample (Columns 5 and 6), which all have the 
same direction as the corresponding evidence presented in Table 8, but are not statistically significant. Only 
the estimated coefficients on vid_length remain unchanged in direction and general statistical significance 
across all specifications. While the relatively high t-statistics suggest that the differences to the evidence pre-
sented in Table 8 might reflect a power issue, the results could also indicate that, in the absence of historical 
financial statements, investors place less weight on firms’ voluntary disclosures on Companisto. For the sub-
sample of institutional investors, however, I find no differences to the full sample results in the direction and 
statistical significance (i.e., p < 0.1) of the estimated coefficients on all disclosure variables (see Appendix 
A4.2).  
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male and female investors appear to be positively associated with the presence of selected fi-
nancial disclosures (fin_discl), the association is less pronounced for male investors. Analo-
gously, while the likelihood of investments by all retail investors is negatively associated with 
hist_fin_stat, the link is less negative for male investors.  
In a second step, I run sub-sample regressions for different age groups of retail investors 
(see Table 9, Columns 2 to 6). In all specifications, I employ type as an indicator to differentiate 
between investors that have invested in equal to or more than (less than) five distinct start-ups. 
My results indicate that across all age groups there exists a positive and statistically significant 
relation between investors’ investment decisions and fin_discl, team_discl and vid_length for 
less crowdinvesting experienced investors (i.e., type = 0). However, in the sub-samples of in-
vestors that are older than 30 years, the interaction effect of type and vid_length is negative and 
statistically significant, suggesting that the pitch video is less relevant for more experienced 
crowdinvestors (type = 1) (see Table 9, Columns 4 to 6). The respective age groups appear to 
be driving the previously presented evidence for the full sample of retail investors (see Table 8, 
Column 5).    
Taken together, the evidence presented in Table 9 supports the notion that crowdinves-
tors are heterogeneous in their investment behavior. Specifically, I find that the extent to which 
the level of crowdinvesting experience affects the investment behavior varies across different 
age groups of retail investors.  
5.2.3 Determinants of the Investment Amount 
Given that not only the decision to invest but also the amount that investors are willing 
to invest in a specific firm might be positively related to the extent of its disclosure on the CIP 
(e.g., Ahlers et al. 2015), I conduct an additional analysis based on model (1) with the natural 
logarithm of the investment amount (amount) as the dependent variable. If start-ups’ disclosures 
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on Companisto decrease information asymmetry and therefore increase the likelihood of in-
vestments, the same might hold for the investment amount. This should be the case if the in-
vestment decision reflects a continuous rather than a binary coded variable with the investment 
amount (relative to their wealth) representing the quality of investors’ investment decision. Fol-
lowing this rationale, I expect the investment amount to be positively associated with the extent 
of firms’ disclosures on Companisto. However, as I already investigated the link between the 
investment propensity and firms’ disclosures, I exclude all non-investments (i.e., amounts equal 
to zero) from my sample. While the results of my analysis must therefore be interpreted with 
caution (i.e., as conditional on investing), an advantage of this procedure is that, statistically, 
there should be no link between the two analyses. Obviously, the association might also go in 
the other direction, i.e., it might be that investors information acquisition varies with the amount 
that they (plan to) invest. 
[Table 10 about here] 
Analogously to the results with the investment decision as dependent variable and con-
sistent with related evidence (e.g., Ahlers et al. 2015), the investment amounts of both retail 
and institutional investors are increasing in firms’ unaudited voluntary disclosures with the as-
sociation being more pronounced for institutional investors (Table 10, Columns 4 and 5). More-
over, I find that the amount invested by (institutional) retail investors is (not) positively associ-
ated with the length of the pitch video.58 Finally, for retail investors, I find that the association 
between the investment amount and my financial disclosure index is stronger for more experi-
enced investors.  
                                                     
58  In an additional untabulated regression, I find that, for the sub-sample of institutional investors, there is no 
statistically significant association between log(amount) and vid_length. 
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5.2.4 Retail Investor Demographics and the Investment Amount 
[Table 11 about here] 
In a next step, I investigate how retail investors’ demographics and their level of 
crowdinvesting experience mitigate the association between their investment amounts and 
firms’ disclosures. For this purpose, I re-run sub-sample regressions for the sample of retail 
investors with amount as dependent variable (see Table 11).  
Consistent with the evidence presented in Table 8, I find that retail investors’ age and 
gender is associated with their investment behavior. Specifically, for (fe)male retail investors I 
find (no) a positive association between their investment amounts and the presence of selected 
financial disclosures (fin_discl). For investors aged below 20 (20 to 29), I find a positive asso-
ciation between their investments amounts and team_discl (fin_discl) only for the group of more 
experienced investors (i.e., with pfsize ≥ 5). Moreover, for investors aged 50 or above, I find 
that team_discl (vid_length) is only (not) associated with the investment decisions of crowdin-
vesting experienced investors. 
While this evidence suggests that not only the investment decision but also the invest-
ment amount varies with investors’ demographics and their level of crowdinvesting experience, 
it is important to keep in mind that the average investment amount systematically varies with 
investors’ demographics (see Panel B in Table 4).   
5.3 Limitations 
As this study uses proprietary data from a single source, the presented evidence must be 
interpreted with caution. In particular, the sample selection that results from the use of data 
from a single German crowdinvesting portal should be considered, when determining how the 
results of this study might generalize. Moreover, it is possible that any association that I find 
between my disclosure measures and the investment decisions (amounts) of crowdinvestors is 
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driven by omitted firm characteristics. Given the fact that firms’ disclosure level should (also) 
reflect their assessment of the potential costs (e.g., proprietary costs) and benefits (e.g., lower 
of disclosure) of additional disclosure, my findings might mainly reflect investors’ preferences 
with regard to the determinants of firms’ disclosure choice (e.g., the structure of their target 
market). Analogously, firms’ primary motivation to engage in crowdinvesting (e.g., for market 
research or financing), (i) should be related to their characteristics and (ii) might affect their 
disclosure strategy. Taken together, due to the potentially endogenous nature of my explanatory 
variables (i.e., my disclosure measures), my results remain descriptive in nature and do not 
allow for any causal inference.  
6 Conclusion 
This study uses proprietary investor-level data from Companisto, one of the largest Ger-
man crowdinvesting portals, to examine the role of firms’ voluntary disclosure for investment 
decisions in the crowdinvesting market. Specifically, I extend the existing crowdinvesting lit-
erature by showing how crowdinvestors’ actual investment behavior (i.e., their decision to in-
vest as well as the investment amount) varies with their demographics, their level of sophisti-
cation and their crowdinvesting experience. My findings suggest that both, retail and institu-
tional investors, are more likely to invest in firms that provide higher levels of financial disclo-
sures and information on the managing team. In contrast to institutional investors, the invest-
ment propensity of retail investors is also increasing in the extent of firms’ ‘soft’ disclosures 
(i.e., the length of the pitch videos). My results further indicate that retail investors are hetero-
geneous in their investment behavior. Specifically, I find that the link between the investment 
decision and firms’ disclosures varies with retail investors’ age, gender and level of crowdin-
vesting experience. My evidence is consistent with the relevance of ‘soft’ information (financial 
information) to be decreasing (increasing) with their level of crowdinvesting experience (their 
average investment amounts). Furthermore, the results of an additional analysis reveal that not 
 49 
only the decision to invest, but also the investment amount is increasing in the extent of firms’ 
voluntary (financial) disclosures.  
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A Appendix 
A1 Variable Definitions 
Variable   Definition 
t  Date at which investor i has (not) invested in firm j (firm l, which was up for fund-
ing at the same time as investor i invested in firm j)  
Transaction Attributes  
investedi,j,t   Indicator variable equal to one (zero) if investor i is (not) invested in firm j in t  
(log)amounti,j,t  (Natural logarithm of) Amount that investor i invested in firm j in t 
oppt   Number of firms that are simultaneously up for funding at t 
%fundedj,t   Ratio of cumulative investments in firm j at t over maximum sought capital 
Investor Attributes 
typei  Binary coded variable indicating the investor type. Depending on the respective 
specification of model (1) a value of 1 (0) indicates (a) that the investor is registered 
as “company“ (“private“) as of January 2015; (b) that a “private“ investor has in-
vested in equal to or more (less) than five distinct start-ups or (c) that a “private“ 
investor has, on average, invested equal to or more (less) than 500 Euro per start-
up-investment  
countryi,t  Country of residency of investor i at t  
agei,t  Age of investor i at t  
malei  Indicator variable equal to one (zero) if investor is male (female) 
transactionsi,t  Number of transactions investor i has proceeded on Companisto at t 
pfsizei,t  Number of unique start-ups investor i holds in her portfolio at t 
expi,t  Number of weeks that investor i has been registered on Companisto at t 
Øamounti  Amount that investor i has invested, on average, per start-up-investment between 
registration on Companisto and January 15, 2015   
Firm Attributes  
overall_disclj   Magnitude of disclosures that firm j provides on Companisto at funding-start, 
measured as total number of words (divided by 1,000 for the multivariate regres-
sion analyses) 
fin_disclj   Financial disclosure index, measured as the sum of points awarded for the presence 
of disclosures on seven items related to financial information (1 point for each item 
disclosed)  
team_disclj   Team disclosure index, measured as the sum of points awarded for the presence of 
disclosures on seven items related to information on the managing board (1 point 
for each item disclosed) divided by the number of board members 
vid_lengthj   Length of the pitch video measured in minutes  
hist_fin_statj,t   Indicator variable equal to one (zero) if unaudited financial statements of firm j 
were (not) publicly available through the online-platform of the Federal Gazette 
(Bundesanzeiger) at t; this includes both published and deposited financial state-
ments  
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A1    Variable Definitions (continued) 
 
Variable   Definition 
%eq_offeredj   % Maximum share of equity offered by firm j in the scope of the funding round, 
measured as the ratio of the maximum sought capital and the sum of the firm 
value as estimated by Companisto and the maximum sought capital (in per-
cent) 
%held_by_thirdj   % Share of equity held by third parties (e.g., Venture Capitalists, Business An-
gels) at funding-start (in percent) 
(log)valuej   % (Natural logarithm of) Value of firm j as estimated by Companisto at funding-
start (in Euro)  
years_i_bj   % Years since foundation of firm j at funding-start  
years_2_bej   (Estimated) Years to break-even of firm j at funding-start 
rewardsj   Indicator variable equal to one if firm j offers rewards in return for invest-
ments that exceed certain (predefined) amount thresholds, and zero otherwise  
team_buslawj   Indicator variable equal to one (zero) if at least one (no) management board 
member holds a degree in business, economics and/or law  
team_industry_expj   Indicator variable equal to one (zero) if at least one (no) member of the man-
agement board has already gained industry-specific work experience at fund-
ing-start 
team_start-up_expj   Indicator variable equal to one (zero) if at least one (no) member of the man-
agement board has already gained start-up-related work experience at fund-
ing-start 
patentj  Indicator variable equal to one (zero) if the company holds at least one (no) 
patent at funding-start 
#staffj   Number of staff firm j employs at the funding-start 
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A2 Correlations of disclosure items 
Panel A: Correlations – Financial Disclosure Index (fin_discl) components 
N = 33 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) applic_funding  0.103 0.669 0.108 0.607 0.594 0.433 
(2) kpi 0.103  -0.179 0.134 0.298 0.229 0.134 
(3) rev_sources 0.669 -0.179  0.134 0.298 0.229 0.000 
(4) rev_sensitivity 0.108 0.134 0.134  0.066 0.182 0.250 
(5) exp_breakdown 0.607 0.298 0.298 0.066  0.360 0.263 
(6) cf_info 0.594 0.229 0.229 0.182 0.360  0.729 
(7) cf_activities 0.433 0.134 0.000 0.250 0.263 0.729  
Panel B: Correlations – Team Disclosure Index (team_discl) components 
N = 33 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) interests  -0.279 -0.335 -0.294 -0.003 -0.062 -0.037 
(2) educ_place -0.287  0.664 0.195 -0.086 -0.244 0.219 
(3) educ_field -0.362 0.645  0.162 0.206 -0.145 0.100 
(4) educ_degree -0.332 0.199 0.257  -0.268 0.000 -0.265 
(5) exp_industry -0.032 -0.116 0.078 -0.193  0.074 0.246 
(6) exp_duration -0.066 -0.280 -0.195 -0.009 0.111  -0.007 
(7) exp_employer -0.043 0.251 0.082 -0.166 0.201 0.025  
Notes: This table provides correlations among the items included in the Financial Disclosure Index (Panel A) 
as well as the items included in Team Disclosure Index (Panel B). In both panels, statistical significance at the 
0.1 level using two-tailed tests is indicated in bold type. Pearson's correlation coefficients are shown in the 
lower triangle while Spearman's rank correlations appear above the diagonal. See Appendix A1 for the variable 
definitions. 
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A3 Full sample regressions 
A3.1 Complete regression results 
       
Panel A: Disclosure Measures 
Dependent variable = invested 
Sample Pooled Sample Retail Investors 
Investor Type  
(for which type equals 1) 
- Institutional 
pfsize  
≥ 5 
Øamount 
≥ € 500 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
overall_discl -0.079** -0.044** -0.044** -0.038** -0.027 -0.037* 
  (-2.482) (-2.195) (-2.197) (-2.050) (-1.389) (-2.036) 
type * overall_discl   0.019 0.009 0.003 0.001 
   (0.640) (0.238) (0.114) (0.054) 
fin_discl -0.005 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.068*** 0.073*** 0.062*** 
  (-0.177) (3.440) (3.372) (3.848) (4.096) (3.724) 
type * fin_discl   0.043** 0.053** -0.015 0.037*** 
   (2.445) (2.663) (-0.769) (3.172) 
team_discl 0.012 0.050** 0.049** 0.046** 0.054** 0.047** 
  (0.292) (2.312) (2.275) (2.370) (2.649) (2.618) 
type * team_discl   0.032 0.038* -0.030 -0.009 
   (1.395) (1.939) (-1.594) (-0.638) 
vid_length 0.061 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.083*** 0.073*** 
  (1.499) (3.436) (3.453) (3.591) (4.186) (4.043) 
type * vid_length   -0.042* -0.053** -0.053*** -0.016 
   (-1.949) (-2.346) (-3.534) (-1.352) 
hist_fin_stat -0.026 -0.048 -0.047 -0.064* -0.066* -0.053 
 (-0.289) (-1.151) (-1.115) (-1.702) (-1.707) (-1.530) 
type * hist_fin_stat   -0.105** -0.112** -0.033 -0.078** 
   (-2.506) (-2.444) (-0.717) (-2.349) 
Country FE  Yes Yes    
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investor FE       Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 26,968 26,968 26,968 26,968 26,467 26,467 
Investments 15,795 15,795 15,795 15,795 15,493 15,493 
Non-Investments 11,173 11,173 11,173 11,173 10,974 10,974 
adj. R² 2.58% 45.20% 45.20% 41.80% 42.80% 42.00% 
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A3.1    Complete regression results (continued) 
       
Panel B: Control Variables   
Dependent variable = invested 
Sample Pooled Sample Retail Investors 
Investor Type  
(for which type equals 1) 
- Institutional 
pfsize  
≥ 5 
Øamount 
≥ € 500 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
team_buslaw  -0.076* -0.075* -0.079* -0.107** -0.091** 
   (-1.764) (-1.724) (-1.966) (-2.555) (-2.445) 
type * team_buslaw   -0.081** -0.069 0.014 0.048* 
   (-2.151) (-1.691) (0.355) (1.896) 
team_industry_exp  0.050 0.048 0.044 0.052* 0.041 
   (1.625) (1.550) (1.511) (1.767) (1.483) 
type * team_industry_exp   0.051 0.047 -0.062* 0.034* 
   (1.397) (1.169) (-1.861) (1.754) 
team_start-up_exp  -0.015 -0.017 -0.021 -0.040 -0.020 
   (-0.313) (-0.339) (-0.423) (-0.870) (-0.439) 
type * team_start-up_exp   0.128** 0.130** 0.048 -0.007 
   (2.584) (2.141) (1.435) (-0.239) 
%held_by_third  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
   (0.313) (0.327) (0.506) (0.667) (0.491) 
type * %held_by_third   -0.003** -0.003** -0.001 0.001 
   (-2.176) (-2.059) (-0.729) (0.658) 
log_value  0.146** 0.146** 0.172*** 0.205*** 0.164*** 
  (2.665) (2.649) (3.439) (3.677) (3.566) 
type * log_value   -0.029 -0.007 -0.107* 0.056* 
   (-0.423) (-0.080) (-1.884) (1.736) 
years_i_b  0.039* 0.038* 0.041** 0.044** 0.040** 
   (1.899) (1.854) (2.143) (2.199) (2.274) 
type * years_i_b   0.071*** 0.075*** -0.003 0.013 
   (3.132) (3.144) (-0.158) (0.837) 
years_2_be  0.090** 0.089** 0.099** 0.108*** 0.098*** 
   (2.266) (2.240) (2.555) (2.762) (2.762) 
type * years_2_be   0.030 0.038 -0.033 0.017 
   (0.718) (0.943) (-0.961) (0.569) 
patent  -0.163* -0.160* -0.178** -0.205** -0.174** 
   (-2.012) (-1.964) (-2.279) (-2.391) (-2.391) 
type * patent   -0.204** -0.271** 0.111 -0.069 
   (-2.135) (-2.441) (1.132) (-1.220) 
Country FE  Yes Yes    
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investor FE       Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 26,968 26,968 26,968 26,968 26,467 26,467 
Investments 15,795 15,795 15,795 15,795 15,493 15,493 
Non-Investments 11,173 11,173 11,173 11,173 10,974 10,974 
adj. R² 2.58% 45.20% 45.20% 41.80% 42.80% 42.00% 
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A3.1    Complete regression results (continued) 
       
Panel B: Control Variables (continued)   
Dependent variable = invested 
Sample Pooled Sample Retail Investors 
Investor Type  
(for which type equals 1) 
- Institutional 
pfsize  
≥ 5 
Øamount  
≥ € 500 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
rewards  0.039 0.039 0.034 0.021 0.026 
   (1.113) (1.094) (0.960) (0.569) (0.775) 
type * rewards   0.063 0.031 0.049 0.017 
   (1.394) (0.630) (1.473) (0.825) 
%eq_offered  0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.022*** 
   (10.490) (10.357) (9.894) (11.015) (10.044) 
type * %eq_offered   0.001 0.001 -0.010*** 0.005*** 
   (0.257) (0.288) (-4.767) (5.455) 
opp  -0.256*** -0.256*** -0.238*** -0.234*** -0.245*** 
  (-13.675) (-13.686) (-11.479) (-11.242) (-11.776) 
type * opp   -0.000 0.040* -0.027 0.041*** 
   (-0.000) (1.797) (-1.575) (2.908) 
%funded  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
   (-7.689) (-7.665) (-8.921) (-8.180) (-9.102) 
type * %funded   -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 
    (-0.561) (-1.447) (-0.615) (0.738) 
#staff  0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 
  (0.503) (0.522) (0.270) (0.401) (0.181) 
type * #staff   -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 
   (-0.403) (-0.293) (-0.426) (0.288) 
pfsize  0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.023*** -0.005 
  (0.855) (0.872) (-1.143) (-2.824) (-1.178) 
type * pfsize   -0.002 0.007 0.019** 0.000 
   (-0.490) (0.940) (2.507) (0.051) 
type  0.011 0.027  1.962***  
  (0.749) (0.029)  (2.831)  
constant 0.699** -1.526** -1.537** -1.948*** -2.566*** -1.974*** 
 (2.623) (-2.209) (-2.200) (-3.124) (-3.704) (-3.116) 
Country FE  Yes Yes    
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investor FE       Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 26,968 26,968 26,968 26,968 26,467 26,467 
Investments 15,795 15,795 15,795 15,795 15,493 15,493 
Non-Investments 11,173 11,173 11,173 11,173 10,974 10,974 
adj. R² 2.58% 45.20% 45.20% 41.80% 42.80% 42.00% 
Notes: This table reports (the full) OLS regression results of different specifications of model (1) that differ with 
respect to the employed explanatory variables and fixed effects structures. The pooled sample [specifications (1) 
to (4)] comprises 26,968 transactions, whereas the sample of only retail investors [specification (5) and (6)] 
comprises 26,467 transactions. The table reports regression coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses). 
The t-statistics are based on robust standard errors with one-way clustering by firm. ***, **, * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. See Appendix A1 for the variable defini-
tions. 
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A3.2 Varying thresholds of investor attributes 
 
Dependent variable = invested 
Sample Retail Investors 
Investor Type  
(for which type equals 1) 
pfsize 
 ≥ 3 
pfsize 
 ≥ 10 
pfsize  
≥ 15 
Øamount 
≥ € 250  
Øamount 
≥ € 1,000 
Øamount 
≥ € 5,000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
overall_discl -0.018 -0.033* -0.035* -0.042** -0.037* -0.039** 
  (-0.882) (-1.879) (-1.914) (-2.378) (-1.998) (-2.088) 
type * overall_discl -0.017 0.031* 0.019 0.012 -0.001 0.139** 
 (-0.705) (1.776) (1.049) (1.168) (-0.055) (2.128) 
fin_discl 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.067*** 
  (3.705) (4.225) (4.067) (3.872) (3.744) (3.844) 
type * fin_discl -0.008 -0.030 -0.043 0.017* 0.035** 0.074** 
 (-0.380) (-1.547) (-1.630) (1.745) (2.581) (2.057) 
team_discl 0.056** 0.049** 0.046** 0.045** 0.048** 0.047** 
  (2.512) (2.608) (2.459) (2.558) (2.494) (2.397) 
type * team_discl -0.025 -0.055** -0.068** 0.006 -0.017 -0.110*** 
 (-1.371) (-2.337) (-2.672) (0.584) (-1.016) (-2.959) 
vid_length 0.087*** 0.077*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 
  (4.083) (4.157) (3.879) (4.108) (3.706) (3.638) 
type * vid_length -0.043*** -0.074*** -0.072*** -0.002 -0.015 -0.040 
 (-2.861) (-3.855) (-3.491) (-0.175) (-1.119) (-1.610) 
hist_fin_stat -0.067 -0.065* -0.065* -0.046 -0.058 -0.062 
 (-1.576) (-1.799) (-1.803) (-1.351) (-1.597) (-1.645) 
type * hist_fin_stat -0.031 -0.005 0.005 -0.065*** -0.090* -0.313*** 
 (-0.673) (-0.127) (0.071) (-2.807) (-1.836) (-2.919) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 26,467 26,467 26,467 26,467 26,467 26,467 
Investments 15,493 15,493 15,493 15,493 15,493 15,493 
Non-Investments 10,974 10,974 10,974 10,974 10,974 10,974 
adj. R² 42.70% 42.70% 42.40% 42.00% 41.90% 41.80% 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results of different specifications of model (1) that differ with respect 
to the definition of the binary coded variable (type) that is used to test for differences between investors that 
differ with regard to their number of investments in distinct start-ups (pfsize) at investment date [specifications 
(1) to (3)] as well as differences with regard to the amount that an investor has invested, on average, per start-up 
(Øamount) since she registered on Companisto [specifications (4) to (6)]. The sample only contains transactions 
by retail investors. The table reports regression coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses). The t-sta-
tistics are based on robust standard errors with one-way clustering by firm. ***, **, * indicate statistical signif-
icance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. See Appendix A1 for the variable definitions. 
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A4 Sub-sample regressions 
A4.1   Sub-sample of transactions related to firms with no publicly available historical financial statements 
 
Dependent variable = invested 
Sample Pooled Sample Retail Investors 
Investor Type  
(for which type equals 1) 
- Institutional 
pfsize  
≥ 5 
Øamount 
≥ € 500 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
overall_discl -0.100** -0.039 -0.039 -0.034 -0.032 -0.038 
  (-2.784) (-1.522) (-1.515) (-1.203) (-0.957) (-1.370) 
type * overall_discl   -0.094** -0.039 -0.013 0.030 
   (-2.375) (-0.579) (-0.343) (1.578) 
fin_discl -0.007 0.033 0.031 0.047* 0.041 0.042 
  (-0.239) (1.243) (1.197) (1.749) (1.390) (1.567) 
type * fin_discl   0.047* 0.089** 0.022 0.047*** 
   (1.814) (2.246) (0.565) (3.671) 
team_discl -0.014 0.023 0.023 0.035 0.035 0.036 
  (-0.385) (0.732) (0.723) (1.037) (0.970) (1.100) 
type * team_discl   0.070 0.065 0.033 -0.009 
   (1.680) (1.044) (0.681) (-0.522) 
vid_length 0.033 0.063** 0.064** 0.068** 0.084** 0.072** 
  (0.621) (2.247) (2.280) (2.234) (2.573) (2.457) 
type * vid_length   -0.005 -0.044 -0.049 -0.032** 
   (-0.153) (-1.053) (-1.351) (-2.200) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE  Yes Yes    
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investor FE       Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 19,525 19,525 19,525 19,525 19,181 19,181 
Investments 11,739 11,739 11,739 11,739 11,519 11,519 
Non-Investments 7,786 7,786 7,786 7,786 7,662 7,662 
adj. R² 4.41% 42.80% 42.80% 40.20% 41.00% 40.40% 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results of different specifications of model (1) that differ with respect 
to the employed explanatory variables and fixed effects structures. In contrast to the evidence presented in Table 
8, the underlying sample only contains transactions related to firms for which no financial statement information 
was publicly available through the online-platform of the Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger) at the investment 
date (t). The pooled sample [specifications (1) to (4)] therefore comprises 19,525 transactions, whereas the sam-
ple of only retail investors [specification (5) and (6)] comprises 19,181 transactions. The table reports regression 
coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses). The t-statistics are based on robust standard errors with 
one-way clustering by firm. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided), 
respectively. See Appendix A1 for the variable definitions. 
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A4.2 Sub-sample of investor types and by investor attributes 
 
Dependent variable = invested 
Sample Full Sample  
Only frms with  
no historical financial statements 
Sub-sample 
Institutional 
Investor 
Retail Inv., 
pfsize ≥ 5 
Retail Inv., 
Øamount ≥ 
€ 500 
Institutional 
Investor 
Retail Inv., 
pfsize ≥ 5 
Retail Inv., 
Øamount ≥ 
€ 500 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
overall_discl -0.029 -0.025 -0.037 -0.074 -0.040 -0.008 
  (-0.845) (-1.318) (-1.595) (-1.115) (-1.417) (-0.234) 
fin_discl 0.120*** 0.058*** 0.101*** 0.136*** 0.075** 0.092*** 
 (5.862) (3.434) (4.189) (4.461) (2.678) (2.920) 
team_discl 0.084*** 0.022 0.039 0.100* 0.069* 0.029 
  (5.657) (1.434) (1.320) (1.782) (1.904) (0.727) 
vid_length 0.017 0.030** 0.055* 0.023 0.038 0.037 
 (0.981) (2.074) (1.958) (0.510) (1.320) (0.996) 
hist_fin_stat -0.177*** -0.094** -0.131** -0.074 -0.040 -0.008 
  (-3.846) (-2.341) (-2.110) (-1.115) (-1.417) (-0.234) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 501 6,932 4,888 344 5,125 3,592 
Investments 302 4,900 2,465 220 3,612 1,877 
Non-Investments 199 2,032 2,423 124 1,513 1,715 
adj. R² 45.10% 47.80% 39.90% 38.70% 48.20% 39.80% 
Notes: This table reports OLS sub-sample regression results of model (1). In Columns (1) to (3) regression results 
for the full sample are presented. In Columns (4) to (6) regression results for the sample of firms for which no 
financial statement information was publicly available through the online-platform of the Federal Gazette (Bun-
desanzeiger) at the investment date (t). In Columns (1) and (4) only transactions by institutional investors are 
included. Columns (2) and (5) only include transactions by retail investors with equal to or more than five distinct 
start-ups in their portfolio. In Columns (3) and (6) includes only investors that have, on average, invested equal 
to or more than 500 Euro per investment since they registered on Companisto. The table reports regression co-
efficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses). The t-statistics are based on robust standard errors with one-
way clustering by firm. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided), 
respectively. See Appendix A1 for the variable definitions. 
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 FIGURE 1 
Crowdinvesting – market structure 
 
 
Source: Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016a. 
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FIGURE 2 
Companisto interface – “Team”-Section 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows a screenshot taken on Companisto’s webpage. It gives an example of 
the information provided in the “Team”-Section of each listing.  
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FIGURE 3 
Companisto interface – “Financial Data”-Section 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows a screenshot taken on Companisto’s webpage. It illustrates firms’ information 
environment on Companisto. The screenshot gives an example of the “Financial Data-Section” of each 
listing. In the different tabs (i.e., sections) of each listing (e.g., “Overview”, “Team“, etc.) potential inves-
tors are provided with different types of information (e.g., information on the business model, investments 
by others, etc.).  
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(4) If at a later stage, investor i 
invests again in firm k, no fur-
ther non-investment in firm j is 
generated. 
FIGURE 4 
Generation of non-investments 
 
transaction investor firm amount transaction date invested 
a i k 255 6/7/2012 11:18 1 
b i j 0 6/7/2012 11:18 0 
c i k 150 6/22/2012 13:20 1 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the approach taken in the scope of the empirical analysis in order to 
generate non-investments, i.e., transactions for which the value of the variable invested is set to zero. 
Steps (1) to (4) describe the basic intuition behind this process.  
(2) At the date investor i invests in firm k, firm j is also up for 
funding. If investor i does not invest in firm j (neither before nor 
after she invests in firm k), transaction b, i.e., a non-investment 
(invested = 0) for investor i and firm j, is generated.  
 
transaction investor firm amount transaction date invested 
a i k 255 6/7/2012 11:18 1 
b i j 0 6/7/2012 11:18 0 
c i k 150 6/22/2012 13:20 1 
 (2) At the date investor i invests in firm k, firm j is also up for 
funding. If investor i does not invest in firm j (neither before nor 
after she invests in firm k), transaction b, i.e., a non-investment 
(invested = 0) for investor i and firm j, is generated.  
(1) Investor i invests 
in firm k. 
(3) This s (assumed to be) the date, t which investor 
i deci es ( ) to invest in firm (j) k. Th refore, the date 
of investment in firm k is applied as the tra saction 
date for the correspond n  non-investment in firm j. 
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FIGURE 5 
Funding history on Companisto 
 
 
Notes: This figure gives an overview of the funding start and duration of all funding rounds conducted on Companisto as of January 2015. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample selection 
 
Data on 10,027 investors, 37 listings (35 firms), 28,768 investments (as of January 2015) 
  investors listings transactions 
Number of investments (transactions with invested = 1) 10,027 37 28,768 
less number of investments by investors from countries 
other than Austria, Germany or Switzerland 
-337  -828 
plus non-investment (transactions with invested = 0)     26,081 
  9,690 37 54,021 
less investments that are related to listings that...    
 …represent second funding rounds of firms on the CIPs  -2 -5,482 
 …are related to other investment types   -2 -4,021 
less transactions with incomplete information -53   -3,011 
less transactions of investors with less than two holdings -5,737   -14,539 
Final sample 3,900 33 26,968 
Notes: This table illustrates the specific steps taken in the selection of the final sample.  
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TABLE 2 
Measuring voluntary disclosure 
       
Panel A: Financial Disclosure Index (fin_discl) components 
Item  Level of detail Variable Definition 
Application of raised capital   applic_funding 1 if application of the raised capital is given, 0 otherwise 
Key performance indicators   kpi 1 if information on key performance indicators is provided, 0 otherwise 
Revenue  Breakdown by source rev_sources 1 if sources are provided, 0 otherwise 
  Sensitivity analysis rev_sensitivity 1 if sensitivity analysis is provided, 0 otherwise 
Costs  Breakdown by source exp_breakdown 1 if breakdown is provided, 0 otherwise 
Cashflow information   cf_info 1 if cashflow information is provided, 0 otherwise 
  Breakdown by activity cf_activities 1 if breakdown by activity is provided, 0 otherwise 
Panel B: Team Disclosure Index (team_discl) components 
Item     Level of detail Variable Definition 
Interests    interests 1 if interests are given, 0 otherwise  
Education     Place of studies educ_place 1 if place of studies is given, 0 otherwise  
      Field of study educ_field 1 if field of studies is given, 0 otherwise  
      Degree educ_degree 1 if degree of education is given, 0 otherwise  
Work experience     Industry exp_industry 1 if industry is given, 0 otherwise  
      Duration exp_duration 1 if duration is given, 0 otherwise  
      Employer exp_employer 1 if employer is given, 0 otherwise  
Notes: This table illustrates the composition of the two disclosure indices. Specifically, the description and variable definition of each component of the financial disclosure index 
(Panel A) and the team disclosure index (Panel B) are presented.  
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TABLE 3 
Summary statistics of disclosure indices 
 
Panel A: Financial Disclosure Index (fin_discl) components 
Variable   Obs. Mean 
applic_funding   33 0.727 
kpi   33 0.636 
rev_sources   33 0.636 
rev_sensitivity   33 0.030 
exp_breakdown   33 0.879 
cf_info   33 0.485 
cf_activities   33 0.333 
fin_discl   33 3.727 
 
Panel B: Team Disclosure Index (team_discl) components 
Variable   Obs. Mean 
interests   33 0.506 
educ_place   33 0.689 
educ_field   33 0.767 
educ_degree   33 0.308 
exp_industry   33 0.965 
exp_duration   33 0.367 
exp_employer   33 0.663 
team_discl   33 4.264 
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the self-con-
structed disclosure indices. Specifically, the descriptive statistics for each 
item of the financial disclosure index (Panel A) and the team disclosure 
index (Panel B) are presented. See Appendix A1 for the definitions of the 
two disclosure indices. Definitions for the specific items of the financial 
disclosure index (Panel A) and the team disclosure index (Panel B) are 
given in Table 2. In addition, Appendix A2 contains correlations for the 
components of both indices.   
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 Panel B: Investor Attributes by Age 
   Investor properties (Share of) Investor groups 
Age Investors Transactions 
male  
(= 1) 
Øamount 
(in €) 
pfsize 
(# of start-
ups) 
exp  
(in weeks) 
Øamount ≥  
€ 500 
pfsize ≥  
5 
exp ≥  
1 year 
≤ 19 34 146 0.97 89.78 3.74 39.41 5.88% 52.94% 26.47% 
20 to 29 1,246 8,206 0.91 242.76 4.53 71.27 12.12% 58.03% 64.04% 
30 to 39 1,336 9,737 0.89 417.24 5.00 78.53 19.69% 62.35% 71.63% 
40 to 49 781 5,497 0.88 608.12 4.70 73.12 26.12% 62.10% 64.02% 
50 to 59 335 2,177 0.80 785.86 4.36 73.61 27.46% 53.73% 60.90% 
60 ≥ 94 704 0.86 801.29 4.99 75.43 36.17% 65.96% 61.70% 
Retail 3,826 26,467 0.89 438.18 4.72 74.21 19.50% 60.14% 66.02% 
Institutional 74 501 - 1,274.25 4.84 67.05 43.24% 62.16% 72.97% 
Full sample 3,900 26,968 - 454.05 4.72 74.07 19.95% 60.18% 66.15% 
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for the attributes of the investors registered on Companisto as of January 2015. Panel A provides information on the investor types (i.e., 
the share of retail and institutional investors). The data is presented on the transaction-level and illustrates the number of investments (non-investments) for each group of investors. 
Panel B presents investor attributes by age group and investor type. See Appendix A1 for the variable definitions. 
TABLE 4 
Investor attributes 
Panel A: Investors and Transactions  
Investor type Investors 
Transactions 
Investments Non-Investments Total 
Institutional 74 1.90% 302 1.91% 199 1.78% 501 1.86% 
Retail 3,826 98.10% 15,493 98.09% 10,974 98.22% 26,467 98.14% 
Total 3,900 100.00% 15,795 100.00% 11,173 100.00% 26,968 100.00% 
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TABLE 5 
Summary statistics and correlations – investor level 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics – Investor Level 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
age 3,826 36.30 10.41 18.18 28.17 34.22 43.16 85.30 
male 3,826 0.89 0.32 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
pfsize 3,900 4.72 4.68 2.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 35.00 
exp 3,900 74.07 37.79 0.14 42.43 72.57 109.36 137.00 
amount 3,900 454.05 1,409.24 5.00 40.00 125.00 364.58 35,200.00 
 
 
Panel B: Correlations – Investor Level 
N = 3,900 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) age   -0.079 0.019 0.055 0.263 
(2) male -0.086   0.121 0.011 0.059 
(3) pfsize 0.012 0.085   0.258 -0.020 
(4) exp 0.044 0.011 0.294   -0.142 
(5) Øamount 0.141 0.029 -0.061 -0.128   
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for the attributes of the investors registered on Com-
panisto as of January 2015. Specifically, summary statistics (Panel A) and correlations (Panel B) are 
presented. In Panel B, statistical significance at the 0.1 level using two-tailed tests is indicated in bold 
type. Pearson's correlation coefficients are shown in the lower triangle while Spearman's rank corre-
lations appear above the diagonal. See Appendix A1 for the variable definitions. 
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TABLE 6 
Summary statistics and correlations – firm level 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics – Firm Level  
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
overall_discl 33 5.23 1.26 2.84 4.13 5.43 6.20 7.33 
fin_discl 33 3.70 1.79 0.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 
team_discl 33 4.26 0.80 2.33 4.00 4.33 5.00 5.67 
vid_length 33 5.01 1.10 2.92 4.07 5.20 5.97 7.03 
hist_fin_stat 33 0.24 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
%eq_offered 33 14.07 7.12 4.69 9.09 12.50 16.67 33.33 
%held_by_third 33 14.79 20.42 0.00 0.00 5.00 24.00 70.00 
value 33 1,800,000 2,130,000 650,000 900,000 1,100,000 1,750,000 12,000,000 
years_i_b 33 1.21 1.08 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 5.00 
years_2_be 33 2.02 0.62 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.00 4.00 
patents 33 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
rewards 33 0.39 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
team_buslaw 33 0.76 0.44 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
team_industry_exp 33 0.70 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
team_start-up_exp 33 0.76 0.44 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
#staff 33 7.58 6.41 2.00 4.00 6.00 9.00 38.00 
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 TABLE 6 (continued) 
Summary statistics and correlations – firm level 
    
Panel B: Correlation Matrix – Firm Level   
N = 33 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) overall_discl   0.491 -0.059 0.498 0.193 0.356 0.032 0.333 0.022 -0.108 0.011 0.182 0.119 -0.374 -0.223 -0.198 
(2) fin_discl 0.540   -0.174 0.416 0.224 0.200 0.076 0.454 0.393 -0.390 0.317 0.073 -0.087 -0.170 -0.266 0.054 
(3) team_discl 0.014 -0.173   -0.003 -0.190 0.065 0.085 -0.204 0.031 -0.180 -0.156 0.059 0.149 0.087 0.216 0.046 
(4) vid_length 0.450 0.424 -0.012   -0.097 0.012 0.125 0.266 0.102 -0.230 0.006 0.150 0.145 -0.357 -0.267 -0.106 
(5) hist_fin_stat 0.203 0.241 -0.180 -0.094   -0.153 0.217 0.228 0.433 0.098 0.313 0.123 -0.175 -0.243 -0.010 0.056 
(6) %eq_offered 0.268 0.131 -0.085 -0.028 -0.153   -0.082 -0.171 -0.307 -0.179 -0.344 -0.082 0.216 0.014 -0.182 -0.376 
(7) %held_by_third 0.069 0.048 0.056 0.168 0.270 -0.101   0.011 0.415 0.068 -0.071 0.308 -0.241 -0.055 -0.039 0.257 
(8) value 0.165 0.347 -0.168 0.161 0.079 -0.158 -0.023   0.433 0.014 0.490 0.206 -0.347 0.146 -0.276 0.506 
(9) years_i_b -0.054 0.328 -0.118 0.107 0.484 -0.296 0.332 0.441   -0.058 0.407 0.291 -0.055 0.095 -0.168 0.271 
(10) years_2_be -0.207 -0.460 -0.259 -0.249 0.037 -0.033 0.030 0.032 -0.019   0.200 0.018 -0.057 0.042 0.179 0.016 
(11) patents 0.016 0.280 -0.239 -0.017 0.313 -0.282 -0.061 0.787 0.530 0.161   -0.039 -0.313 0.209 0.179 0.468 
(12) rewards 0.155 0.087 0.045 0.178 0.123 -0.050 0.289 0.222 0.189 -0.030 -0.039   -0.123 -0.143 -0.268 0.053 
(13) team_buslaw 0.090 -0.085 0.279 0.103 -0.175 -0.018 -0.240 -0.189 -0.153 -0.037 -0.313 -0.123   -0.065 0.010 -0.505 
(14) team_industry_exp -0.328 -0.208 0.045 -0.340 -0.243 0.044 -0.128 0.193 0.131 0.106 0.209 -0.143 -0.065   0.243 0.248 
(15) team_start-up_exp -0.211 -0.280 0.204 -0.289 -0.010 -0.167 -0.096 -0.020 -0.086 0.195 0.179 -0.268 0.010 0.243   0.004 
(16) #staff -0.012 0.099 0.005 0.214 0.004 -0.223 0.292 0.470 0.302 -0.145 0.322 0.162 -0.498 0.227 -0.184   
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the start-up attributes. Specifically, summary statistics (Panel A) and correlations (Panel B) are presented. In 
Panel B, statistical significance at the 0.1 level using two-tailed tests is indicated in bold type. Pearson's correlation coefficients are shown in the lower triangle 
while Spearman's rank correlations appear above the diagonal. See Appendix A1 for the variable definitions. 
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TABLE 7 
Summary statistics and correlations – transaction level 
 
Panel A: (Portfolio-weighted) Firm Properties by Investor Type – Transaction Level (Investments only) 
Investor Type   Institutional 
 Retail 
Variable   Investments Mean SD   Investments Mean SD 
overall_discl   302 5.79 0.51   15,493 5.46 0.69 
fin_discl  302 4.51 0.73   15,493 4.00 1.13 
team_discl   302 4.17 0.43   15,493 4.13 0.49 
vid_length   302 5.21 0.45   15,493 5.12 0.51 
hist_fin_stat   302 0.27 0.21   15,493 0.26 0.22 
%funded   302 36.81 17.16   15,493 37.82 17.29 
%eq_offered  302 17.23 4.00   15,493 16.87 4.96 
%held_by_third   302 14.36 8.84   15,493 14.38 9.32 
value   302 2,620,000 1,820,000   15,493 2,450,000 1,880,000 
years_i_b   302 1.34 0.69   15,493 1.32 0.66 
years_2_be   302 1.95 0.31   15,493 2.06 0.34 
patent   302 0.16 0.23   15,493 0.14 0.22 
rewards  302 0.44 0.27   15,493 0.46 0.26 
team_buslaw  302 0.66 0.23   15,493 0.68 0.24 
team_industry_exp  302 0.70 0.24   15,493 0.72 0.23 
team_start-up_exp  302 0.69 0.27   15,493 0.64 0.27 
#staff  302 9.13 4.46   15,493 8.75 3.80 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
Summary statistics and correlations – transaction level 
 
Panel B: Correlation matrix – Transaction Level  
N = 26,968 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) invested                         
(2) pfsize 0.180                      
(3) exp -0.076 0.648                    
(4) amount 0.208 -0.025 -0.044                  
(5) overall_discl -0.115 0.085 0.114 0.015                
(6) fin_di -0.055 0.158 0.222 0.040 0.514              
(7) team_di -0.013 -0.054 -0.109 -0.012 0.251 0.004            
(8) vid_length 0.030 0.118 0.135 0.049 0.523 0.461 0.059          
(9) hist_fin_stat -0.051 -0.047 -0.042 -0.019 -0.026 0.191 -0.144 -0.207        
(10) opp -0.544 -0.257 0.095 -0.065 0.124 0.044 0.044 0.011 0.059      
(11) %funded -0.313 -0.243 -0.045 -0.044 0.088 0.075 0.050 0.091 0.030 0.293    
(12) %eq_offered 0.153 0.020 0.033 0.045 0.028 -0.074 -0.169 -0.073 -0.293 0.011 0.007  
(13) %held_by_third 0.019 0.013 -0.003 0.011 -0.025 -0.025 0.086 0.051 0.231 0.091 0.076 -0.135 
(14) value 0.080 0.112 0.224 0.098 0.071 0.356 -0.159 0.133 0.062 -0.023 -0.082 -0.228 
(15) years_i_b 0.025 0.056 0.121 0.035 -0.069 0.341 -0.170 0.089 0.536 -0.019 -0.029 -0.417 
(16) years_2_be 0.045 -0.015 0.020 -0.007 -0.311 -0.524 -0.413 -0.292 0.089 -0.035 -0.058 0.032 
(17) patents -0.003 0.068 0.159 0.045 -0.117 0.295 -0.240 -0.038 0.345 0.026 -0.097 -0.385 
(18) rewards 0.067 0.048 0.066 0.053 0.265 -0.072 0.029 0.032 0.021 0.081 0.044 0.129 
(19) team_buslaw -0.051 -0.056 -0.104 -0.024 0.349 0.035 0.440 0.205 -0.200 -0.079 -0.025 -0.089 
(20) team_industry_exp 0.105 0.023 0.059 0.038 -0.272 -0.268 -0.062 -0.375 -0.111 -0.052 -0.157 0.114 
(21) team_start-up_exp -0.017 -0.014 -0.041 -0.021 -0.116 -0.256 0.196 -0.149 0.065 0.025 -0.093 -0.255 
(22) #staff 0.130 0.046 0.069 0.089 -0.079 0.177 -0.020 0.154 0.094 0.063 -0.002 -0.291 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
Summary statistics and correlations – transaction level 
     
Panel B: Correlation matrix – Transaction Level (continued) 
N = 26,968 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
(13) %held_by_third                   
(14) value -0.049                  
(15) years_i_b 0.330 0.481                
(16) years_2_be 0.114 0.090 0.089              
(17) patents -0.038 0.787 0.612 0.206            
(18) rewards 0.168 0.246 -0.006 0.100 -0.070          
(19) team_buslaw -0.266 -0.143 -0.193 -0.217 -0.323 -0.096        
(20) team_industry_exp -0.085 0.255 0.101 0.192 0.273 -0.026 -0.217      
(21) team_start-up_exp 0.133 0.068 0.029 0.166 0.276 -0.304 -0.044 0.205    
(22) #staff 0.337 0.491 0.420 -0.103 0.416 0.154 -0.463 0.239 -0.063 
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the different transaction attributes. Specifically, summary statistics (Panel A) and 
correlations (Panel B) are presented. In Panel A, portfolio-weighted [i.e., by using the relative investment amount as a weight for each 
investor-firm pair (i.e., investment)] transaction attributes are presented by investor type. In Panel A, a statistically significant mean 
difference for the two sub-samples at the 0.1 level using two-tailed tests is indicated in bold type. In Panel B, statistical significance at 
the 0.1 level using two-tailed tests is indicated in bold type. See Appendix A1 for the variable definitions. 
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TABLE 8 
Full sample regressions 
 
Dependent variable = invested 
Sample Pooled Sample Retail Investors 
Investor Type  
(for which type equals 1) 
- Institutional pfsize ≥ 5 
Øamount 
≥ € 500 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
overall_discl -0.079** -0.044** -0.044** -0.038** -0.027 -0.037* 
  (-2.482) (-2.195) (-2.197) (-2.050) (-1.389) (-2.036) 
type * overall_discl   0.019 0.009 0.003 0.001 
   (0.640) (0.238) (0.114) (0.054) 
fin_discl -0.005 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.068*** 0.073*** 0.062*** 
  (-0.177) (3.440) (3.372) (3.848) (4.096) (3.724) 
type * fin_discl   0.043** 0.053** -0.015 0.037*** 
   (2.445) (2.663) (-0.769) (3.172) 
team_discl 0.012 0.050** 0.049** 0.046** 0.054** 0.047** 
  (0.292) (2.312) (2.275) (2.370) (2.649) (2.618) 
type * team_discl   0.032 0.038* -0.030 -0.009 
   (1.395) (1.939) (-1.594) (-0.638) 
vid_length 0.061 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.083*** 0.073*** 
  (1.499) (3.436) (3.453) (3.591) (4.186) (4.043) 
type * vid_length   -0.042* -0.053** -0.053*** -0.016 
   (-1.949) (-2.346) (-3.534) (-1.352) 
hist_fin_stat -0.026 -0.048 -0.047 -0.064* -0.066* -0.053 
 (-0.289) (-1.151) (-1.115) (-1.702) (-1.707) (-1.530) 
type * hist_fin_stat   -0.105** -0.112** -0.033 -0.078** 
   (-2.506) (-2.444) (-0.717) (-2.349) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE  Yes Yes    
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investor FE       Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 26,968 26,968 26,968 26,968 26,467 26,467 
Investments 15,795 15,795 15,795 15,795 15,493 15,493 
Non-Investments 11,173 11,173 11,173 11,173 10,974 10,974 
adj. R² 2.58% 45.20% 45.20% 41.80% 42.80% 42.00% 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results of different specifications of model (1) that differ with respect 
to the employed explanatory variables and fixed effects structures. The pooled sample [specifications (1) to (4)] 
comprises 26,968 transactions, whereas the sample of only retail investors [specification (5) and (6)] comprises 
26,467 transactions. The table reports regression coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses). The t-
statistics are based on robust standard errors with one-way clustering by firm. ***, **, * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. See Appendix A1 for the variable defini-
tions. The complete regression results, i.e., also including the results for the control variables, are presented in 
Appendix A3.1. 
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TABLE 9 
Sub-sample analysis by retail investors’ demographics and crowdinvesting experience 
 
Dependent variable = invested 
Sample Retail Investors 
Age group all < 20 20 to 29 30 to 39 40 to 49 ≥ 50 
Investor Type  
(for which type equals 1) 
male pfsize ≥ 5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
overall_discl -0.024 -0.072 -0.031 -0.024 -0.032* 0.028 
  (-0.889) (-1.220) (-1.491) (-0.974) (-1.998) (1.343) 
type * overall_discl -0.016 0.029 -0.006 0.005 0.022 -0.043 
 (-0.875) (0.413) (-0.182) (0.214) (1.116) (-1.578) 
fin_discl 0.115*** 0.103** 0.081*** 0.077*** 0.063*** 0.038** 
  (3.791) (2.210) (3.617) (3.603) (5.131) (2.687) 
type * fin_discl -0.052** -0.037 -0.037 -0.014 -0.005 0.018 
 (-2.289) (-0.802) (-1.272) (-0.672) (-0.207) (0.704) 
team_discl 0.014 0.097** 0.057** 0.047* 0.066*** 0.046** 
  (0.560) (2.725) (2.694) (1.932) (3.444) (2.635) 
type * team_discl 0.036** -0.040 -0.039 -0.040* -0.001 -0.003 
 (2.041) (-0.932) (-1.650) (-2.018) (-0.021) (-0.114) 
vid_length 0.045 0.077** 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.107*** 0.105*** 
  (1.472) (2.054) (3.220) (3.357) (5.617) (6.138) 
type * vid_length 0.028 0.008 -0.022 -0.052*** -0.087*** -0.095*** 
 (1.679) (0.164) (-0.913) (-3.117) (-4.557) (-3.022) 
hist_fin_stat -0.152** -0.029 -0.074* -0.073 -0.064* -0.037 
 (-2.342) (-0.209) (-1.729) (-1.551) (-1.784) (-0.951) 
type * hist_fin_stat 0.096* 0.103 -0.021 -0.013 -0.058 -0.119 
 (1.943) (0.735) (-0.334) (-0.262) (-0.989) (-1.614) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 26,467 347 9,166 9,145 5,267 2,542 
Investments 15,493 216 5,353 5,449 3,005 1,470 
Non-Investments 10,974 131 3,813 3,696 2,262 1,072 
adj. R² 41.90% 44.30% 43.00% 43.20% 42.50% 39.30% 
Notes: This table reports OLS sub-sample regression results of model (1). The dependent variable is invested. In 
Columns (1) results of the sample of (all) retail investors are presented. Here, type represents an indicator vari-
able that takes on the value 1 (0) for male (female) investors. In Columns (2) to (6) regression results for the sub-
samples of different age groups of retail investors are presented. Here, type takes on the value (1) 0 if investors 
have invested in equal to or more than (less than) five distinct start-ups. The table reports regression coefficient 
estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses). The t-statistics are based on robust standard errors with one-way clus-
tering by firm. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. 
See Appendix A1 for the variable definitions. 
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TABLE 10 
Sub-sample analysis of investment amount determinants 
 
Dependent variable = log(amount) 
Sample Pooled Sample 
Retail 
Investors 
Investor Type  
(for which type equals 1) 
- Institutional pfsize ≥ 5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
overall_discl -0.028 -0.048 -0.049 -0.065*** -0.029 
  (-0.548) (-1.457) (-1.500) (-3.099) (-1.443) 
type * overall_discl   0.232** -0.147** -0.052** 
   (2.367) (-2.484) (-2.044) 
fin_discl 0.056 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.054*** 0.033** 
  (1.269) (2.780) (2.841) (4.118) (2.575) 
type * fin_discl   0.094 0.165*** 0.035** 
   (1.036) (3.175) (2.262) 
team_discl -0.067 0.039* 0.040* 0.023 0.013 
  (-1.072) (1.843) (1.928) (1.260) (0.659) 
type * team_discl   -0.063 -0.037 0.027 
   (-0.892) (-1.111) (1.154) 
vid_length 0.065 0.097*** 0.095*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 
  (1.047) (4.676) (4.651) (4.003) (3.365) 
type * vid_length   -0.126 -0.170** -0.001 
   (-1.002) (-2.136) (-0.077) 
hist_fin_stat -0.112 -0.119 -0.104 -0.010 -0.001 
 (-0.919) (-1.679) (-1.553) (-0.225) (-0.020) 
type * hist_fin_stat   -1.321*** -0.487*** -0.055 
   (-4.165) (-3.301) (-1.279) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE  Yes Yes   
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investor FE       Yes Yes 
Obs. (investments) 15,795 15,795 15,795 15,795 15,493 
adj. R² 0.72% 9.60% 9.68% 81.20% 81.00% 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results of different specifications of model (1) that differ with respect 
to the employed explanatory variables and fixed effects structures. However, in contrast to model (1), the em-
ployed dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the investment amount. As this analysis focuses on the 
identification of factors that explain variation in the investment amount, I exclude all non-investments. The 
pooled sample [specifications (1) to (4)] therefore comprises 15,795 investments, whereas the sample of only 
retail investors [specification (5)] comprises 15,493 investments. The table reports regression coefficient esti-
mates and t-statistics (in parentheses). The t-statistics are based on robust standard errors with one-way clustering 
by firm. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. See 
Appendix A1 for the variable definitions. 
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TABLE 11 
Sub-sample analysis of retail investors’ investment amount by gender and age group  
 
Dependent variable = log(amount) 
Sample Retail Investors 
Age group all < 20 20 to 29 30 to 39 40 to 49 ≥ 50 
Investor Type  
(for which type equals 1) 
male  pfsize ≥ 5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
overall_discl -0.012 0.053 -0.013 -0.068** 0.004 -0.046 
  (-0.311) (0.576) (-0.465) (-2.085) (0.142) (-1.000) 
type * overall_discl -0.058 -0.428* -0.126** 0.006 -0.058 0.003 
 (-1.365) (-1.904) (-2.157) (0.156) (-1.373) (0.036) 
fin_discl -0.023 -0.008 0.030 0.033 0.044** 0.044* 
  (-0.811) (-0.141) (1.620) (1.422) (2.366) (1.975) 
type * fin_discl 0.084*** 0.202 0.094** 0.011 0.023 0.000 
 (2.944) (1.185) (2.169) (0.532) (0.625) (0.008) 
team_discl 0.025 -0.165* 0.036 0.002 0.000 -0.007 
  (0.897) (-2.001) (1.363) (0.082) (0.023) (-0.224) 
type * team_discl 0.002 0.656*** -0.008 0.033 0.048 0.130** 
 (0.077) (3.036) (-0.179) (1.051) (1.166) (2.610) 
vid_length 0.046** -0.025 0.046** 0.078*** 0.008 0.105*** 
  (2.081) (-0.267) (2.040) (2.880) (0.386) (4.040) 
type * vid_length 0.013 0.192 0.015 0.003 0.007 -0.134*** 
 (0.581) (1.105) (0.419) (0.104) (0.213) (-3.023) 
hist_fin_stat 0.050 0.059 -0.033 0.046 0.023 -0.037 
 (0.595) (0.304) (-0.504) (0.668) (0.374) (-0.646) 
type * hist_fin_stat -0.055 -0.636 -0.066 0.020 -0.175* -0.137 
 (-0.720) (-1.200) (-0.700) (0.279) (-1.823) (-1.118) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 15,493 216 5,353 5,449 3,005 1,470 
adj. R² 81.00% 66.70% 76.60% 79.30% 84.30% 86.30% 
Notes: This table reports OLS sub-sample regression results of model (1). The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of the investment amount. In Columns (1) results of the sample of (all) retail investors are presented. 
Here, type represents an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 (0) for male (female) investors. In Columns 
(2) to (6) regression results for the sub-samples of different age groups of retail investors are presented. Here, 
type takes on the value (1) 0 if investors have invested in equal to or more than (less than) five distinct start-ups. 
The table reports regression coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses). The t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors with one-way clustering by firm. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. See Appendix A1 for the variable definitions. 
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Abstract 
This study examines retail investors’ actual information acquisition in the Crowdinvesting market. Us-
ing proprietary investor-level Google Analytics data from Companisto, one of the largest German 
Crowdinvesting platforms, I find that crowdinvestors do not consider a substantial fraction of start-ups’ 
(financial) disclosures before investing. Furthermore, I show that investors’ information acquisition var-
ies with their demographics, their level of crowdinvesting experience and (average) investment amounts. 
My findings are consistent with investors acquiring less information in the presence of potential signals 
of quality. Specifically, it appears that investors decrease information acquisition following the public 
disclosure of professional investments during the crowdinvesting campaign and for firms that hold pa-
tents. Also, I find a negative association between investors’ information acquisition and the progress 
(i.e., the stage) of the funding round with this association being more pronounced for more experienced 
crowdinvestors. Finally, my results suggest that investors acquire less information for less risky invest-
ments. 
Keywords: retail investors, information acquisition, crowdinvesting 
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1 Introduction 
In crowdinvesting, (unsophisticated) retail investors take on the role of risk capital pro-
viders, a field traditionally reserved for professional investors (e.g., venture capital firms and 
business angels) (Mollick 2013)59,60. The internet-based and, therefore, easily accessible nature 
of so-called crowdinvesting portals (CIPs) and the services they provide in their function as 
financial intermediaries put (retail) investors in a position in which they are just a few clicks 
away from an investment in an early-stage start-up. However, the success of this relatively new 
form of external entrepreneurial financing is affected by the relative costs of raising capital and 
thus the level of regulation. In many jurisdictions, disclosure requirements in the context of 
crowdinvesting campaigns are relatively low. In Germany, they comprise unaudited financial 
statements along with a brief description of risks associated with the investment. CIPs further 
require firms to provide additional disclosures related to the business model, the expected future 
performance and the managing team. Thus, most available information is unaudited and partly 
(ex ante) unverifiable. Combined with the lack of operating history and the low relevance of 
historical financial statements for the assessment of the economic potential of early-stage ven-
tures, it is unclear which information investors (should) use as a basis for their investment de-
cisions (Bradford 2012; Mäschle 2012; Cumming and Johan 2013).61 
                                                     
59  As all three studies constituting this Ph.D. thesis investigate investor behavior in crowdinvesting (on 
Companisto), there are certain, and in some cases inevitable, similarities in the structure and contents of these 
studies. Specifically, as the order of the papers presented in this study reflects the chronology of their first 
drafts, my second (and third) study build(s) up on my first (and second) study. These similarities are particularly 
pronounced in the discussion of the related literature [pages 89 to 90 (151 to 152) of the second (third) paper 
build up on pages 12 to 13 and pages 23 to 29 of the first (and pages 89 to 90 of the second) paper], the 
description of the institutional environment [pages 91 to 97 (153 to 154) of the second (third) paper build up 
on pages 17 to 23 of the first (and pages 91 to 97 of the second) paper], and the (discussion of the) variables 
used in the empirical analysis [pages 98 to 103 of the second paper build up on pages 31 to 38 of the first 
paper]. As all three studies have not been previously published, for the scope of this dissertation, I generally 
abstain from self-quotations. However, in places, I discuss the results of my prior studies or name them as 
examples for prior findings. 
60  Note that the discussion in the entire following paragraph is based on Bradford (2012), Mäschle (2012), and 
Cumming and Johan (2013). 
61  See Klöhn et al. (2016) for a more detailed discussion of start-ups’ disclosure requirements in Germany.  
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I add to this question by providing descriptive empirical evidence on retail investors’ 
actual information acquisition on Companisto, one of the largest German crowdinvesting plat-
forms. Consistent with prior evidence from traditional capital markets (e.g., Bhattacharya et 
al. 2012), I find that crowdinvestors tend to neglect (i.e., don’t access) a substantial fraction of 
start-ups’ (financial) disclosures. Specifically, I find that the (projected) financial disclosures 
that start-ups provide in addition to historical financial statements are accessed prior to only 
around 50 percent of all investments. Given that this information is ex ante unverifiable in na-
ture and unaudited, it is not clear whether investors should consider this information for their 
investment decisions (Stocken 2000; Mercer 2004). Related evidence on the selection criteria 
of professional risk capital providers, for example, suggests that Business Angels consider the 
reliability of start-ups’ financial projections as insufficient as to use them for valuation purposes 
(Mason and Rogers 1997; van Osnabrugge and Robinson 2000). Nevertheless, start-ups’ finan-
cial projections on Companisto should still be useful for respective investors as they are accom-
panied by a discussion of the underlying assumptions and might (therefore) be informative with 
regard to the abilities (i.e., financial knowledge) and personal characteristics (e.g., level of con-
fidence) of the managing team. The evidence presented by Mason and Harrison (1996), for 
example, suggests that unrealistic and flawed financial projections are major deal rejection fac-
tors for Business Angels. Moreover, related evidence from crowdinvesting markets (e.g., Ah-
lers et al. 2015; Hemaidan 2017) indicates a positive association between start-ups’ financial 
information and ‘funding success’. 
My analyses further reveal that crowdinvestors’ information acquisition varies with 
their demographics, their level of crowdinvesting experience as well as their (average) invest-
ment amounts. Specifically, my results indicate a negative (positive) association between in-
vestors’ age (average investment amount) and both their likelihood of accessing and the time 
spent on processing start-ups’ disclosures on Companisto. Moreover, I find that male investors 
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are more likely to access the different types of information (e.g., financial forecasts, profiles of 
the managing team) provided in each crowdinvesting. Consistent with prior literature on the 
decision criteria of professional risk capital providers (e.g., Häussler et al. 2012), my findings 
further suggest that certain firm attributes which investors might consider as signals of start-up 
quality (e.g., patents) are negatively associated with the time investors spend on the acquisition 
of forward-looking financial information. Also, my evidence indicates that the presence of pro-
fessional investments during the crowdinvesting campaign [i.e., relatively large investments 
(1,000 Euro or above) by firms whose names suggest professional risk capital providers] is 
negatively associated with investors’ information acquisition. In line with this evidence and 
consistent with research on the selection criteria of Business Angels (e.g., van Osnabrugge 
2000; Sudek 2006), I find that the presence of co-investments by professional risk capital pro-
viders prior to the crowdinvesting campaign is associated with investors’ information acquisi-
tion. Finally, I find that investors spend significantly less time on information acquisition if the 
start-up issues a debt (instead of an equity-like) security, suggesting that the extent of infor-
mation acquisition also varies with the level of investment risk. 
The evidence presented in this study adds to a series of papers on (the determinants of) 
retail investors’ information usage that indicate that (unsophisticated) private investors primar-
ily use filtered information (e.g., Elliott et al. 2008; Ernst et al. 2009), tend to ignore relevant 
information (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 2012), and have problems to process (complex) financial 
information (e.g., Frederickson and Miller 2004; Koonce et al. 2010) (see Cascino et al. 2013, 
2014 for an overview and a more detailed discussion). Several more recent studies provide 
direct evidence on investors’ actual information acquisition by analysing Google searches 
(Drake et al. 2012) and the download activity on EDGAR62 (Drake et al. 2015, 2017; Loughran 
and McDonald 2017). Drake et al. (2015), for example, find that EDGAR activity is positively 
                                                     
62  Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system.  
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associated with firms’ performance and the strength of their information environment. More 
closely related to my study is the evidence presented by Drake et al. (2017) who investigate 
how information acquisition via EDGAR is associated with the demographics in certain areas 
(i.e., U.S. ZIP codes). However, the data used in these studies does typically not allow for in-
vestor-level analyses and can (therefore) not link investors’ information behavior to their in-
vestment activity. I add to this literature in several ways. First, by employing user-level Google 
Analytics (GA) data, I provide a more direct and complete measure of retail investors’ actual 
information acquisition. Secondly, in contrast to studies that focus on information acquisition 
related to (relatively established) firms that engage in traditional capital markets, the crowd-
funding (crowdinvesting) setting allows me to examine information acquisition related to a 
substantial fraction of firms’ overall information environment (see Michels 2012 for a more 
detailed discussion). Finally, due to the internet-based nature of crowdinvesting, I can observe 
both investors’ information acquisition related to a substantial fraction of firms’ information 
environment (on Companisto) and all investment decisions that follow this information acqui-
sition. I am therefore able to provide direct user-level evidence on investors’ actual information 
acquisition prior to investing. Given the risky and internet-based nature of crowdinvesting, it 
is, however, not clear to which extent the insights gained in this study are representative for 
investors’ information behavior in other capital markets. 
My findings also contribute to the growing body of crowdinvesting literature (see 
Moritz and Block 2016 and Wallmeroth et al. 2017 for an overview of the crowdfunding liter-
ature) by providing direct evidence on crowdinvestors’ information behavior before investing. 
A large part of this literature focuses on crowdinvestors’ selection criteria. While some studies 
theoretically discuss potential quality signals in crowdinvesting (e.g., Agrawal et al. 2014; 
Vismara 2017b), the empirical evidence suggests that the characteristics of the managing board 
(e.g., Ahlers et al. 2015; Bernstein et al. 2017), publicly observable investments by others (e.g., 
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Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016b; Kim and Viswanathan 2016; Vismara 2017a), the extent of 
firms’ disclosures on the CIP (e.g., Hemaidan 2017), and the dynamics of the funding process 
(e.g., Block et al. 2016; Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016b; Dorfleitner et al. 2017) are related 
to the investment behavior of crowdinvestors. However, apart from Bernstein et al. (2017), who 
conduct a field experiment in which they randomize the information content of a newsletter to 
analyze the information preferences of (accredited) investors on AngelList, these studies typi-
cally do not analyze the information acquisition process itself but link issuance attributes to 
investment decisions. I extend these findings by adding an information acquisition perspective. 
More closely related to my study is the evidence provided by Moritz et al. (2015). The authors 
survey different participants (i.e., investors, CIPs and start-ups) in the German crowdinvesting 
market, showing that investors regard investments of professional risk capital providers as a 
signal of start-up quality. I add to their findings by providing evidence consistent with the pres-
ence of professional investments affecting crowdinvestors’ information acquisition process 
prior to investing. This result is also consistent with the evidence provided by Kim and Viswa-
nathan (2016) whose findings indicate that the extent to which crowdfunders’ investment be-
havior is affected by prior investments varies with the expertise of the early investors. Moreo-
ver, in line with the findings of Agrawal et al. (2014) who highlight the importance of accumu-
lated capital as a quality signal for crowdinvestors, I find a negative association between inves-
tors’ information acquisition and the ratio of the accumulated investment amount and the total 
funding amount. My findings are also consistent with related survey-based evidence. In their 
study Polzin et al. (2017) find that crowdfunders generally consider the different types of in-
formation disclosed in funding campaigns. Based on the survey data for a small group of 
crowdinvestors, their findings further suggest that the weight investors place on start-ups’ dis-
closures varies with investor demographics and the investment amount. 
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While Google Analytics (GA) has previously been used for academic research (Crutzen 
et al. 2013; Clark et al. 2014) on the behavior of webpage users, to my knowledge, I am the 
first to use large-scale user-level GA data to study investors’ information acquisition. 
An important limitation of my study lies in the fact that I am only able to track registered 
investors’ information acquisition related to the different information sections (i.e., webpages) 
of each issuance. However, potential investors can also download a pitch deck, unaudited his-
torical financial statements, and a three-page prospectus while being logged off. The pitch deck 
typically contains condensed information on key aspects of the business (e.g., information on 
the product, target market and (expected) financial position) that is also included in the different 
information sections. Given the potential (complementary) association between the extent of 
information acquisition related to this additional information and the information included in 
my sample, my results should therefore be interpreted carefully.63  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information on crowdinvesting in general, specific regulatory conditions in Germany and the 
information environment on Companisto. The data and research design underlying the empiri-
cal analyses of this study are explained in Section 3. Section 4 shows descriptive empirical 
evidence on investors’ information acquisition on Companisto while Section 5 concludes. 
2 Institutional Background 
2.1 Defining Crowdfunding and Crowdinvesting 
Following Belleflamme et al. (2010:5), crowdfunding can be generally defined as “(…) 
an open call, essentially through the Internet, for the provision of financial resources either in 
form of donation or in exchange for some reward (…)”. Prior literature typically distinguishes 
                                                     
63  However, in untabulated analyses, I find that my results related to investors’ information acquisition (i.e., the 
evidence presented in Tables 5 and 6) do not substantially change when I exclude issuances that include a pitch 
deck (11 out of 24 issuances). Moreover, in the corresponding multiple regression analysis (i.e., the evidence 
presented in Table 8), I include issuance-fixed effects to control for time-invariant issuance attributes.    
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between four major forms of crowdfunding, which differ with respect to contributors’ expected 
returns (Schwienbacher and Larralde 2012; Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016a,b). The dona-
tion-based model (e.g., Betterplace.org) does not offer any direct return as most projects on 
these platforms have a charitable character. In the reward-based model (e.g., Kickstarter.com), 
by contrast, funders typically obtain the final product (e.g., a video game or music album) in 
return for their contribution (Ahlers et al. 2015; Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016a,b).  
[Figure 1 about here] 
More directly related to an investment perspective are the lending-based model (e.g., 
Prosper.com) and equity-based (e.g., wefunder.com). While in the former, contributors provide 
loans in exchange for fixed interest payments that are often determined through a reverse auc-
tion and repayments of principal, in the second model, contributors provide capital in exchange 
for residual claims in the future cash flows of an early stage venture. As CIPs act as financial 
intermediaries between start-ups and investors by offering standardized financial contracts, they 
usually charge a commission of up to ten percent of the funded amount. However, this com-
mission is only due if the funding is successful.64 In addition to their financial service, most 
CIPs offer advisory services, e.g., with respect to strategic marketing (Ahlers et al. 2015; Hor-
nuf and Schwienbacher 2016a,b, 2017)65. Figure 1 depicts the crowdinvesting process. 
2.2 Crowdinvesting in Germany 
Crowdinvesting is generally categorized in lending-based and equity-based models. 
Most CIPs, however, offer mezzanine financial instruments to avoid equity-specific securities 
regulation. In Germany, CIPs typically employ a special form of subordinated loans to enable 
start-ups to raise capital without being required to disclose an extensive IPO prospectus (Klöhn 
                                                     
64  Investments are returned to investors if the investment amount is not raised within the funding period. 
65  Note that the discussion in the entire previous paragraph is based on Ahlers et al. 2015 as well as Hornuf and 
Schwienbacher (2016a,b, 2017). 
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and Hornuf 2012; Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2017)66. Given their subordinated nature, in case 
of bankruptcy, these loans are only repaid once the claims of other debt-holders have been 
served. During a pre-defined holding period, investors receive fixed interest payments. How-
ever, firms can also issue subordinated loans that offer investors a pro-rate share in the profits 
and the value development of a firm. As these securities essentially reflect a risk-and-reward 
exposure typically associated with equity, I refer to these loans as ‘equity-like’. However, vot-
ing rights are typically not transferred (Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016b). On Companisto, 
one of the largest German CIPs, firms can issue both debt- and equity-like securities with the 
former issuance being less risky given that (a) it can only be issued by already “established 
growth companies” (Companisto 2017) and as (b) investors’ cash flows are less volatile.67 To 
minimize the impact of fraudulent activities, German securities regulation limits the maximum 
investment amount without the obligation to register to 2.5 million (10,000) Euro per issuance 
(investor).68 
2.3 Disclosures on Companisto 
This study aims to provide a description of crowdinvestors’ information acquisition. 
Thus, it is crucial to understand which kind of information start-ups placing a funding on Com-
panisto (are required to) provide. According to German securities regulation, firms must pro-
vide unaudited financial statements and briefly discuss material risks and rewards associated 
                                                     
66  Note that the discussion in the entire previous [following] paragraph is based on Klöhn and Hornuf (2012) and 
Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2017) [Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2016b)]. 
67  Naturally, the specifics of the investment forms as well as the available set of information (i.e., the (mandated) 
content and structure of start-ups’ disclosures on Companisto) are subject to constant change (e.g., as a result 
of regulatory changes). The information presented in the remainder of this paper is therefore not necessarily 
representative for Companisto’s investment forms and the available set of information for the time before and 
the time after my sample period (see Hemaidan 2017 (Gassen and Hemaidan 2017) for a description of the 
investment forms and information requirements on Companisto before (after) my sample period). Also, the 
disclosure requirements discussed in this paper do not consider firms’ contractual post-funding information 
obligations on Companisto. 
68  See Klöhn et al. (2016) [and Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2017)] for a detailed discussion of the regulation of 
crowdinvesting in Germany [and in other countries].  
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with the issuance in a three-page prospectus.69 However, the information provided in these pro-
spectuses is often extremely condensed and not very comprehensive.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
To address this lack of publicly available information, Companisto requires start-ups to 
disclose additional information including a general “Overview“ of the business model, the prod-
uct(s) and target market(s) in a separate section of the issuance (see Figure 2). As this typically 
also includes other factors, e.g., a SWOT analysis, it should be relevant for potential investors. 
This intuition is supported by related evidence on the selection criteria of Business Angels 
which indicates that sophisticated private risk capital providers consider the size (Feeney et al. 
1999) and growth (Mason and Rogers 1997) of the target market as well as the product (status) 
(Mason and Harrison 1996, 2002) in their investment decisions (see Maxwell et al. 2011 for an 
overview of business angels selection criteria). In addition, the “Overview“-Section contains a 
pitch video, in which the founders introduce themselves and their businesses. Prior research on 
crowdinvestors’ investments decisions (e.g., Moritz et al. 2015; Hemaidan 2017) suggests that 
the (length of the) pitch video is positively associated with crowdinvestors decision to invest in 
a start-up. The pitch video further allows investors to get a personal impression of the founders 
who use the pitch video to present themselves and their company in the video (Moritz et al. 
2015). The evidence presented by Mason and Stark (2004), for example, suggests that both the 
individual attributes of the entrepreneurs as well as the composition of the managing team (i.e., 
the range of attributes) are highly relevant for the investment decisions of professional risk 
capital providers. Related research from P2P-lending further indicates that soft factors (i.e., 
appearance-based judgements) are considered by investors in their decision-making (Duarte et 
                                                     
69  Moreover, in accordance with the Introductory Act of the German Civil Code (EGBGB), a three-page 
consumer information sheet is provided. This information is legally mandated for all types distance (e.g., in-
ternet) or off-premises sales and includes legal information on the (risks of the) product and all rights related 
to buyer protection.   
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al. 2012; Ravina 2012). Taken together, this section should be highly relevant for potential in-
vestors.  
[Figure 3 about here] 
Aside from historical financial statements, firms are required to disclose selected finan-
cial forecasts (e.g., EBIT) for the subsequent years accompanied by a discussion of the assump-
tions underlying these forecasts in the “Financial Data“-Section of each issuance (see Figure 3). 
Moreover, Companisto mandates firms to provide information related to the (legal) structure of 
the start-up (e.g., the shareholder structure, the number of employees). In addition, firms often 
voluntarily disclose information on key performance indicators (KPIs) and forecasted financial 
statements (i.e., projected income and cash flow statements) as well as information on the firm’s 
investment strategy and (expected) liquidity, all of which related research identifies as relevant 
for professional risk capital providers (see Maxwell et al. 2011). As previously discussed, while 
investors might not necessarily rely on this information when assessing the firm’s value and 
expected financial position, respectively, they might still screen it as it is potentially indicative 
of the attributes and quality of the managing team. This would be consistent with related evi-
dence (e.g., Ahlers et al. 2015; Bernstein et al. 2017; Hemaidan 2017; Polzin et al. 2017) which 
generally indicates that crowdinvestors consider firms’ voluntary (financial and management 
team-related) disclosures in the scope of their investment decisions. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
Furthermore, firms are required to disclose profiles of the members of the managing 
team in the “Team“-Section of each issuance (see Figure 4). In addition to narrative disclosures 
on their (professional) background, Companisto requires start-ups to include a picture and links 
to the social media-profiles of each member of the managing team. Given that the pitch video 
typically includes information on the founders of the start-up, it is hard to assess the incremental 
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information content of this section for investors that have already watched the pitch video. 
However, not all pitch videos contain detailed information on the educational and professional 
background of each member of the managing team. I therefore believe that the additional infor-
mation included in this section is generally relevant for potential investors. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
Firms are further encouraged to directly interact with (potential) investors via both an 
“Updates“-Section (i.e., regular information updates regarding the development of the start-up) 
as well as a forum (i.e., the “Comments“-Section). Also, Companisto shows all prior invest-
ments by other investors (including user names as well as the timing and amount of investment) 
in a separate section of each issuance (see Figure 5).70  
The order of the different information sections is constant across issuances.71 The 
“Overview“-Section represents the landing (i.e., first) page of each issuance and is followed by 
the “Updates“, “Financial Data“-, “Team“-, “Comments“- and “Prior Investments“-Section. 
Building up on related evidence that indicates that the location of information in financial state-
ments affects retail investors’ information behavior (Maines and McDaniel 2000; Hodge et al. 
2010), it can be expected that investors’ information acquisition on Companisto should be af-
fected by the way the information is structured (e.g., investors might be less likely to access 
and spend significantly less time on the ‘last’ information sections of each issuance).  
In addition to the information presented in the above-mentioned information sections 
(i.e., tabs), each issuance includes a download section in a sidebar that is visible (i.e., can be 
                                                     
70  Investments by others are also disclosed on the starting page of Companisto. Thus, it is possible for investors 
to see this information without accessing the issuance-specific “Prior Investments”-Section. Please note that 
the original name of this information section on Companisto is „Companists“ (i.e., the term that Companisto 
uses when referring to its registered investors). 
71  However, some issuances contain additional information sections. In my sample, five issuances include an 
additional information section (e.g., with additional videos). I control for this in my research design by, de-
pending on the respective analysis, adding a binary coded variable that takes on the value (0) 1 if the issuance 
exhibits (no) additional information sections or by including issuance-fixed effects.    
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accessed) on all information sections and that comprises unaudited financial statements, a pitch 
desk, the participation contract as well as the prospectus and the consumer information sheets 
are available in PDF format.  
3 Data and Research Design 
3.1 Data 
[Table 1 about here] 
I start my sample selection by gathering investor-level data from Companisto. Between 
June 2012 and January 2017, a total of 68,450 registered investors faced 77 issuances resulting 
in 63,436 investments. As the focus of my study lies on investors’ information acquisition prior 
to these investments, I additionally gather Google Analytics data. User-level webpage tracking 
is a relatively new feature of GA which requires the implementation of an additional interface 
by the operator of the webpage. For Companisto, this data has been available since October 
2015. For the period of October 2015 to January 2017, I gather user-level data on crowdinves-
tors’ information acquisition. During this period, registered and logged in investors visited 
2,421,417 separate webpages on Companisto with most of these page views being not directly 
related to issuances. Thus, I exclude 1,543,959 page views to narrow my sample on investors’ 
information acquisition related to issuance-related disclosures. I merge the remaining 877,458 
page views with the investor-level data and retain a total of 28,505 investors with 20,326 in-
vestments in 33 start-ups. 
As some issuance-specific information sections (i.e., the “Updates“- and the “Prior In-
vestments”-Sections) can be accessed by investors while being logged off, I only consider page 
views related to information sections that can only be accessed in logged in mode (i.e., “Over-
view“, “Financial Data“, “Team“ and “Comments“). Therefore, I further exclude 429,126 issu-
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ance-related page views. Next, I exclude 125 investors due to missing investor-specific infor-
mation. To reduce the bias from investments by friends or family members of a start-up’s found-
ers, whose investment decisions might be taken independently from start-ups’ information en-
vironment on the CIP (e.g., Agrawal et al. 2015), I drop 3,411 investors who, as of January 
2017, have invested in less than two distinct start-ups on Companisto. Moreover, as I want to 
explore investors’ information acquisition prior to investing in a start-up, I drop 247,380 page 
views which did not result in an investment, or occurred after an investment in the respective 
firm. Furthermore, I exclude all investments in start-ups whose funding round started before 
the sample period as well as investments related to issuances that represent the second funding 
round of firms on Companisto.72  
Finally, as I find that some firms only provide information in German, I exclude 593 
investors that are not located in a German-speaking country. I end up with a final sample of 
118,463 page views by 3,128 investors making 10,114 investments in 24 start-ups. 
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Information Acquisition  
To measure investors’ information acquisition, I define two variables, page_view and 
content_pt. Both variables are measured on the investor-issuance-content type-level with 
page_view being binary coded and taking on a value of one (zero) if investor i has (not) accessed 
information section k of issuance j before her investment. My second proxy, content_pt, on the 
other hand, aggregates the time (i.e., minutes) for which investor i has opened a single webpage 
related to issuance j in her web browser (pagetime) on the issuance-content type-level. This 
                                                     
72  I thereby exclude two issuances representing second funding rounds on Companisto, as a successful first issu-
ance might serve as an additional information signal that could influence investors’ information acquisition. 
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allows me to examine factors associated with the total time that investors spend with the acqui-
sition of different types of information provided in each listing.73 Given that Google Analytics 
is not able to record the pagetime related to page views that reflect either the first or the last 
page accessed during a session74, I drop all observations where content_pt includes page views 
with a pagetime of zero (i.e., the default value that GA reports for all first or last page views of 
a session).75 
In contrast to page_view, any empirical evidence based on content_pt does not allow 
for a clear interpretation. While content_pt can be interpreted as the extent of investors’ infor-
mation acquisition, it should also be affected by investors’ ability to process the respective 
information. This should be particularly considered when interpreting differences in the distri-
bution of content_pt across different groups of investors. However, given that a large fraction 
of firms’ disclosures presented in the different information sections on Companisto is non-fi-
nancial and qualitative, it is not clear to which extent investors differ in their ability to process 
this information. Given the fixed structure of crowdinvestors’ information environment on 
Companisto, investors’ experience on Companisto should be negatively associated with the 
time that they need to identify potentially relevant information. However, it might also be that 
investors’ information preferences change with their level of experience (e.g., Bernstein et al. 
                                                     
73  To avoid bias of long webpage views that were unrelated to information acquisition, I winsorize pagetime for 
all values above 120 minutes. 
74  As Google Analytics measures “time on page” (i.e., pagetime) as the time between two page views (i.e., two 
hits that redirect the user to a new html-page), a reference point within a webpage is needed to accurately 
calculate pagetime. As for the first and last page view of a session such a reference point on the respective site 
is missing, GA is not able to correctly measure “time on page” which results in a displayed pagetime of zero. 
75  For each information section (i.e., specification of content_pt), I exclude all investments with at least one page 
view related to the respective information section that has a value of zero. Thus, the samples of investments 
used for my analysis of content_pt differ across information sections. It should further be noted that I thereby 
drop page views where the actual pagetime is zero, e.g., where the investor just clicks through the different 
information sections (i.e., tabs) of an issuance without previously screening the information. 
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2017) and/or that they rely relatively less on the additional information provided in the down-
load section of each issuance. It is therefore ex ante unclear how crowdinvesting experience 
should affect investors’ information acquisition. 
3.2.2 Investor Attributes 
To investigate how investors’ information acquisition varies with their demographics, I 
include age and gender (binary coded, with one indicating that an investor is male). Moreover, 
I account for investors’ level of crowdinvesting experience on Companisto by including the 
number of unique start-ups in their portfolio (pfsize) as well as the time since they first regis-
tered on Companisto (exp). Both pfsize and exp as well as age are measured at the time t that 
investor i first accesses information section k of start-up j. 
3.2.3 Issuance Attributes 
Furthermore, to examine how issuance attributes are associated with investors’ infor-
mation acquisition, I build up on prior research (Ahlers et al. 2015; Moritz et al. 2015; Vismara 
2017a) and include a set of variables that capture issuance attributes. First, I include a binary 
coded variable with one (zero) indicating the issuance of debt [equity(like)] securities. Moreo-
ver, I add an indicator variable (prior_VC) that takes on the value of one if at least one profes-
sional risk capital provider (i.e., Business Angel and/or Venture Capital Company) is already 
invested in the start-up prior to the start of the crowdinvesting campaign on Companisto. If 
investors believe that respective investments reflect the positive outcome of an extensive due 
diligence by investors that are more sophisticated than themselves76, they might free-ride on 
others’ efforts and/or expertise by decreasing their own information acquisition (Hornuf and 
                                                     
76  This notion is consistent with the survey evidence provided by Moritz et al. (2015:326). When asked about the 
relevance of VC and BA investments for his own investment decision, one investor stated: “(…) if business 
angels are already invested, there must be more behind it. They have a deeper look into the company, as they 
are directly investing thousands of Euros”. Another investor points out: “[i]f I see that an external investor 
already participated like a business angel or a public development bank, then I am more interested as the com-
pany already has a proof-of-concept”.  
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Schwienbacher 2016b). Professional investments might generally be regarded as (additional) 
signals for a start-up’s quality, which would be in line with the evidence provided by Kim and 
Viswanathan (2016) who find that the effect of early investments on later investors increases 
in the investment expertise of the early investors. Apart from the financial support, start-ups 
often also benefit from the business advice (Sapienza 1992) and network (Barry et al. 1990) as 
well as the monitoring services (Gompers 1995) that professional risk capital providers usually 
offer. Investors might therefore regard the co-investment of professional risk capital providers 
as beneficial for the future success of the start-up (Baum and Silverman 2004; Hsu 2004). As 
their information acquisition should aim at the assessment of the risk and return profile of a 
start-up, the presence of co-investments might decrease information asymmetry and thus the 
time that investors spend on processing other (more complex) information (Agrawal et al. 
2014). Following this rationale, the presence of a patent (binary coded with one indicating that 
the start-up holds at least one patent) might have a similar effect on investors’ perception of the 
risk related to a start-up investment and (thus) their information acquisition (Häussler et al. 
2012; Ahlers et al. 2015; Moritz et al. 2015). However, it is also possible that investors only 
acquire (additional) information on start-ups if certain, i.e., the above discussed criteria, are 
met, which would imply a positive association with both dependent variables, page_view and 
content_pt.77 Thus, the direction of the relation between my two measures of information ac-
quisition and the presence of potential quality signals is unclear. This also applies to the number 
of years that a firm has been operating under its legal form (years_i_b) which might be regarded 
as a proxy for founders’ commitment to the venture (Ahlers et al. 2015). However, in combi-
nation with other firm attributes (e.g., no VC shareholder, low growth in revenues and (thus) 
cash flow) a long operating history might also be regarded as a bad signal of a firm’s quality. 
                                                     
77  Given the rather standardized information structure of the issuances in my sample, investors should be able to 
systematically screen issuances with regard to the presence of the discussed factors. 
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To add a further control for the business stage of a start-up, I include the total number of em-
ployees (#staff). 
In addition, to account for the extent of start-ups’ disclosures on Companisto, I control 
for the number of words included in firms’ narrative disclosures (discl), the number of figures 
(#figures) and tables (#tables) as well as the length (in minutes) of the pitch video (vid_length) 
included in the “Overview“-, “Team“- and “Financial Data“-Section of each issuance. Moreo-
ver, I include a binary coded variable (add_tabs) that takes on the value one (zero) if an issuance 
includes additional information sections (e.g., in which more technical information and/or vid-
eos are presented). 
3.2.4 Funding Dynamics 
As the dynamics of the funding process might also affect investors’ information acqui-
sition, I build up on prior literature (Block et al. 2016; Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016b; Kim 
and Viswanathan 2016; Vismara 2017a) and include several variables that are measured at the 
date t that investor i first accesses information related to issuance j. This includes the total num-
ber of information updates (#updates) a start-up provides during the crowdinvesting campaign. 
I further add the ratio of cumulative investments in start-up j at t to the total amount received 
during the crowdinvesting campaign (%funded). Also, I include the cumulative number of in-
vestors (#investors) in start-up j at t. By including %funded and #investors (#updates), I (indi-
rectly) control for the stage of the crowdinvesting campaign which should be, to some extent, 
mechanically associated with the extent of investors’ information acquisition. Additionally, to 
measure the incremental effect of professional investments that are conducted and disclosed 
during the crowdinvesting campaign, I include a binary coded variable (prof_invested) with one 
indicating that at least one investment of at least 1,000 Euro by a firm whose name indicates a 
professional risk capital provider is displayed in the “Prior Investments”-Section of issuance j 
(i.e., invested during the crowdinvesting campaign). Analogously to my expectations regarding 
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the potential effect of prior_VC (measured before the crowdinvesting campaign) on investors’ 
information acquisition, the investment of a professional risk capital provider during the 
crowdinvesting campaign might decrease investors’ incentives to acquire and process infor-
mation on their own (Block et al. 2016; Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016b; Kim and Viswana-
than 2016; Vismara 2017a) 78. 
Finally, I include the amount that investor i invests in start-up j and thus a variable that 
varies on the investor-issuance-level.79 
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
4.1.1 Investor-Level 
[Table 2 about here] 
[Table 3 about here] 
Tables 2 and 3 provide descriptive statistics on the 3,128 investors in my sample. Spe-
cifically, Table 2 gives an overview of the investment amount, the portfolio size (pfsize, i.e., 
the number of unique start-ups in the portfolio) and experience (exp, i.e., the time since regis-
tration) on Companisto for different age groups of investors. The average investor in my sample 
has been registered for less than two years and has invested in roughly eight distinct start-ups 
since registering on the CIP. Moreover, I find that the majority of investors (93 percent) is male 
and relatively young as almost 65 percent investors in my sample are aged between 20 and 39 
years. Still, there are 107 investors that are aged 60 or older. As Table 2 indicates, there is a 
                                                     
78  Note that the discussion in the entire previous paragraph is based on Block et al. 2016, Hornuf and 
Schwienbacher 2016b, Kim and Viswanathan 2016, and Vismara 2017a. 
79  In case that an investor invests more than once during an issuance, I only consider her first investment into the 
start-up. 
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high positive correlation between investors’ age and their average investment amount. Addi-
tionally, I find a positive association between investors’ age and their portfolio sizes. Panel B 
of Table 3 further reveals that male investors, on average, seem to hold larger portfolios on 
Companisto than their female counterparts. 
It is, however, important to note that I am only able to observe investment experience, 
i.e., exp and pfsize, on Companisto which might not be representative for investors’ overall 
level of (crowd)investing experience. However, in Germany, crowdinvesting only emerged in 
2011 with Companisto being among the first CIPs. Taking further into account that Companisto 
is one of the leading CIPs in Germany, I believe that the bias of non-observable crowdinvesting 
experience is, on average, low.80  
4.1.2 Firm-Level 
[Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the 24 start-ups in my sample. Most firms is-
sue ‘equity-like’ securities. Professional risk capital providers (e.g., Venture Capital firms 
and/or Business Angels) were already invested in half of the start-ups before the crowdinvesting 
campaign on Companisto started. I can therefore analyze if a prior professional investment 
(prior_VC) serves as a quality signal influencing investors’ information acquisition. Narrative 
firm-level disclosures presented in the core information sections of an issuance on Companisto 
                                                     
80  Nevertheless, I acknowledge that I am unable to identify whether investors gained other risk capital experience. 
I believe that it is unlikely that a substantial part of the sample has provided venture capital for a longer period 
of time, but I cannot definitely rule this out. Moreover, I am unable to identify investors’ overall investment 
experience. Generally, the overall investment experience of an investor should be positively correlated with 
her age. 
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(discl) encompassed 4,871 words on average, reflecting start-ups’ low overall information en-
vironment.81 More than one third of the firms in my sample hold at least one patent. Neverthe-
less, the presence of a patent is not statistically associated with the extent of start-ups’ narrative 
disclosures (discl). Disclosure quantity is, however, positively associated with the number of 
figures and tables presented on Companisto. 
4.1.3 Investment-Level 
[Table 5 about here] 
Table 5 (Panel A) provides descriptive statistics for the 10,114 investments in my sam-
ple. The minimum investment amount on Companisto is five Euros.82 Arguably, this might 
rather reflect consumption than a rational investment. The average (median) investment 
amounts to 490 (100) Euro with at least 25 percent of all investments (p75) being equal to or 
above 500 Euro. This is substantial enough to believe that a large fraction of all investments is 
accompanied by a structured information acquisition. Panel A further reveals that only in 
50 (36) percent of all investments, the “Financial Data“ (“Comments“)-Section is accessed 
[pv_financials (pv_forum)=1] prior to an investment in the respective start-up. Information on 
the managing team is accessed (pv_team=1) prior to only 21 percent of all investments. This 
suggests that investors tend to ignore a significant proportion of the information available on 
Companisto. In contrast, the “Overview“-Section which includes, for example, information on 
the business model and market along with the pitch video is accessed prior to 97 percent of all 
                                                     
81  It is important to note that this does not contain the number of words included in updates and the information 
included in the additional disclosures (e.g., historical financial statements, three-page prospectus) that are avail-
able for download. 
82  In June 2017, the minimum investment amount on Companisto has been raised to 100 Euro. 
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investments (pv_overview=1) which is not surprising given that investors are automatically di-
rected to this section after accessing an issuance on Companisto.83 
Univariate correlations (Panel B in Table 5) reveal that the likelihood of an investor 
accessing an information section (other than the “Overview“-Section) is negatively associated 
with the funding progress, i.e., the later the stage of the crowdinvesting campaign, the lower 
the probability that investors access one of the information sections. In contrast, an investment 
equal to or above 1,000 Euro by a professional risk capital provider (prof_invested=1) in the 
scope of the crowdinvesting campaign seems to be positively associated with the likelihood of 
investors’ accessing start-ups’ different information sections (except for the “Overview“-Sec-
tion). In addition, I find that investors’ investment amounts as well as their age, experience 
(exp) and portfolio size (pfsize) are negatively associated with the likelihood of them accessing 
the “Financial Data“- and “Team“-Section. 
4.1.4 Content-Type-Level 
[Table 6 about here] 
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for the investment-related page views in my sam-
ple by content type (i.e., issuance section) for different sub-samples of retail investors. Given 
the generally high average values and low variance of page_view for the “Overview“-Section, 
I don’t find any statistically significant differences between different types of retail investors. 
Therefore, in the following discussion, I will focus on my results related to the other information 
sections. For the interpretation of my results, it is important to consider the different nature of 
                                                     
83  However, if investors access a crowdinvesting campaign without being logged on to Companisto and are thus 
directed to the (logged off, i.e., trimmed-down, version of the) “Overview”-Section and select one of the other 
information sections, they are required to log on to Companisto. If investors then log on, they are directed to 
the selected information section. If they don’t access the “Overview”-Section in logged on mode before invest-
ing in the respective start-up, page_view takes on a value of zero with regard to the “Overview”-Section of the 
respective issuance. 
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the four information sections. While the information in the “Overview“-, “Team“- and “Finan-
cial Data“-Section is provided by the firm (before the start of the crowdinvesting campaign), 
the ‘Forum’ also contains the questions and comments posted by investors.84 Moreover, the 
interpretation of my proxies for investors’ information acquisition (i.e., page_views and con-
tent_pt) differs for the Forum as it is not clear whether, for a given crowdinvesting, an investor 
uses this section primarily to inform herself by reading others posts or whether she uses this 
section mainly to respond to the questions and comments of the start-up or other investors. 
My results show that male investors are more likely to access the different information 
sections of an issuance prior to investing. This difference is (statistically) significant with the 
difference in likelihoods amounting to roughly 15 (7) [7] percent on average for the “Financial 
Data“ (“Team“) [“Comments”]-Section of each issuance. 
In a second step, I split my sample by pfsize allowing me to investigate the association 
between investing experience on Companisto and investors’ information acquisition. Prior lit-
erature on retail investors’ information usage reveals that their information choice (e.g., Elliott 
et al. 2008) and ability to process (complex financial) information (e.g., Frederickson and Mil-
ler 2004) varies with their level of sophistication (see Cascino et al. 2013, 2014). To investigate 
the role of sophistication in my setting, I use the number of investments in unique start-ups that 
investors have conducted on Companisto as a proxy for their level of (crowd)investing experi-
ence. Specifically, I split my sample by distinguishing between investors that (at t) have in-
vested in less (equal to or more) than five distinct start-ups. While I don’t find any statistically 
significant difference between the two groups for the “Financial Data“-Section, my findings 
                                                     
84  Start-ups have the choice to either answer investors’ comments privately or to answer them publicly. In the 
(first) latter case, both the comment or question by the investor as well as the start-ups’ answer are (not) pub-
licly displayed in the “Comments”-Section. However, if start-ups fail to answer timely, the comment or ques-
tion is automatically posted publicly in the Forum. 
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suggest that more experienced investors are, on average, less (more) likely to access the “Team“ 
(“Comments”)-Section of an issuance. 
Finally, I split my sample by the average amount that an investor has invested per start-
up on Companisto. Given that the acquisition and processing of information is costly, the time 
that investors spend on analyzing start-ups’ disclosures on the CIP should be positively associ-
ated with their investment amount, i.e., the potential returns from using that information for 
their investment decisions (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Diamond and Verrecchia 1981). 
Moreover, investors that invest equal to or more than 500 Euro per start-up (e.g., Business An-
gels), are likely to systematically differ from other investors (e.g., those that invest five Euro 
per start-up) with regard to their motivation to engage in crowdinvesting and/or their overall 
level of investing experience. Compared to low average amount investors whose main motiva-
tion to engage in crowdinvesting might be to support entrepreneurs and/or innovative business 
ideas, investors with high average investments are more likely to focus on the maximization of 
their investment returns (i.e., screen start-ups’ disclosures) (e.g., Hornuf and Schwienbacher 
2016b). In line with these expectations, I find that investors with comparably high investment 
amounts are more likely to access the different information sections of an issuance with the 
mean differences for the two groups (≥ 10 percent for all information sections) being (statisti-
cally) significant.  
[Table 7 about here] 
Consistent with the evidence presented in Table 6, I find that investors with higher av-
erage investment amounts are not only more likely to access the different information sections 
of a start-up, but also seem to spend significantly more time on the acquisition of information 
presented in the different information sections of a start-up (see Table 7). Moreover, compared 
to female investors, male investors seem to spend significantly more time on the acquisition of 
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information presented in the “Financial Data“- and “Team“-Section. With regard to investors’ 
crowdinvesting experience, the results are again mixed, indicating that more experienced in-
vestors tend to spend significantly less (more) time on the acquisition of information in the 
“Overview“- and “Team“- (“Financial Data“- and “Comments“)-Section of an issuance. 
Regarding the interpretation of the findings presented in Table 6 and 7 it is important to 
keep in mind that the relative share of the different groups of retail investors differs across 
issuances. Therefore, the presented evidence might reflect differences in investors’ preferences 
regarding certain start-up attributes that might (in)directly affect firms’ disclosure strategy ra-
ther than differences in investors’ information behavior. Moreover, given the fact that investors 
might systematically differ in their ability to process the presented information, differences in 
content_pt do not necessarily reflect differences in the extent of investors’ information acqui-
sition. 
Taken together, the previously presented evidence indicates that crowdinvestors tend to 
neglect a substantial fraction of firms’ (financial) information prior to investing. The fact that 
investors access firms’ projected financial statements prior to only about 50 percent of their 
investments is particularly striking in face of start-ups’ low overall information environment 
(on Companisto). Also, given prior evidence on the importance of the managing team for in-
vestment decisions related to start-up-investments (e.g., Mason and Stark 2004; Ahlers et al. 
2015), it is rather surprising that the “Team“-Section, which also includes links to the founders’ 
social network accounts (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn) is not even accessed in 79 percent of all 
investments. Finally, I find evidence consistent with crowdinvestors’ information acquisition 
varying with their demographics, their level of crowdinvesting experience and average invest-
ment amount.  
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4.2 Multiple Regression Analyses 
4.2.1 Information Acquisition and Investor Type 
To further test the association between investor attributes and information acquisition, 
I run multiple OLS regressions in which I employ both page_view (Columns 1 to 4) and con-
tent_pt (Columns 5 to 8) as dependent variable. To control for differences in investor prefer-
ences with regard to (time-invariant) start-up attributes that might be related to investors’ in-
formation acquisition, I include issuance-fixed effects. To further address the potential influ-
ence of unobserved heterogeneity, I include quarter-, year- and country-fixed effects and cluster 
standard errors at the issuance-level. Finally, I add all investor- and investment attributes as 
well as the proxies for the funding dynamics as controls. Table 8 displays the related results. 
[Table 8 about here] 
Consistent with the evidence presented in Tables 6 and 7, I find that both male investors 
as well as investors with relatively high average investment amounts (Øamount ≥ 500) are more 
likely to access the “Financial Data“-, “Team“- and “Comments“-Section of a crowdinvesting 
prior to investing into the respective start-up. Consistent with this evidence, I find that the latter 
group of investors, on average, also spends significantly more time with the acquisition of in-
formation presented in the “Overview“-, “Team“- and “Comments“-Section. Also, my results 
indicate that, prior to investing, investors with more experience in crowdinvesting (pfsize ≥ 5) 
are less likely to access the “Team“-Section and spend significantly less time on the “Over-
view“-Section.85 These findings are consistent with the evidence provided by Bernstein et al. 
(2017), which suggests that crowdinvestors’ information preferences are associated with their 
level of crowdinvesting experience. 
                                                     
85  In Appendix A2, the multivariate regression results for different cutoffs of pfsize and Øamount are presented. 
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The evidence presented in Table 8 further reveals a negative association between inves-
tors’ age and the time since their registration (exp) on Companisto and their likelihood of ac-
cessing the different information sections of a start-up. In line with these findings, the results 
of the regression with content_pt as the dependent variable suggest that (older) investors that 
have been registered on Companisto longer also spend significantly less time on the (“Over-
view“-, “Team“- and) “Financial Data“-Section before investing. 
4.2.2 Information Acquisition and Funding Dynamics 
To investigate the role of the funding dynamics for retail investors’ information acqui-
sition, I run multiple OLS regressions in which I again employ both page_view (Columns 1 
to 4) and content_pt (Columns 5 to 8) as the dependent variables. Moreover, to investigate how 
this association varies with investors’ level of crowdinvesting experience, I use the number of 
unique start-ups in their portfolio on Companisto as a proxy for their (crowd)investing experi-
ence. Specifically, I employ type as an indicator that takes on the value 0 (1) if investors have 
invested in less (equal to or more) than five distinct start-ups and interact type with all inde-
pendent variables of interest. As this analysis focuses on the role of funding dynamics for in-
vestors’ information behavior, I employ issuance-, investor-, quarter- and year-fixed effects and 
cluster standard errors at the issuance-level. Table 9 displays the related results. 
[Table 9 about here] 
I find a negative and statistically significant association between the likelihood of in-
vestors accessing the “Financial Data“-Section of a crowdinvesting and %funded86, with this 
association being more pronounced for more experienced investors (Column 2). This indicates 
                                                     
86  Appendix A2 includes the pooled sample results which indicate a negative and statistically significant 
association between the likelihood of investors accessing the “Financial Data” (and “Team”)-Section of a 
crowdinvesting and %funded. 
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that investors are less likely to access start-ups’ financial projections at later stages of the fund-
ing round. My results further suggest that inexperienced investors are less likely to access the 
Forum after observing a professional investment.87  
[Table 10 about here] 
To further explore how crowdinvestors’ information acquisition varies with their char-
acteristics, I re-specify type to take on the value 1 (0) if an investor, on average, invests equal 
to or more (less) than 500 Euro per investment. To analyze how the association between 
crowdinvestors’ information acquisition and the dynamics of the funding process varies with 
crowdinvestors’ (average) investment amounts, I re-run the above presented regressions (see 
Table 10). 
My results indicate that the previously observed negative association between %funded 
and page_view does not vary with investors’ average investment amount. However, for inves-
tors with relatively low average investment amounts, I find that they are less likely to access 
the “Team“-Section at later stages of the funding process.88 Moreover, my results indicate that, 
compared to low average amount investors, individuals that, on average, invest 500 Euro or 
above per start-up-investment are more likely to decrease their information acquisition related 
to the “Team“-Section after a professional investment (prof_invested=1) during the crowdin-
vesting campaign. 
                                                     
87  In untabulated sub-sample regressions, I find that this association is not statistically significant for investors 
whose portfolio comprises five or more distinct start-ups. 
88  In untabulated sub-sample regressions, I find that this association is not statistically significant for investors 
that invest 500 Euro or more per start-up investment. 
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Taken together, the results presented in this section suggest that retail investors’ infor-
mation acquisition is negatively associated with the presence of investments by others. Moreo-
ver, I find that this association varies with investors’ level of crowdinvesting experience as well 
as their average investment amount. 
4.2.3 Information Acquisition and Issuance Attributes 
In a next step, I exclude issuance-fixed effects and re-run all regressions to test how 
crowdinvestors’ information acquisition varies with selected issuance attributes. Again, I use 
type as an indicator for investors’ crowdinvesting experience. My set of control variables in-
cludes proxies for the extent of firms’ disclosures on Companisto.  
[Table 11 about here] 
The results presented in Table 11, with page_view as dependent variable (Col-
umns 1 to 4), suggest that the presence of a patent is negatively associated with the likelihood 
of investors accessing the “Overview“-Section of an issuance. Moreover, I find that investors 
are significantly less likely to access the “Overview“- and the “Financial Data“-Section of an 
issuance if a debt [instead of an equity(like)] security is being issued in the crowdinvesting 
campaign. This suggests that information acquisition is positively associated with investment 
risk. 
Moreover, I find that for firms that hold patents prior to the start of the crowdinvesting 
campaign investors spend significantly less time on the acquisition of information presented in 
the “Financial Data“-Section of the respective issuance. While this result is consistent with prior 
evidence on the decision criteria of traditional risk capital providers (e.g., Häussler et al. 2012), 
it further indicates that certain firm attributes already affect the information acquisition process 
itself. In contrast, I find that co-investments of professional investors prior to the crowdinvest-
ing campaign increase the time that investors spend in the Forum of an issuance.  
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[Table 12 about here] 
To analyze how the role of issuance attributes for crowdinvestors’ information acquisi-
tion differs with their average investment amounts, I re-specify type (Øamount ≥ 500=1; 0 oth-
erwise) and re-run all regressions (see Table 12).  
My results indicate that, for start-ups that hold at least one patent and/or have VC share-
holders prior to the crowdinvesting campaign, individuals with an average investment of 
500 Euro or above spend less time on the acquisition of information in the “Team“-Section than 
investors with relatively low average investment amounts. 
In sum, I find that the presence of certain firm attributes that retail investors’ might 
regard as indicative for the quality of an investment is negatively associated with retail inves-
tors’ information acquisition.89 However, when interpreting the results presented in this section, 
it is important to note that firms that differ in the above mentioned attributes (e.g., that hold a 
patent) are likely to also differ systematically in other dimensions that might directly affect 
investors’ information acquisition but are not accounted for in my empirical design. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, I document retail investors’ actual information acquisition on Companisto, 
one of the largest German crowdinvesting platforms, by analyzing user-level Google Analytics 
data. This relatively novel type of data allows me to link investors’ information behavior to 
their personal characteristics including their investment activity. In line with prior evidence on 
the information usage of retail investors in traditional capital markets, I find that crowdinvestors 
tend to ignore a large fraction of start-ups’ disclosures on Companisto. My results further sug-
gest that investors’ information acquisition varies with their demographics, their level of 
                                                     
89  This does, however, not hold for the Forum, for which the direction and statistical significance vary across 
investor types.  
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crowdinvesting experience as well as their average investment amount. Specifically, I find that 
male (high average amount) investors spend considerably more time on information acquisition 
than their female counterparts (investors with a low average investment amount). Moreover, I 
find a negative association between both investors’ age and the time since they first registered 
on Companisto and their information acquisition. My findings further indicate that retail inves-
tors decrease their information acquisition over the crowdinvesting campaign (i.e., as the num-
ber of investments by others increases) and that they spend less time on the acquisition of in-
formation in the presence of potential signals of start-up quality. Specifically, I find that the 
acquisition of information related to the managing team of a start-up significantly decreases 
after a publicly disclosed investment by a professional investor during the crowdinvesting cam-
paign. Also, investors spend significantly less time on the acquisition of forward-looking finan-
cial information if the start-up holds at least one patent. Lastly, my findings suggest that infor-
mation acquisition is positively associated with the level of investment risk. 
To my knowledge, I am the first to provide large-scale user-level empirical evidence on 
investors’ actual information acquisition prior to investing. However, my study faces several 
limitations. I am, for example, unable to rule out that my data is biased from both, very long 
and very short webpage sessions that were unrelated to information acquisition. Nevertheless, 
untabulated robustness checks reveal that my results are materially unchanged, if I tighten or 
loosen my exclusion thresholds. Thus, I believe that Google Analytics, on average, tracks a 
reliable representation of investors’ information acquisition process. Furthermore, my evidence 
is not generalizable to traditional equity markets. However, I believe that regulators and re-
searchers interested in these relatively novel forms of financial markets can learn from my ev-
idence as retail investors engaging in crowdinvesting seem to exhibit similar behavioral patterns 
as documented by prior literature.
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A     Appendix 
A1 Variable Definitions 
Variable/Index Definition 
j 
 Issuance (i.e., start-up): Given that, in my sample, there has been no firm 
that collected funds through more than one crowdinvesting campaign, the 
number of firms equals the number of issuances in the sample  
k 
 Content type (i.e., the information section of each issuance): the infor-
mation structure on Companisto is equal across issuances and comprises 
the following information sections (i.e., content types): “Overview“, 
“Updates“, “Team“, “Financial Data“, “Comments” and “Prior Invest-
ments“ 
t 
 (If not differently specified:) Date at which investor i (first) accesses a 
webpage with contents related to issuance (i.e., start-up) j 
Information Acquisition 
content_pti,j,k,t 
 Total time (i.e., minutes) investor i has opened webpages with content 
type (i.e., section) k of issuance j in her internet browser before invest-
ment; t reflects the date when investor i first accessed contents 
(i.e., webpages) related to the issuance j 
page_viewi,j,k,t 
 Binary coded variable with (0) 1 indicating that investor i has (not) ac-
cessed webpages with content type (i.e., section) k of issuance j before 
investment; t reflects the date when investor i first accessed content type 
k (i.e., webpages) related to the issuance j; pv_overview (pv_financials) 
[pv_team] {pv_forum} measures the page views related to the Overview 
(Financial Data) [Team] {Comments} section of each crowdinvesting  
Investor Attributes 
agei,t  Age of investor i at t 
genderi  Gender of investor i 
countryi  Country of residency of investor i 
pfsizei,t  Number of unique start-ups investor i holds in her portfolio at t 
expi,t  Number of weeks that investor i has been registered on Companisto at t 
typei,t 
 Binary coded variable indicating the investor type. Depending on the re-
spective specification a value of 1 (0) indicates (a) that the investor is 
registered as “company“ (“private“) as of January 2017; (b) that a “pri-
vate“ investor has invested in equal to or more (less) than five distinct 
start-ups or (c) that a “private“ investor has, on average, invested equal 
to or more (less) than 500 Euro per start-up-investment 
Investment Attributes 
amounti,j  Amount that investor i invests in firm j in t (divided by 1,000) 
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A1      Variable Definitions (continued) 
Variable Definition 
 
Issuance Attributes 
disclj 
  Total amount of narrative disclosures that firm j provides on Compa-
nisto at funding-start in “Overview“-, “Team“- and “Financial Data“-
Section, measured as total number of words 
#figuresj 
 Number of figures that are included in disclosures related to issuance 
j on Companisto at funding-start 
#tablesj 
 Number of tables that are included in disclosures related to issuance 
j on Companisto at funding-start 
vid_lengthj   Duration of the pitch video; measured in minutes  
patentj 
 Binary coded variable with one indicating that issuing firm j holds at 
least one patent at funding start; zero otherwise  
debtj  
 Binary coded variable with one (zero) indicating that issuance j repre-
sents the sale of debt (equity-like) securities 
prior_VCj 
 Binary coded variable with one indicating that at least one profes-
sional risk capital provider (i.e., Business Angel and/or Venture Cap-
ital Company) is invested in issuing firm j prior to (i.e., at the begin-
ning of) the crowdinvesting campaign; zero otherwise 
years_i_bj   Years start-up j has been operating under current legal form at fund-
ing-start  
add_tabsj  Binary coded variable with one (zero) indicating that issuance j in-
cludes additional information sections (e.g., an additional video-sec-
tion) 
#staffj   Number of staff firm j employs at the funding-start 
Funding Dynamics 
%fundedj,t 
  Ratio of cumulative investments in issuing firm j at t over total fund-
ing amount 
#investorsj,t 
 Cumulative number of investments (~investors that invested) during 
the crowdinvesting campaign in firm j at t 
prof_investedj,t 
 Binary coded variable with 1 indicating that at least one investment 
by a firm whose name indicates a professional risk capital provider 
and whose investments amounts to at least 1,000 Euro is displayed in 
the “Prior Investments”-Section of firm j at t; 0 otherwise  
#updatesj,t  Total number of updates provided by firm j at t 
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A2 Varying type cut-offs: Information Acquisition and Investor Attributes 
     
Dependent Variable page_view content_pt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Content Type Overview Financials Team Forum Overview Financials Team Forum 
type (male) -0.006 0.104*** 0.059*** 0.037** 0.155 2.441 1.396 1.400 
 (-1.394) (5.144) (3.372) (2.126) (0.184) (1.292) (1.334) (0.805) 
type (1 if pfsize ≥ 3) -0.005 -0.020 -0.043*** -0.033*** -4.319*** 0.109 -0.502 1.061 
 (-0.960) (-1.354) (-4.517) (-3.059) (-6.620) (0.099) (-0.731) (1.032) 
type (1 if Øamount ≥ 1,000) -0.000 0.087*** 0.033** 0.061*** 0.068 -0.518 1.442 -0.777 
 (-0.088) (4.704) (2.441) (3.831) (0.041) (-0.284) (1.098) (-0.425) 
age 0.000 -0.007*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.041 -0.037 -0.098*** 0.121* 
 (0.512) (-20.931) (-4.973) (-9.152) (-1.628) (-1.234) (-3.613) (1.936) 
pfsize 0.000 -0.001 -0.002*** 0.001** 0.034 0.032 -0.022 0.118* 
 (1.567) (-1.470) (-3.682) (2.127) (0.916) (0.612) (-0.519) (1.866) 
exp -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000** -0.001 -0.022** 0.002 -0.027** 
 (-1.278) (-2.192) (-1.504) (-2.180) (-0.105) (-2.428) (0.424) (-2.206) 
updates -0.001 0.011* 0.005 0.016*** 0.811*** 0.765*** -0.161 0.910*** 
 (-0.322) (2.028) (1.359) (3.026) (5.479) (2.928) (-0.750) (3.234) 
amount -0.001 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.042*** 2.675*** 1.676 0.154 1.142 
 (-0.529) (5.817) (7.257) (8.754) (3.299) (1.585) (0.439) (1.401) 
%funded 0.015 -0.282*** -0.162*** -0.261*** -11.290*** -10.539*** 1.221 -8.296 
 (0.783) (-4.815) (-3.522) (-6.199) (-4.838) (-3.985) (0.427) (-1.473) 
prof_invested 0.001 -0.055** -0.025 -0.049* -0.167 2.540* -2.736 3.756 
 (0.093) (-2.363) (-1.192) (-2.005) (-0.160) (1.874) (-1.704) (1.668) 
#investors -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.010*** -0.011** -0.000 -0.017** 
 (-0.691) (-1.333) (-1.405) (-3.675) (-3.707) (-2.428) (-0.020) (-2.247) 
Constant  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Issuance & Country FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Quarter & Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 10,144 10,144 10,144 10,144 6,441 3,627 1,892 2,231 
adj. R² 39.50% 9.38% 4.82% 8.77% 4.11% 2.03% 1.35% 3.94% 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results of different specifications that differ with respect to the dependent variable. The t-statistics are based on robust standard errors with 
one-way clustering by issuance (i.e., firm). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. See Appendix A1 for the variable 
definitions. 
 119 
 
A3 Pooled Sample: Information Acquisition and Funding Dynamics 
     
Dependent Variable page_view content_pt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Content Type Overview Financials Team Forum Overview Financials Team Forum 
%funded 0.005 -0.101* -0.076* -0.024 -2.738 -0.601 3.049 3.742 
 (0.378) (-1.835) (-1.908) (-0.433) (-0.960) (-0.117) (0.520) (0.584) 
#investors -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.005 -0.010 -0.001 -0.029*** 
 (-0.574) (-1.490) (-0.514) (-2.198) (-1.337) (-1.630) (-0.093) (-3.426) 
prof_invested -0.001 -0.019 0.001 -0.020 0.127 3.194 -3.132 3.833 
 (-0.078) (-1.234) (0.039) (-1.043) (0.106) (1.590) (-1.568) (1.605) 
#updates -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.002 0.416* 0.753 -0.685** 1.509*** 
 (-0.406) (-0.032) (0.154) (0.580) (1.750) (1.273) (-2.218) (2.952) 
pfsize 0.002** -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.240 -0.029 0.264 0.339 
 (2.171) (-0.460) (-0.521) (0.693) (1.186) (-0.098) (0.885) (0.948) 
exp 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.278 -0.594 0.167 -1.027* 
 (0.550) (-0.042) (-0.715) (-0.889) (-1.416) (-1.540) (0.812) (-1.726) 
amount -0.001 0.018** 0.036*** 0.024*** 2.887** 4.522* 1.012 -0.329 
 (-0.250) (2.708) (5.621) (3.050) (2.269) (1.984) (0.663) (-0.175) 
Constant  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Investor & Issuance FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Quarter & Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 10,144 10,144 10,144 10,144 6,441 3,627 1,892 2,231 
adj. R² 48.80% 53.00% 33.90% 55.30% 30.50% 15.20% -2.20% 20.20% 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results of different specifications that differ with respect to the dependent variable. The t-statistics are based on robust standard errors with 
one-way clustering by issuance (i.e., firm). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. See Appendix A1 for the variable 
definitions. 
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A4 Pooled Sample: Information Acquisition and Firm Attributes 
 
Dependent Variable page_view content_pt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Content Type Overview Financials Team Forum Overview Financials Team Forum 
prior_VC -0.039 0.012 0.012 0.020 -1.384 0.483 -0.007 6.027*** 
 (-1.329) (0.803) (0.606) (1.343) (-1.108) (0.251) (-0.004) (3.166) 
patent -0.055* 0.001 0.010 -0.002 -0.433 -3.360** 0.274 2.720 
 (-1.731) (0.076) (0.834) (-0.228) (-0.644) (-2.520) (0.233) (1.632) 
debt -0.283*** -0.080*** 0.008 -0.041 -2.653 -3.214 -0.722 -3.703 
 (-3.056) (-2.892) (0.290) (-1.203) (-1.107) (-0.833) (-0.254) (-1.005) 
years_i_b 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.096 0.184 -0.031 -0.102 
 (0.300) (0.397) (-1.097) (1.392) (-0.843) (1.193) (-0.226) (-0.840) 
#staff 0.007*** 0.001** -0.001 -0.000 0.121*** 0.005 -0.054 0.109 
 (2.834) (2.382) (-1.416) (-0.291) (2.896) (0.054) (-0.755) (1.378) 
add_tabs 0.078* 0.019 -0.036 -0.018 0.857 -0.554 -2.015 0.145 
 (1.741) (1.231) (-1.709) (-0.883) (0.670) (-0.275) (-1.178) (0.050) 
discl -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.015* 
 (-1.189) (-1.892) (0.305) (-0.657) (-1.007) (-0.507) (0.064) (-1.873) 
#tables -0.108** 0.011* 0.003 0.015** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* -0.001 
 (-2.805) (1.877) (0.652) (2.373) (-0.935) (-0.647) (-1.806) (-0.526) 
Constant  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Investor FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Quarter & Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 10,144 10,144 10,144 10,144 6,441 3,627 1,892 2,231 
adj. R² 35.10% 52.90% 33.80% 55.20% 30.30% 15.10% -2.82% 20.00% 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results of different specifications that differ with respect to the dependent variable. The t-statistics are based on robust standard errors with 
one-way clustering by issuance (i.e., firm). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. See Appendix A1 for the variable 
definitions. 
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A4     Pooled Sample: Information Acquisition and Firm Attributes (continued) 
 
     
Dependent Variable page_view content_pt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Content Type Overview Financials Team Forum Overview Financials Team Forum 
#figures 0.006** 0.000 -0.001 -0.002*** 0.011 -0.037 0.209* -0.418*** 
 (2.245) (0.330) (-1.168) (-3.060) (0.176) (-0.421) (1.960) (-3.982) 
vid_length -0.000 0.000** 0.000 -0.000 0.004 0.005 0.012*** 0.000 
 (-0.855) (2.319) (0.140) (-0.613) (1.238) (1.179) (3.127) (0.007) 
#updates -0.004 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.048 0.058 -0.225 0.372 
 (-1.188) (0.321) (0.760) (0.443) (0.267) (0.151) (-0.896) (0.840) 
%funded 0.046 -0.109*** -0.081*** -0.059 -4.781* -2.015 -0.251 -10.400* 
 (1.304) (-3.063) (-3.507) (-1.432) (-2.056) (-0.540) (-0.052) (-2.023) 
#investors -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.015* 
 (-1.386) (-1.458) (-0.629) (-1.358) (-1.007) (-0.507) (0.064) (-1.873) 
prof_invested -0.042** -0.002 0.009 -0.003 -0.659 1.474 -0.964 2.866 
 (-2.367) (-0.148) (0.884) (-0.206) (-1.021) (0.925) (-0.665) (1.627) 
pfsize -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.241 0.059 0.063 0.404 
 (-0.360) (-0.244) (-0.897) (0.719) (1.208) (0.216) (0.200) (1.177) 
exp 0.008** -0.003* -0.003** -0.003 0.027 -0.229 -0.072 0.170 
 (2.210) (-1.911) (-2.238) (-1.640) (0.188) (-1.312) (-0.355) (0.739) 
amount -0.002 0.018** 0.036*** 0.025*** 2.825** 4.570* 1.088 -0.129 
 (-0.704) (2.721) (5.677) (3.167) (2.239) (2.016) (0.692) (-0.072) 
Constant  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Investor FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Quarter & Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 10,144 10,144 10,144 10,144 6,441 3,627 1,892 2,231 
adj. R² 35.10% 52.90% 33.80% 55.20% 30.30% 15.10% -2.82% 20.00% 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results of different specifications that differ with respect to the dependent variable. The t-statistics are based on robust standard errors with 
one-way clustering by issuance (i.e., firm). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. See Appendix A1 for the variable 
definitions. 
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 FIGURE 1 
Crowdinvesting – Market Structure 
 
 
Source: Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2016a). 
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FIGURE 2 
Firms‘ Disclosures on Companisto 
 
Notes: This figure shows a screenshot taken on Companisto’s webpage. It illustrates firms’ infor-
mation environment on Companisto. The screenshot gives an example of the “Overview“-Section of 
each listing which is typically the landing page if investors access a crowdinvesting. In the different 
tabs (i.e., sections) of each listing (e.g., “Overview“, “Team“, etc.) potential investors are provided 
with different types of information (e.g., information on the business model, key financials, etc.).  
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FIGURE 3 
Firms‘ Disclosures on Companisto: Financials 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows a screenshot taken on Companisto’s webpage. It gives an example 
of the information provided in the “Financial Data“-Section of each listing. This section in-
cludes some general information on the legal form and structure of the firm along with for-
ward-looking financial information. 
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FIGURE 4 
Firms‘ Disclosures on Companisto: Team Attributes 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows a screenshot taken on Companisto’s webpage. It gives an exam-
ple of the information provided in the “Team“-Section of each listing. Here, the profiles 
and social media links of the managing team (including the founders) can be found. 
 
 132 
FIGURE 5 
Firms‘ Disclosures on Companisto: Investment History 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows a screenshot taken on Companisto’s webpage. It gives an ex-
ample of the information provided in the “Companists“ (i.e., the “Prior Investments“)-
Section of each listing. In this section, investors can observe the full investment history 
of the respective crowdinvesting, including investor names and the amounts and dates of 
their respective investments.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
  
Starting point: Data on 68,450 investors, 77 issuances, 63,436 investments, 2,421,417 page views 
  investors issuances investments page views 
User-level data (i.e., registration and investing 
information) from Companisto 
    (period: Jun 2012 to Jan 2017) 
68,450 77 63,436   
User-level Google Analytics data on investors’ 
information acquisition on Companisto 
    (period: Oct 2015 to Jan 2017) 
      2,421,417 
less page views that are not issuance-related       -1,543,959 
Merged sample 28,505 33 20,326 877,458 
less page views related to issuance information 
other than the following sections: “Overview“, 
“Team“, “Financial Data“, “Comments” 
-4,458   -4,667 -429,126 
less observations with missing investor infor-
mation 
-125   -6 -5,687 
less investments by users who invested in less 
than two unique start-ups since registering on 
Companisto 
-3,411   -2,107 -50,522 
less page views without (after) an investment in 
the respective firm 
-16,717 -2 0 -247,380 
less investments related to issuances, that repre-
sent the second funding rounds of firms on 
Companisto 
-73 -7 -251 -2,363 
less investments by investors who live or ac-
cessed the contents on Companisto in countries 
other than Austria, Germany and Switzerland  
-593   -3,151 -23,917 
Final Sample 3,128 24 10,144 118,463 
Notes: This table illustrates the specific steps taken in the selection of the final sample.  
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TABLE 2 
Investor Attributes 
 
    Investor properties (Share of) Investor groups 
Age Investors Investments male amount 
pfsize 
(# of start-
ups) 
exp  
(in weeks) 
Øamount ≥  
€ 500 
pfsize ≥ 5 
exp ≥  
1 year 
≤ 19 55 267 0.98 106.46 4.47 47.31 7.27% 23.64% 34.55% 
20 to 29 912 3,182 0.94 300.97 7.06 78.59 18.75% 45.18% 57.68% 
30 to 39 1,103 3,448 0.94 600.89 7.95 96.74 32.73% 50.86% 69.17% 
40 to 49 616 2,011 0.93 866.64 9.15 105.10 43.18% 53.41% 75.00% 
50 to 59 335 952 0.87 1,219.05 7.83 97.96 55.82% 50.15% 74.03% 
≥ 60 107 284 0.89 1,446.20 6.79 82.53 70.09% 42.06% 68.22% 
Total 3,128 10,144 0.93 652.20 7.82 91.87 34.02% 48.85% 66.85% 
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for the attributes of the investors registered on Companisto as of January 2017. Specifically, it shows investor attributes 
by age group and investor type.  
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TABLE 3 
Summary Statistics and Correlations – Investor Level 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics – Investor Level 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
age 3,128 36.98 11.21 18.21 28.36 34.79 44.46 89.85 
male 3,128 0.93 0.26 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
pfsize 3,128 7.82 9.40 2.00 3.00 4.00 9.00 77.00 
exp 3,128 91.87 63.96 0.00 44.14 69.86 136.29 242.57 
Øamount 3,128 652.20 1,236.38 5.00 71.37 244.75 700.00 22,500 
Panel B: Correlations – Investor Level 
N = 3,128 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) age   -0.076 0.101 0.171 0.348 
(2) male -0.084   0.050 -0.010 0.011 
(3) pfsize 0.052 0.043   0.509 -0.113 
(5) exp 0.115 -0.002 0.477   -0.022 
(6) Øamount 0.267 -0.002 -0.112 -0.042   
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for the attributes of the investors registered on 
Companisto as of January 2017. Specifically, summary statistics (Panel A) and correlations 
(Panel B) are presented. In Panel B, statistical significance at the 0.1 level using two-tailed tests is 
indicated in bold type. Pearson's correlation coefficients are shown in the lower triangle while 
Spearman's rank correlations appear above the diagonal. See Appendix A1 for the variable defini-
tions. 
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TABLE 4 
Summary Statistics and Correlations – Firm Level 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics – Firm Level  
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
debt 24 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
years_i_b 24 4.58 5.99 0.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 28.00 
#staff 24 13.54 11.95 1.00 6.00 10.50 16.50 52.00 
add_tabs 24 0.21 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
prior_VC 24 0.50 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 
patent 24 0.38 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
discl 24 4,870.71 1,255.13 2,786.00 3,845.50 4,680.50 5,808.00 7,244.00 
#tables 24 2.83 1.55 0.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 7.00 
#figures 24 13.04 7.16 3.00 6.50 12.50 16.00 31.00 
vid_length 24 273.38 92.73 106.00 216.00 275.00 340.00 500.00 
#updates 24 8.46 4.66 1.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 18.00 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
Summary Statistics and Correlations – Firm Level 
 
Panel B: Correlations – Firm Level  
N = 24 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) debt   0.464 0.416 -0.155 -0.302 0.078 -0.153 -0.187 0.076 0.153 -0.055 
(2) years_i_b 0.767   0.787 -0.241 -0.202 0.095 0.012 0.063 -0.010 0.226 0.194 
(3) #staff 0.644 0.568   -0.142 0.054 -0.019 -0.012 0.018 0.160 0.041 0.283 
(4) add_tabs -0.155 -0.208 -0.112   0.103 -0.185 -0.422 -0.318 -0.022 0.171 -0.239 
(5) prior_VC -0.302 -0.327 -0.061 0.103   -0.258 0.024 -0.123 0.151 -0.235 0.255 
(6) patent 0.078 0.290 -0.021 -0.185 -0.258   0.056 0.147 0.081 -0.062 0.063 
(7) discl -0.149 -0.122 0.030 -0.443 0.037 0.035   0.488 0.462 0.115 0.253 
(8) #tables -0.166 -0.129 -0.075 -0.349 -0.165 0.198 0.396   0.290 -0.049 -0.077 
(9) #figures 0.020 -0.044 0.178 -0.047 0.268 0.069 0.459 0.220   0.142 0.225 
(10) vid_length 0.102 0.121 0.058 0.130 -0.246 0.045 0.061 -0.053 0.098   0.014 
(11) #updates -0.063 0.160 0.261 -0.254 0.265 0.035 0.215 -0.031 0.300 -0.009   
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the issuance (i.e., firm) attributes. Specifically, summary statistics (Panel A) and correlations 
(Panel B) are presented. In Panel B, statistical significance at the 0.1 level using two-tailed tests is indicated in bold type. Pearson's correlation 
coefficients are shown in the lower triangle while Spearman's rank correlations appear above the diagonal. See Appendix A1 for the variable defini-
tions. 
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TABLE 5 
Summary Statistics and Correlations – Investment Level 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics – Investment Level  
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
pv_overview 10,144 0.97 0.18 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
pv_financials 10,144 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
pv_team 10,144 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
pv_forum 10,144 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
age 10,144 36.20 11.01 18.04 27.64 34.43 43.41 89.33 
male 10,144 0.95 0.23 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
pfsize 10,144 9.44 12.73 0.00 1.00 4.00 12.00 74.00 
exp 10,144 60.75 63.76 0.00 5.29 37.71 99.29 240.86 
debt 10,144 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
years_i_b 10,144 5.62 6.45 0.00 2.00 3.00 6.00 28.00 
#staff 10,144 16.63 12.09 1.00 8.00 12.00 26.00 52.00 
add_tabs 10,144 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
prior_VC 10,144 0.60 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
patent 10,144 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
discl 10,144 4,776.41 1,263.50 2,786.00 3,796.00 4,534.00 5,945.00 7,244.00 
#tables 10,144 2.59 1.40 0.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 7.00 
#figures 10,144 13.30 7.48 3.00 6.00 12.00 16.00 31.00 
vid_length 10,144 274.73 85.64 106.00 217.00 279.00 347.00 500.00 
#updates 10,144 2.97 4.23 0.00 0.00 1.00 5.00 19.00 
prof_invested 10,144 0.51 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
amount 10,144 0.49 1.06 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.50 10.00 
%funded 10,144 0.38 0.31 0.00 0.08 0.33 0.66 1.00 
#investors 10,144 332.56 327.51 0.00 45.00 249.00 518.00 1,485.00 
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 TABLE 5 (continued) 
Summary Statistics and Correlations – Investment Level 
 
       
Panel B: Correlations – Investment Level      
N = 10,114 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
(1) pv_overview  -0.11 -0.04 -0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.06 -0.12 0.02 -0.11 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.04 
(2) pv_financials -0.11  0.44 0.49 -0.12 0.07 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.11 -0.07 0.13 -0.14 -0.13 
(3) pv_team -0.04 0.44  0.47 -0.02 0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.10 -0.05 0.15 -0.12 -0.11 
(4) pv_forum -0.06 0.49 0.47  -0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.00 -0.14 -0.11 0.14 -0.18 -0.17 
(5) age 0.02 -0.12 -0.02 -0.05  -0.06 0.12 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 0.29 -0.06 -0.06 
(6) male -0.01 0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.07  0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
(7) pfsize 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 0.04 0.08 0.03  0.72 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.02 -0.37 -0.25 -0.26 -0.38 -0.40 
(8) exp 0.01 -0.05 -0.07 -0.01 0.09 0.02 0.65  0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.10 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.01 -0.19 -0.14 -0.12 -0.21 -0.19 
(9) amount 0.04 -0.08 -0.04 -0.05 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.01  0.47 0.36 -0.18 -0.39 0.13 -0.20 -0.14 0.05 0.13 -0.05 0.19 0.08 0.03 -0.02 
(10) debt 0.07 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.73  0.69 -0.44 -0.41 0.25 0.09 0.26 0.07 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.11 -0.02 0.10 
(11) years_i_b 0.10 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 0.54 0.51  -0.25 -0.10 0.18 0.20 0.30 0.46 0.01 0.08 0.23 0.11 0.00 0.14 
(12) #staff 0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.10 -0.18 -0.30 -0.19  0.15 -0.09 -0.44 -0.38 -0.07 0.09 -0.05 0.05 0.01 0.04 -0.01 
(13) add_tabs 0.06 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.39 -0.50 -0.16 0.15  -0.40 -0.02 -0.06 0.18 -0.18 0.11 -0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.13 
(14) prior_VC -0.12 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.42 0.12 -0.09 -0.40  0.00 0.05 0.04 -0.19 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.02 
(15) patent 0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.08 0.08 -0.15 -0.05 0.18 -0.49 -0.06 0.00  0.65 0.49 0.17 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 
(16) discl -0.20 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.10 -0.13 -0.06 0.12 -0.42 -0.09 0.08 0.60  0.39 0.09 -0.06 -0.25 -0.02 -0.11 -0.11 
(17) #tables 0.07 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.29 -0.08 0.25 0.05 0.45 0.34  0.10 0.11 0.20 0.00 0.02 0.04 
(18) #figures 0.08 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.04 -0.20 -0.11 0.17 0.07 0.04  -0.10 0.08 0.05 0.01 -0.04 
(19) vid_length 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 -0.10 -0.04 -0.02 -0.23 -0.08 -0.08 0.01 0.05 -0.12 0.12 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.17 -0.12  0.55 0.02 0.84 0.89 
(20) #updates 0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.11 -0.03 -0.04 -0.20 -0.10 0.19 0.21 0.30 0.05 -0.04 0.08 -0.01 -0.25 0.19 0.00 0.47  0.05 0.56 0.61 
(21) prof_invested 0.01 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.24 0.00 -0.16 -0.08 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.03  -0.02 0.03 
(22) %funded 0.00 -0.13 -0.11 -0.17 -0.05 -0.03 -0.27 -0.12 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.03 -0.07 -0.12 0.01 0.01 0.74 0.53 -0.02  0.89 
(23) #investors 0.04 -0.09 -0.09 -0.14 -0.04 -0.02 -0.28 -0.10 -0.05 0.07 0.12 0.01 0.16 0.00 -0.11 -0.13 0.04 -0.07 0.86 0.55 0.02 0.81  
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the investment-level variables. Specifically, summary statistics (Panel A) and correlations (Panel B) are presented. In Panel B, Pearson's 
correlation coefficients are shown in the lower triangle while Spearman's rank correlations appear above the diagonal. Statistical significance at the 0.1 level using two-tailed tests is indicated 
in bold type. See Appendix A1 for the variable definitions. 
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TABLE 6 
Summary Statistics of Page View by Content and Investor Type 
 
mean(page_view) 
Content Type 
Obs. Overview Financial Data Team Forum 
Investor Type 
Full sample 10,144 0.968 0.497 0.208 0.358 
      
(a) Female 558 0.973 0.357 0.142 0.289 
(b) Male 9,586 0.968 0.505 0.212 0.362 
Diff (a) - (b)  0.005 -0.149*** -0.071*** -0.074*** 
      
(c) pfsize < 5 5,193 0.967 0.500 0.224 0.335 
(d) pfsize ≥ 5 4,951 0.969 0.494 0.191 0.383 
Diff (c) - (d)   -0.002 0.005 0.033*** -0.047*** 
      
(e) Øamount < 500 7,244 0.968 0.464 0.178 0.320 
(f) Øamount ≥ 500 2,900 0.968 0.579 0.285 0.454 
Diff (e) - (f)   0.000 -0.115*** -0.107*** -0.134*** 
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for investors’ information acquisition related to the 10,144 investments in the full 
sample. Based on investor-level Google Analytics data, it shows the distribution of page views (page_view) by content and investor 
type. 
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 TABLE 7 
Summary Statistics of Pagetime by Content and Investor Type 
 
content_pt 
 Content Type Overview Financial Data Team Forum 
Investor Type Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Full sample 6,441 11.32 21.67 3,627 11.19 23.34 1,892 4.35 13.65 2,231 15.81 26.49 
             
(a) Female 399 10.80 20.47 147 8.23 16.77 71 2.66 7.04 124 13.76 18.47 
(b) Male 6,042 11.35 21.75 3,480 11.31 23.57 1,821 4.42 13.84 2,107 15.93 26.89 
Diff (a) - (b)  -0.55  -3.08**  -1.76**  -2.17 
             
(c) pfsize < 5 3,231 12.04 21.63 1,869 10.49 20.95 1,039 4.76 14.91 1,146 14.27 25.42 
(d) pfsize ≥ 5 3,210 10.59 21.69 1,758 11.93 25.63 853 3.86 11.92 1,085 17.43 27.50 
Diff (c) - (d)  1.45**  -1.45**  0.90*  -3.16*** 
             
(e) Øamount < 500 4,857 9.86 19.93 2,461 10.22 22.05 1,163 3.89 13.43 1,480 14.16 23.05 
(f) Øamount ≥ 500 1,584 15.79 25.79 1,166 13.23 25.75 729 5.09 13.96 751 19.04 31.99 
Diff (e) - (f)  -5.93***  -3.00***  -1.20**  -4.88*** 
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for investors’ information acquisition. Based on investor-level Google Analytics data, it shows the distribution 
of pagetime across content types and investor groups. Specifically, the distribution of content_pt which aggregates the time for which investors open a webpage 
on the investor-issuance-content type-level is presented. 
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TABLE 8 
Information Acquisition and Investor Attributes 
     
Dependent Variable page_view content_pt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Content Type Overview Financials Team Forum Overview Financials Team Forum 
type (male) -0.006 0.104*** 0.057*** 0.035* 0.100 2.467 1.511 1.868 
 (-1.407) (5.206) (3.286) (2.040) (0.134) (1.321) (1.454) (1.075) 
type (1 if pfsize ≥ 5) -0.000 -0.014 -0.024** 0.003 -3.198*** 1.529 -1.641 -1.085 
 (-0.128) (-1.147) (-2.775) (0.229) (-4.794) (1.410) (-1.512) (-0.942) 
type (1 if Øamount ≥ 500) -0.001 0.116*** 0.072*** 0.117*** 3.850*** 1.616 1.242* 5.379*** 
 (-0.209) (7.724) (5.900) (9.569) (3.669) (1.198) (1.741) (3.066) 
age 0.000 -0.007*** -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.067** -0.053* -0.101*** 0.081 
 (0.489) (-22.932) (-6.460) (-10.073) (-2.725) (-1.768) (-3.700) (1.359) 
pfsize 0.000 -0.001 -0.001*** 0.001** 0.056 0.017 0.012 0.174** 
 (1.116) (-0.931) (-3.068) (2.249) (1.436) (0.295) (0.347) (2.709) 
exp -0.000 -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** -0.003 -0.024*** 0.004 -0.020* 
 (-1.710) (-2.182) (-1.955) (-2.638) (-0.415) (-3.041) (0.613) (-1.755) 
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Issuance & Country FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Quarter & Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 10,144 10,144 10,144 10,144 6,441 3,627 1,892 2,231 
adj. R² 39.50% 9.87% 5.09% 9.38% 4.21% 2.14% 1.54% 4.57% 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results of different specifications that differ with respect to the dependent variable. The t-statistics are based on robust standard errors with 
one-way clustering by issuance (i.e., firm). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. See Appendix A1 (A2) for the variable 
definitions [the complete regression output (including controls) for the pooled sample]. 
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TABLE 9 
Information Acquisition, Funding Dynamics and Crowdinvesting Experience 
     
investor type = 1 (0) if pfsize ≥ (<) 5 
Dependent Variable page_view content_pt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Content Type Overview Financials Team Forum Overview Financials Team Forum 
%funded 0.004 -0.059 -0.065 0.030 2.331 1.613 9.155 0.125 
 (0.251) (-0.930) (-1.231) (0.429) (0.646) (0.291) (1.064) (0.019) 
type x %funded 0.002 -0.066* -0.007 -0.103** -9.236** -4.075 -12.299 6.875 
 (0.076) (-1.740) (-0.127) (-2.292) (-2.646) (-0.836) (-1.654) (1.072) 
#investors -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.006 -0.009 -0.002 -0.029*** 
 (-0.495) (-1.258) (-0.108) (-1.693) (-1.571) (-1.396) (-0.306) (-2.865) 
type x #investors -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.003 -0.005 0.004 -0.000 
 (-0.158) (-1.240) (-0.918) (-0.829) (0.863) (-0.444) (0.571) (-0.033) 
prof_invested 0.005 -0.003 -0.009 -0.036 0.179 2.804 -2.724 5.926 
 (0.862) (-0.188) (-0.662) (-1.600) (0.125) (1.397) (-0.909) (1.670) 
type x prof_invested -0.010 -0.023 0.020 0.032* 0.052 0.828 -0.516 -3.591 
 (-1.037) (-1.476) (0.743) (1.741) (0.039) (0.353) (-0.140) (-1.041) 
#updates -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 0.356 0.562 -0.836*** 1.501** 
 (-0.668) (-0.654) (-0.105) (-0.159) (1.284) (0.772) (-2.824) (2.260) 
type x #updates 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.138 0.737 0.264 -0.108 
 (0.660) (1.399) (0.802) (1.646) (0.593) (1.074) (0.786) (-0.132) 
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Investor & Issuance FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Quarter & Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 10,144 10,144 10,144 10,144 6,441 3,627 1,892 2,231 
adj. R² 48.70% 53.10% 33.80% 55.30% 30.60% 15.20% -1.88% 20.00% 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results of different specifications that differ with respect to the dependent variable. The t-statistics are based on robust standard errors with 
one-way clustering by issuance (i.e., firm). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. See Appendix A1 (A3) for the variable 
definitions [the complete regression output (including controls) for the pooled sample]. 
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TABLE 10 
Information Acquisition, Funding Dynamics and Average Investment Amounts 
     
investor type = 1 (0) if Øamount ≥ (<) 500 
Dependent Variable page_view content_pt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Content Type Overview Financials Team Forum Overview Financials Team Forum 
%funded 0.004 -0.088 -0.081* -0.037 -3.500 -1.116 4.281 2.105 
 (0.236) (-1.631) (-1.884) (-0.637) (-1.339) (-0.228) (0.603) (0.363) 
type x %funded 0.008 -0.063 0.032 0.061 4.549 -0.304 -3.115 7.921 
 (0.428) (-0.986) (0.536) (0.977) (0.913) (-0.036) (-0.522) (0.711) 
#investors -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.026*** 
 (-0.713) (-1.376) (-0.383) (-2.341) (-1.124) (-0.996) (-0.632) (-3.289) 
type x #investors 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.010 0.010 -0.010 
 (0.953) (0.704) (-0.476) (0.980) (-0.835) (-1.136) (1.433) (-0.884) 
prof_invested -0.001 -0.019 0.010 -0.017 0.387 1.568 -2.969 5.078* 
 (-0.169) (-1.194) (0.517) (-0.907) (0.305) (0.813) (-1.230) (2.004) 
type x prof_invested 0.002 0.001 -0.039* -0.015 -1.308 6.089 -0.450 -5.038 
 (0.185) (0.033) (-1.968) (-0.591) (-0.474) (1.711) (-0.181) (-1.148) 
#updates 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.004 0.340 0.754 -0.410 1.447*** 
 (0.289) (-0.009) (-0.182) (1.131) (1.343) (1.299) (-1.318) (3.296) 
type x #updates -0.004* -0.000 0.005 -0.007 0.320 0.141 -0.723* 0.256 
 (-1.902) (-0.058) (1.252) (-1.608) (1.061) (0.319) (-1.728) (0.403) 
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Investor & Issuance FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Quarter & Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 10,144 10,144 10,144 10,144 6,441 3,627 1,892 2,231 
adj. R² 48.80% 53.00% 33.80% 55.20% 30.50% 15.30% -2.29% 20.10% 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results of different specifications that differ with respect to the dependent variable. The t-statistics are based on robust standard errors with 
one-way clustering by issuance (i.e., firm). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. See Appendix A1 (A3) for the variable 
definitions [the complete regression output (including controls) for the pooled sample]. 
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TABLE 11 
Information Acquisition, Firm Attributes and Crowdinvesting Experience 
     
investor type = 1 (0) if pfsize ≥ (<) 5 
Dependent Variable page_view content_pt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Content Type Overview Financials Team Forum Overview Financials Team Forum 
prior_VC -0.045 0.022 0.010 0.014 -0.226 -1.267 1.874 5.956** 
 (-1.531) (1.364) (0.543) (0.962) (-0.191) (-0.483) (0.861) (2.091) 
type x prior_VC 0.012 -0.021 0.000 0.011 -1.846 2.676 -3.723 -0.050 
 (1.391) (-1.432) (0.024) (0.643) (-1.410) (1.464) (-1.533) (-0.013) 
patent -0.057* 0.012 0.020 -0.003 0.626 -4.548** 0.717 4.018 
 (-1.746) (0.851) (1.362) (-0.338) (0.485) (-2.602) (0.490) (1.707) 
type x patent 0.005 -0.021 -0.018 0.003 -1.907 2.124 -1.088 -2.212 
 (0.391) (-1.154) (-1.145) (0.229) (-1.366) (1.002) (-0.432) (-0.624) 
debt -0.280*** -0.096*** -0.017 -0.045 -2.094 -5.367 -0.218 -6.140 
 (-3.118) (-3.179) (-0.625) (-1.150) (-0.916) (-1.336) (-0.058) (-1.453) 
type x debt -0.007 0.032 0.051*** 0.007 -0.500 3.528 -1.456 6.017 
 (-0.448) (0.867) (3.283) (0.411) (-0.268) (0.749) (-0.703) (1.448) 
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Investor FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Quarter & Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 10,144 10,144 10,144 10,144 6,441 3,627 1,892 2,231 
adj. R² 35.20% 35.20% 52.90% 33.80% 30.40% 15.10% -2.57% 19.90% 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results of different specifications that differ with respect to the dependent variable. The t-statistics are based on robust standard errors with 
one-way clustering by issuance (i.e., firm). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. See Appendix A1 (A4) for the variable 
definitions [the complete regression output (including controls) for the pooled sample]. 
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TABLE 12 
Information Acquisition, Firm Attributes and Average Investment Amounts 
     
investor type = 1 (0) if Øamount ≥ (<) 500 
Dependent Variable page_view content_pt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Content Type Overview Financials Team Forum Overview Financials Team Forum 
prior_VC -0.038 0.013 0.013 0.018 -1.384 0.100 2.080 5.621*** 
 (-1.281) (0.959) (0.640) (1.181) (-0.950) (0.053) (1.122) (2.840) 
type x prior_VC -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 0.011 -0.179 1.433 -5.945*** 1.406 
 (-0.261) (-0.296) (-0.332) (0.847) (-0.053) (0.580) (-3.294) (0.437) 
patent -0.054 0.000 0.011 -0.005 -0.262 -4.274*** 2.003 1.948 
 (-1.623) (0.040) (0.780) (-0.448) (-0.346) (-3.545) (1.566) (1.044) 
type x patent -0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.011 -0.908 3.173 -4.746** 2.267 
 (-0.422) (0.112) (-0.040) (0.762) (-0.326) (1.658) (-2.496) (0.829) 
debt -0.286*** -0.067** 0.017 -0.030 -2.280 -2.851 0.908 1.205 
 (-3.126) (-2.236) (0.568) (-0.842) (-0.879) (-0.823) (0.287) (0.297) 
type x debt 0.010 -0.052 -0.031 -0.040 -2.194 -0.509 -4.700** -12.143*** 
 (1.049) (-1.417) (-0.694) (-1.081) (-0.759) (-0.158) (-2.586) (-2.932) 
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Investor FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Quarter & Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 10,144 10,144 10,144 10,144 6,441 3,627 1,892 2,231 
adj. R² 35.10% 52.90% 33.70% 55.20% 30.30% 15.00% -2.03% 20.20% 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results of different specifications that differ with respect to the dependent variable. The t-statistics are based on robust standard errors with 
one-way clustering by issuance (i.e., firm). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. See Appendix A1 (A4) for the variable 
definitions [the complete regression output (including controls) for the pooled sample]. 
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Abstract 
This project studies the effect of online financial education on crowdinvestors’ information and invest-
ment behavior by conducting a field experiment on Companisto, one of the largest German crowdin-
vesting portals. The randomly administered education program teaches basic and start-up-related invest-
ment knowledge. While the experiment is still ongoing, this preliminary report documents the overall 
research design and explores the determinants of program enrollment, participation, persistence and 
performance. We find that, while program enrollment is overall positively associated with the investors’ 
crowdinvesting exposure, very inexperienced crowdinvestors are also more likely to enroll. Our results 
further indicate that enrolled participants’ pre-treatment level of ‘basic’ financial literacy is significantly 
higher than those of wider populations documented in prior literature. Moreover, we find that investors 
with a lower self-assessed level of financial education are more likely to participate and also more per-
sistent in taking the online modules. The level of advanced financial literacy is positively associated 
with both, persistence and performance. Our preliminary findings inform about the general level of fi-
nancial sophistication of crowdinvestors and the likelihood that low-effort financial literacy interven-
tions reach their targeted audience. After the experiment is completed, we will finalize the project by 
analyzing the program’s effect on financial literacy, as well as individual information and investment 
behavior. 
Keywords: financial education, financial literacy, crowdinvesting, information behavior, investor be-
havior 
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1 Introduction 
Crowdinvesting critically depends on the wisdom of the crowd (see Schwienbacher and 
Larralde 2012 and Bradford 2012 for a related discussion)90. However, as has been documented 
by prior work on financial literacy91, a substantial share of the worlds’ adult population still 
lacks basic financial knowledge (see Lusardi and Mitchell 2014 for a related discussion). While 
this seems generally relevant as, in recent years, internet-based financial intermediaries (e.g., 
virtual banks) have been continuously replacing services that have long been provided by tra-
ditional financial institutions, the lack of financial literacy seems particularly problematic in 
settings where subjects need advanced skills for rational investment decisions such as in 
crowdinvesting (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014). Moreover, as crowdinvesting in many jurisdic-
tions is not subject to traditional securities regulation, the question of financial expertise of 
crowdinvestors is an area of regulatory concern (Bradford 2012; Lusardi and Mitchell 2014). 
In crowdinvesting, internet-based financial intermediaries, so-called crowdinvesting 
portals (CIPs), support early-stage start-ups to obtain external financing by drawing on rela-
tively small contributions from a relatively large number of mostly (unsophisticated) retail in-
vestors (Bradford 2012; Mollick 2014). Given the various services that CIPs provide (e.g., 
                                                     
90  As all three studies constituting this Ph.D. thesis investigate investor behavior in crowdinvesting (on 
Companisto), there are certain, and in some cases inevitable, similarities in the structure and contents of these 
studies. Specifically, as the order of the papers presented in this study reflects the chronology of their first 
drafts, my second (and third) study build(s) up on my first (and second) study. These similarities are particularly 
pronounced in the discussion of the related literature [pages 89 to 90 (151 to 152) of the second (third) paper 
build up on pages 12 to 13 and pages 23 to 29 of the first (and pages 89 to 90 of the second) paper], the 
description of the institutional environment [pages 91 to 97 (153 to 154) of the second (third) paper build up 
on pages 17 to 23 of the first (and pages 91 to 97 of the second) paper], and the (discussion of the) variables 
used in the empirical analysis [pages 98 to 103 of the second paper build up on pages 31 to 38 of the first 
paper]. As all three studies have not been previously published, for the scope of this dissertation, I generally 
abstain from self-quotations. However, in places, I discuss the results of my prior studies or name them as 
examples for prior findings. 
91  As there is no general definition of financial literacy, we follow the definition used by the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2016:85) for the 2015 “Programme for International Stu-
dent Assessment” (PISA) which characterizes financial literacy as the “knowledge and understanding of finan-
cial concepts and risks, and the skills, motivation and confidence to apply such knowledge and understanding 
in order to make effective decisions across a range of financial contexts, to improve the financial well-being 
of individuals and society, and to enable participation in economic life”. See Huston (2010) for an overview 
of selected financial literacy definitions used in the literature.  
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standardized financial contracts), in many countries, retail investors are typically just a few 
clicks away from becoming risk capital providers, a role traditionally reserved for professional 
investors (e.g., Venture Capital firms, Business Angels) (Bradford 2012; Mollick 2013). Due 
to the highly risky nature of start-up investments, in some countries, regulators require CIPs to 
educate potential investors (e.g., JOBS ACT, Title III, section 4A(a)(3)). 
To study the role of financial literacy and financial education in the crowdinvesting 
market, we conduct a randomized field experiment that allows us to analyze the effect of a 
financial literacy intervention on investor behavior. Specifically, in collaboration with Compa-
nisto, one of the largest German CIPs, we design and conduct an online financial education 
program comprising around 5.5 hours of web-based interactive training. When the experiment 
is completed, we will document the effect of this program on retail crowdinvestors’ investment 
activity and their information acquisition prior to investing. For the latter analysis, we will use 
investor-level Google Analytics data that we obtain in addition to other anonymized investor-
level information (e.g., demographics, investment history). This relatively novel type of data 
allows us to track down investors’ web page usage (i.e., information acquisition) on Compa-
nisto.  
While the experiment is still ongoing, we focus this preliminary report on motivating 
the overall research question and on explaining our research design. In addition, we explore the 
decision of our randomly selected subjects to enroll and to participate in the education program 
as well as their persistence and performance during the program. We model the enrollment 
decision based on prior investment behavior and personal demographics of our invited subjects. 
Our findings suggest that investors that self-reported to have less than one year of experience 
with (crowd)investing and similar investment forms, have a higher propensity of enrolling into 
the program than other investors. In addition, we show that, overall, investors with more expo-
sure to the crowdinvesting market are also more likely to enroll. Furthermore, as we measure 
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the pre-treatment level of financial literacy of all enrolled crowdinvestors, we can compare their 
level of financial literacy with levels of financial literacy documented by prior studies. Con-
sistent with related evidence for general investors (Krische 2014), we find that, compared to 
survey samples representative for the overall population, crowdinvestors exhibit a significantly 
higher level of ‘basic’ financial literacy. In a next step, we analyze the determinants of program 
participation and find a negative association between investors’ self-assessed level of financial 
education and their likelihood of program participation. This finding is consistent with investors 
that assess their financial educational background to be weak to be more likely to participate in 
financial literacy interventions. Also, this investor group is more persistent in attending the 
program. However, we also document that overall, higher levels of financial literacy are also 
related positively to the likelihood of program participation and persistence. Finally, we docu-
ment a positive association between program performance and participants’ advanced level of 
financial literacy and their investment skills. 
We designed the content covered in the online financial education program in collabo-
ration with Companisto to improve investors’ ‘basic’ financial knowledge (e.g., about different 
investment opportunities, interest compounding, and on the association between risk and re-
turn), their competence about the asset classes that are offered on Companisto, as well as their 
ability to evaluate the risk and return profile of early-stage start-ups. We thereby focus our 
analysis on both, investors’ financial knowledge and their ability to apply respective concepts 
in a crowdinvesting context (Huston 2010). 
While this is an interim report about an ongoing research project, we contribute to the 
literature by providing compelling descriptive evidence for a surprisingly high level of financial 
literacy among crowdinvestors. In addition, we document that, overall, better informed inves-
tors are more likely to participate in low-effort online financial literacy interventions. However, 
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after controlling for this general trend, we also document that inexperienced investors and in-
vestors that are assessing their financial education level to be low are more likely to obtain 
training. While the prior result is in line with the general findings of the literature, the latter 
lends some support to the hope that financial literacy interventions might be reaching their main 
targeted users. 
Once completed, the empirical evidence provided by this project will also add to the 
literature on the causal effects of financial literacy and on the behavior of crowdinvestors. With 
regards to the first dimension, we will add to a series of studies that investigate the effects of 
financial literacy interventions on various of financial outcomes (see Fernandes et al. 2014 and 
Miller et al. 2015 for an overview).92 In their meta-analysis, Fernandes et al. (2014) find that 
(standardized) effects of financial literacy interventions are generally weak. Specifically, it ap-
pears that the effect sizes of financial education programs are negatively associated with the 
putative precision of the identification strategy. Studies with randomized treatment assignment, 
for example, tend to show small or no (statistically) significant effects. Moreover, while the 
effectiveness of financial education does not seem to vary with the studied financial behavior, 
the type (intensity) of the intervention seems to be (positively) associated with observed effect 
sizes. Also, Fernandes et al. (2014) show that the effects of interventions are increasing in the 
average income within the sample, while it does not seem to influence the effect size whether 
participation in the intervention is voluntary or imposed on the participants. 
We will add to this stream of literature in three ways. First, we will be the first to assess 
the effectiveness of financial literacy interventions in crowdinvesting markets by assessing the 
pre- and post-financial literacy of our subjects. Second, by examining the effect of a financial 
                                                     
92  Experimental studies provide mixed evidence on the effects of financial literacy interventions on various fi-
nancial outcomes, e.g., saving decisions (e.g., Becchetti et al. 2013; Cole et al. 2013), borrowing decisions 
(e.g., Collins 2012; Bruhn et al. 2013), investment decisions (e.g., Clark et al. 2014; Drexler et al. 2014) and 
retirement planning (e.g., Cai et al. 2015). See Fernandes et al. (2014) for an overview of the experimental 
evidence and the standardized effect sizes, respectively.  
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literacy intervention on investors’ actual investment decisions, we will study how financial ed-
ucation affects retail investors’ behavior. Third, we will further contribute to research on the 
determinants of retail investors’ information behavior by providing investor-level field evi-
dence on the role of financial literacy for retail investors’ information acquisition prior to in-
vesting. Prior (mostly survey-based) evidence suggests that retail investors’ information acqui-
sition is associated with their demographics (e.g., Drake et al. 2017; Hemaidan 2017b) and their 
level of financial sophistication (e.g., Elliott et al. 2008; Ernst et al. 2009). Closely related to 
our study is the evidence presented by Hemaidan (2017b) who investigates retail investors’ 
information acquisition. Using investor-level Google Analytics data from Companisto, he finds 
that investors make investment decisions without even accessing a large fraction of start-ups’ 
(financial) disclosure on the CIP. His results further reveal a negative association between in-
vestors’ information acquisition and the presence of potential signals of start-up quality (e.g., 
patents, professional co-investments). We build up on this evidence by analyzing how these 
findings are affected by a manipulation of investors’ financial literacy.  
A growing body in the empirical literature seeks to understand the determinants of in-
vestor behavior in the crowdinvesting market (see Moritz and Block 2016 and Wallmeroth et 
al. 2017 for an overview of the crowdfunding literature). Most of these studies examine how 
firm characteristics (e.g., Ahlers et al. 2015) and the dynamics of the funding process (e.g., 
Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016b; Block et al. 2016) are related to funding outcomes. Due to 
the limited availability of investor-level data, there is, however, only scarce evidence on how 
the information (e.g., Bernstein et al. 2017; Hemaidan 2017b) and investment behavior (e.g., 
Wallmeroth 2016; Hemaidan 2017a) of crowdinvestors vary with their characteristics. By ana-
lyzing the role of financial literacy for crowdinvestors’ information and investment behavior, 
we will thus contribute to this second stream of research.  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information on crowdinvesting (on Companisto). The research design (data) underlying the 
empirical analyses of this study is explained in Section 3 (4). In Section 5, we present prelimi-
nary descriptive evidence on participants’ pre-treatment level of financial literacy and on the 
determinants of program enrollment, participation, persistence and performance. Section 6 con-
cludes and provides an outlook on the next steps taken in the analyses of the effect of the finan-
cial education program. 
2 Crowdinvesting on Companisto 
Crowdinvesting is a special form of crowdfunding, which according to Mollick (2014:2) 
„refers to the efforts by entrepreneurial individuals and groups (…) to fund their ventures by 
drawing on relatively small contributions from a relatively large number of individuals using 
the internet, without standard financial intermediaries.“ Prior literature (Ahlers et al. 2015; Hor-
nuf and Schwienbacher 2016a,b, 2017) identifies four major forms of crowdfunding that differ 
with regard to the return that backers obtain for the contributions. In contrast to other forms of 
internet-based crowdfunding, where contributions are mainly driven by an intrinsic motivation 
to support charitable projects (donation-based crowdfunding) or provided in return for a desired 
product (reward-based crowdfunding), in crowdinvesting, contributions are rather driven by the 
intention to realize a financial return. However, unlike certain forms of crowdlending (e.g., 
peer-to-peer lending), where investors grant loans to other individuals, in crowdinvesting, in-
vestors typically provide financing for early-stage start-ups. While crowdinvesting comprises 
the sale of debt, mezzanine or equity(like) securities, investors typically obtain a pro-rata share 
in the profits and (in case of an exit) firm value development of the funded venture in return for 
their contributions. Therefore, crowdinvesting is often also referred to as equity-based crowd-
funding. CIPs, such as Companisto, are key to the success of this novel form of financial mar-
ket. The services that they provide (e.g., standardized financial contracts, advertisement of the 
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issuance on their portal website) enable start-ups to collect external financing by offering fi-
nancial securities to the general public. In return for these services, CIPs typically charge a fee 
of around ten percent of the funded amount (Ahlers et al. 2015; Hornuf and Schwienbacher 
2016a,b, 2017).  
Following the adoption of the German Small Investor Protection Act in 2015, in Ger-
many, the maximum investment amount without the obligation to register with the financial 
authorities and thus without the requirement to issue a prospectus is limited to (10,000 Euro) 
2.5 million Euro per (investor) issuance (see Klöhn et al. 2016 for a detailed discussion of this 
regulation). German CIPs (including Companisto) typically use two forms of subordinated par-
ticipation loans which are either designed as debt (i.e., fixed-interest) or as equity-like securi-
ties. While being economically comparable to equity, the latter form does typically not transfer 
any voting rights (Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016b, 2017). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The German Small Investor Protection Act also requires CIPs to provide investors with 
a three-page prospectus that summarizes key aspects of the start-up (e.g., financial leverage, 
shareholder structure). Also, start-ups are required to provide the most recent annual reports. In 
addition to legal disclosure requirements, Companisto, for example, requires start-ups to pro-
vide a pitch video, narrative information on the business model and target market, profiles of 
the managing team as well as selected financial information (e.g., EBIT forecasts) including a 
discussion of the assumptions underlying firms’ financial projections. The information envi-
ronment of issuances on Companisto (see Figure 1) generally exhibits a fixed structure with 
each issuance containing similar information sections (e.g., financial forecasts, profiles of the 
managing team). 
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3 Research Design 
3.1 Measuring Financial Literacy 
Before investors are granted access to the contents of the online financial education 
program, they must first complete an “Entry-Level-Test” (ELT) comprising 14 questions used 
to measure participants’ financial literacy along with other selected concepts.93 Our ‘basic’ fi-
nancial literacy index (fin_literacy) is based on the first three ELT questions on fundamental 
concepts in economics and finance that were introduced by Lusardi and Mitchell for the 2004 
U.S. Health and Retirement Study (HRS)94. The questions have since been extensively used in 
the (academic) literature95 to measure individuals’ (1) ability to perform simple calculations 
related to interest rates as well as their understanding of (2) the effect of inflation and (3) the 
fundamentals of risk diversification (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011). Based on these questions, we 
are able to compare participants’ pre-treatment level of financial literacy with the level of fi-
nancial literacy documented in prior literature (e.g., Krische 2014).  
Our second index (adv_fin_literacy) captures participants’ ‘advanced’ financial literacy 
comprising two questions that measure participants’ understanding of the key attributes of eq-
uity and debt securities (ELT-Q4) and the association between risk and return (ELT-Q5). 
Lastly, our third index measures investors’ (start-up related) investment skills 
(inv_skills). The index is based on four questions that, to our best knowledge, are unique to this 
study and are used to measure participants’ ability to evaluate the business model and target 
market of a start-up (ELT-Q6), their understanding of the fundamentals in company valuation 
(ELT-Q7) as well as specific approaches used for the valuation of early-stage start-ups (ELT-
                                                     
93  See Appendix A4 for more information on the ELT design and Appendix A5 for the exact wording of the ELT 
questions. 
94  See Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) for an overview of the questions used in the 2004 U.S. HRS. 
95  The questions have been previously used by, e.g., FINRA Foundation (2009), van Rooij et al. (2011), Krische 
(2014) and Agrawal et al. (2015). 
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Q8). Moreover, we measure participants’ general understanding of factors that should (not) be 
considered when making start-up investments (ELT-Q9). 
We calculate each index as the unweighted sum of points gained from answering the 
underlying ELT questions correctly. Specifically, participants obtain one (zero) point(s) per 
(in)correct answer. In addition, we measure both participants’ self-assessed level of financial 
literacy (fin_lit_self_assessed; ELT-Q1) and financial education (fin_ed_self_assessed; ELT-
Q2) on a seven-point Likert scale, standardized to values ranging from zero to one, with higher 
values indicating higher levels of knowledge or education. Also, we capture participants’ nu-
merical skills (numeracy; ELT-Q12), their degree of risk_aversion (ELT-Q13) along with their 
time_preferences (ELT-Q14). The numeracy score is based on a standard question developed 
by prior literature (Frederick 2005) and takes the value of one if investors answer the respective 
ELT question correctly.96  
3.2 Financial Literacy Intervention 
The online financial education program (i.e., our intervention or treatment) is solely 
available in German and comprises three levels with three modules each and thus a total of nine 
modules (see Figure 2 for a conceptual overview). The modules cover various topics related to 
personal finance and start-up investments. Each module comprises five to ten screen pages and 
contains interactive elements (e.g., check-up questions) that were included to increase partici-
pants’ learning experience and that allow us to track their learning process. At the end of each 
module, participants can test their knowledge in a “Module-End-Test” (METs). After three 
modules, a level is completed. To finish a level (i.e., to get access to the respective “Level-End-
Test”, LET), participants are required to finish all three METs of the respective level. Both the 
METs and LETs contain variations of the questions that are already included in the ELT and 
                                                     
96  In this preliminary report, we do not use risk_aversion nor time_preferences as the answers to the underlying 
questions are yet to be coded.  
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thus allow us to measure how investors’ financial literacy changes during their participation in 
the program.97 This also enables us to explore factors associated with participants’ (test) per-
formance. For each test (ELT, MET and LET), participants receive a detailed explanation of 
the correct answer. Test participation should therefore also have a (direct) positive effect on 
participants’ financial literacy.98 Taken together, the program (including all tests) comprises 
around 5.5 hours of web-based training.99 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Given that firms’ information environment on Companisto typically reflects a large 
fraction of their overall (and generally low) information environment (see Michels 2012 for a 
related discussion), the program contains an overview of the (structure of the) information that 
is typically provided for issuances on Companisto.100 The contents included in the intervention 
should therefore not only increase participants’ (start-up-related) investment knowledge but 
also their ability to apply this knowledge on Companisto (Huston 2010).  
3.3 Experimental Design 
We start our experiment by inviting a randomly selected group of registered investors 
on Companisto to participate in the “BETA-Test” of our online financial education program 
that can be accessed through the Companisto web-page.101 Specifically, on July 2, 2017, 75 (25) 
                                                     
97  The exact wording and/or question type varies within a question pool. However, each pool of questions (from 
which test questions are randomly selected) tests for the same concept(s). See Appendix A3 for more detailed 
information on the design of the METs and LETs. 
98  Participants are generally able to improve their test results by re-taking each MET at will while still having 
access to prior test results (including an explanation of the correct answer).  
99  While this will vary across modules, finishing a module including the respective MET should take participants 
around 30 minutes in total (15 minutes to work through the module and another 15 minutes to complete the 
MET). In addition, the ELT and each LET should take participants around 15 minutes. This includes both, 
completing the test and reading through the correct answers. 
100  Given that, in Germany, the specific contents and structure of the information provided in the scope of crowdin-
vestings (on Companisto) is typically not subject to regulation, the provided information (structure) typically 
varies across CIPs. Thus, it is important to provide investors with specific information on where to find poten-
tially relevant information related to issuances on Companisto. 
101  See Section 4 for a description of the sample selection process (i.e., the randomization approach) and Appen-
dix A6 for the (original) invitation. 
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percent of the investors in our sample did (not) receive a newsletter with the invitation to par-
ticipate in an online financial education program and thus reflect our treatment (control) 
group.102 To increase the participation rate, the invitation included information on a prize draw 
among all participants. Specifically, investors were informed that three randomly selected par-
ticipants would each win a premium grill. The BETA-Test ended on August 20, 2017. To meas-
ure the perceived information content and (thus) the perceived usefulness of the online financial 
education program (i.e., the BETA-Test), a newsletter with a link to a program evaluation sur-
vey (comprising six questions) was sent to investors on August 21, 2017.103 This will, for ex-
ample, allow us to examine how participants’ program evaluation is associated with their (self-
assessed) pre-treatment level of financial literacy, their (test) performance and the effect of the 
financial education program on their information and investment behavior. Figure 3 depicts the 
general time structure of the experiment.104  
[Figure 3 about here]  
Due to the voluntary nature of our financial literacy intervention, we will not use the 
actual participation in the online education program to identify the causal effect of financial 
education on investors‘ information and investment behavior. To avoid potential self-selection 
bias, we will instead use the randomized offer to participate in the financial education program 
as an instrument for the actual participation. The focus of our experiment will therefore lie on 
                                                     
102  Members of Companisto’s so-called “Business Club” (i.e., highly active investors) that are randomly assigned 
into treatment receive a letter in addition to the newsletter. Only investors that receive an invitation (i.e., were 
in the treatment group) were able to access the financial education program on the Companisto webpage. Nat-
urally, we cannot rule out that members of the control group found out about the financial education program. 
As this might have affected the information and investment behavior of respective investors either directly or 
indirectly (i.e., by making them acquire financial knowledge on their own which in turn might has affected 
their behavior), our results might be subject to bias. However, this should work against us finding any (statis-
tically) significant differences between the two groups. 
103  See Appendix A7 for the original newsletter and the exact wording of the questions included in the program 
evaluation survey. 
104  See Appendix A2 for more detailed information on the timeline of the project. 
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the identification of the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect. Figure 4 presents the identification strat-
egy. Our main analysis is going to be based on a difference-in-differences design, which will 
allow us to test for differences in the change of the investment and information behavior be-
tween treatment and control group when comparing the four months prior to the introduction 
of the BETA-Test (pre-period) with the four months following the end of the BETA-Test (post-
period).105 
[Figure 4 about here] 
To get a better understanding of the average effect of the online financial education 
program on the participants (ATT), we will, in an additional analysis, narrow our investigation 
to the subset of investors that actually participate in the financial education program. Despite 
the previously discussed limitations to the generalizability of the related results, we will exam-
ine how investors’ enrollment, participation and performance in the program is associated with 
changes of their information acquisition and investment behavior. 
3.4 Measuring Program Enrollment, Participation, Persistence and Performance 
In this preliminary report, we focus our analysis on the treatment group (i.e., investors 
that received an invitation to participate in the online financial education program) and the 
question how program enrollment, participation, persistence and performance are associated 
with participants’ attributes (i.e., their personal demographics and their additionally provided 
(profile) information) and, for those that enrolled in the study by finishing the ELT, the different 
constructs as measured through the ELT (e.g., measured and self-assessed financial literacy). 
As the intensity of program participation varies across investors, we define three variables, en-
rolled, participated and persistence. Our first proxy, enrolled, is binary coded and takes on a 
                                                     
105  In February 2017, the structure of the information sections of issuances on Companisto has been subject to 
significant changes. To avoid biases related to this change, we therefore take March 1, 2017 as the starting date 
of the pre-period of our difference-in-differences analysis (see Figure 4 for the general timeline of the experi-
ment). 
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value of 1 if an investor has provided answers to the ELT questions that capture her (self-as-
sessed) level of financial literacy and education (ELT Q1 to Q11). This applies to 462 out of 
11,575 invited investors. Our second binary indicator, participated, takes on the value 1 if an 
investor has accessed at least one MET or LET after submitting the ELT and thus being granted 
access to the actual contents of the program (N = 234). To measure the intensity of program 
participation, we define persistence as the natural logarithm of the total number of questions 
that are answered across all MET and LET tests. Finally, we measure participants’ program 
performance as the percentage of correctly answered MET and LET questions. 
3.5 Measuring Information Behavior 
To measure participants’ information acquisition, we will use user-level Google Ana-
lytics data that will allow us to track down investors’ information selection as well as the time 
that they spend on the different information sections of crowdinvestings on Companisto prior 
to investing. Building up on Hemaidan (2017b), who uses similar data to investigate how in-
vestor and firm attributes as well as the dynamics of the funding round are related to investors’ 
information behavior on Companisto, we will be able to examine how investors’ information 
behavior changes through our financial literacy intervention. In a first step, we will investigate 
how participants’ (self-assessed) pre-treatment level of financial literacy, their risk preference 
and their time value of money assessment are related to their information behavior. As an effect 
of the online financial education program, we generally expect participants to increase their 
usage of the information provided in the different sections on Companisto. Specifically, we 
expect them to access more information prior to investing. A major finding of Hemaidan 
(2017b) is that investors neglect a large fraction of the (financial) information provided on 
Companisto, which might be driven by the fact that investors are not able to identify and/or 
process the respective information. This would be consistent with related research on investors’ 
information behavior in traditional capital markets indicating that both investors’ choice of 
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(e.g., Elliott et al. 2008) and ability to process information (e.g., Frederickson and Miller 2004) 
are associated with their level of sophistication (see Cascino et al. 2013, 2014 for an overview 
and a more detailed discussion). The findings of Hemaidan (2017b) might, however, simply 
reflect investors’ lack in familiarity with the information environment on Companisto. Given 
that our online financial education program provides both (i) information on (how to process) 
potentially decision-useful information related to start-up-investments and (ii) an overview of 
the specific information (sections) on Companisto, we expect investors’ information behavior 
[i.e., their likelihood of accessing crowdinvesting-related information (sections)] on Compa-
nisto to be positively affected by program participation. Consistent with the evidence provided 
by Mason and Harrison (1996), we argue (and teach investors) that even if certain information 
might not necessarily be decision-useful at face value (e.g., start-ups’ financial forecasts), it 
might still be informative with regard to the characteristics (e.g., competence, degree of opti-
mism) of the managing team. 
Our second information acquisition proxy of interest is the time that investors spend 
with the acquisition of information provided on Companisto. Specifically, the user-level Google 
Analytics data allows us to measure the aggregated time for which investors have opened each 
information section of a crowdinvesting in their browser prior to investing. An increase in in-
vestors’ financial literacy might decrease the time that it takes them to identify and process 
(potentially) relevant information. However, it might also be the case that an increase in finan-
cial literacy causes investors to screen (and process) information that they previously neglected 
leading to an increase in the measured time that they spend on the acquisition of information in 
the respective information section. It is therefore not possible to clearly predict how participa-
tion in our financial education program will affect the time that investors have certain infor-
mation sections opened in their browser prior to investing. 
 162 
3.6 Measuring Investment Behavior 
To investigate the effect of the online financial education program on investors’ invest-
ment behavior on Companisto, we will focus our analysis on the frequency, timing and volume 
(per start-up and in total) of investments. Given that one entire module of the program focuses 
on the concept of risk diversification, we expect that, compared to individuals from the control 
group106, in the post-treatment period, program participants will invest smaller amounts (per 
start-up) on Companisto. We are further interested in whether participation in the program af-
fects the timing of investments, i.e., the stage of the crowdinvesting campaign at which partic-
ipants invest. Prior evidence on the investment behavior of crowdinvestors suggests that invest-
ments by others affect investors’ investment behavior (e.g., Vismara 2017). Kim and Viswana-
than (2016) show that this phenomenon is more pronounced following investments by ‘experts’. 
If investors perceive others to be more sophisticated, they might regard respective investments 
as signals of quality (e.g., Moritz et al. 2015). Following this rationale, more sophisticated in-
vestors might rather rely on their own evaluation of a start-up instead of free-riding on the 
know-how and due diligence of others. Therefore, we expect a manipulation of investors’ fi-
nancial literacy to affect the timing of their investments. However, it is not clear whether in-
vestors will invest at earlier (e.g., because they don’t wait for the behavior of others) or at later 
stages (e.g., because they invest more time in their own due diligence). In any case, we expect 
the investment behavior of treated investors to be less clustered around investment activities of 
supposedly more sophisticated investors. 
Naturally, it would be interesting to study whether the program induces investors to take 
“better” investment decisions. Wallmeroth (2016), for example, uses a self-generated user-level 
                                                     
106  On June 14, 2017, the minimum investment amount on Companisto was raised from 5 Euro to 100 Euro. Thus, 
for some investors, the amount invested per start-up as well as the aggregated amount invested on Companisto 
should have since increased. However, we expected that this effect is less pronounced for individuals that 
(receive an invitation to) participate in the education program. 
 163 
data set of investments on Companisto to study the likelihood of different types of investors to 
invest in ventures that fail (i.e., go bankrupt). While we will add to this question by studying 
whether investors that (were invited to) participate acquire more information and thus, from an 
ex ante perspective, take better informed decisions, at this point, it is not possible to analyze the 
relative ex post performance of their investments. This will, however, be possible once the first 
start-ups that collected funds during the ex post period of our analysis either go insolvent or 
accomplish to obtain additional financing (profitably sell the firm). Nevertheless, we will ex-
amine whether the investment behavior of our treatment group becomes more similar to the 
pre-treatment behavior of individuals that scored relatively high financial literacy scores in the 
ELT. Moreover, given that we have additional information on the investment behavior of insti-
tutional investors that are included in our sample (i.e., registered as “companies” on Compa-
nisto), we will analyze whether the investment decisions of our (intended) treatment group be-
come more comparable to the behavior of institutional investors.  
4 Data 
We start our sample selection by identifying a sample of investors that we use as a basis 
for our randomization procedure, i.e., from which we can randomly select a treatment group 
that receives an invitation to participate in our online financial literacy intervention. Out of the 
69,955 users that were registered on Companisto as of June 14, 2017, we therefore, in a first 
step, drop all investors that do not want to receive email-news updates (n = 3,305) or letters 
from Companisto (n = 166). Moreover, as in our main analysis, we want to compare how in-
vestors’ information and investment behavior changes from the pre- to the post-treatment pe-
riod, we drop 50,014 registered users that have not yet invested on Companisto.107 Additionally, 
as we want to focus our analysis on retail investors, we exclude 367 users that are registered as 
                                                     
107  Also, investors are not required to provide certain information (e.g., their gender, address and whether they 
invest on their own account or for an institution) before their first investment. An inclusion of registered users 
that have not yet invested on Companisto would therefore limit and potentially bias our analysis.  
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“company” (i.e., institutional) investors from our sample. Given that the contents of our online 
financial education program (i.e., our treatment) are solely provided in German, we drop 662 
investors located in countries other than Germany, Austria or Switzerland. After further exclud-
ing all remaining individuals with missing user information, we obtain a final sample of 15,433 
investors. Panel A in Table 1 depicts the sample selection process. 
[Table 1 about here] 
From this sample, which includes 1,174 “Business Club” members (bc = 1; 0 other-
wise), we randomly select our treatment group. Given the low participation rates documented 
in prior voluntary financial education programs (e.g., Bruhn et al. 2013) and the low average 
effect sizes of prior studies with comparable identification strategies as we use in our main 
analysis (e.g., Fernandes et al. 2014), we select 11,575 (75 %) as our treatment group. We con-
duct the randomization process by drawing from six buckets [country (Austria, Germany and 
Switzerland) X investor type (bc members and all other investors)].108 Thereby, we ensure that 
our treatment and control group do not differ in the relative share of active investors and inves-
tors from the three countries included in our sample. Moreover, we require our treatment and 
control group to be comparable in the distribution of selected investor characteristics that might 
affect participation in the financial education program and (thus) its effect and that might also 
be directly associated with investors’ information and investment behavior. Specifically, we 
balance our treatment and control group with regard to investors’ age, gender (male = 1; 0 
otherwise), portfolio size (nr_startups) and recent investment activity (active = 1; 0 otherwise). 
A comparison of the two samples (see Panel B in Table 1) shows the success of our randomi-
zation process as we do not find any (statistically) significant differences in the above-men-
                                                     
108  We conduct the randomization process without repetitions. However, for our randomization results to be rep-
licable, we set a seed value (40055562 = first numbers of a barcode of a card game). 
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tioned dimensions. Specifically, Panel B in Table 1 shows that for both our treatment and con-
trol group, the average investor is around 38 years old, male and has invested in at least 3 start-
ups. Moreover, we find that only a third (7.5 percent) of all investors in our sample have in-
vested at least once in the past 12 months (are members of the Business Club). Most investors 
in our sample are located in Germany (90.6 percent). Only 5.8 (3.6) percent live in Austria 
(Switzerland).  
5 (Preliminary) Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
5.1.1 Determinants of Program Enrollment 
From the 11,575 investors that received an invitation to participate in the online finan-
cial education program 462 (four percent of) individuals entered the ELT and provided answers 
to questions 1 to 11 allowing us to measure their level of (self-assessed) level of financial liter-
acy (see Panel A in Table 2). However, only around 50 percent (n = 234) of these investors 
accessed at least one MET or LET, i.e., worked through (parts of) the contents of the financial 
education program.   
[Table 2 about here] 
Panel B in Table 2 shows that the likelihood of enrollment is higher for male, active and 
business club investors and is increasing in the number of start-ups and the accumulated amount 
(total_amount) that individuals invested on Companisto. Also, the 42.30 percent of investors 
that, in their profile on Companisto, provided information on their years of experience with risk 
capital investments (took_survey = 1; 0 otherwise) are more likely to enroll into the program. 
The same holds for the 2.70 percent of investors that self-reported to have less than one year of 
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experience with crowdinvesting and comparable investment forms (inexperienced = 1; 0 other-
wise).109 
5.1.2 ELT Results (Financial Literacy Scores)  
[Table 3 about here] 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the results of the ELT including the financial literacy scores 
for the 462 investors that provided answers for the respective questions (‘enrollment sample’). 
While subjects self-assessed their level of both financial literacy (0.573) and financial education 
(0.537) to be rather moderate, almost all investors answered the questions underlying the finan-
cial literacy score correctly [mean (maximum) score = 2.95 (3.00)].110 This score is significantly 
higher than the results of related studies that use a similar set of questions for their financial 
literacy score (see Lusardi and Mitchell 2014 for a cross-country overview). Bucher-Koenen 
and Lusardi (2011), for example, find that only 56.8 percent of the surveyed households from 
a representative German household panel answered all three questions underlying fin_literacy 
correctly. Consistent with the findings of van Rooij et al. (2011) who show a positive link 
between financial literacy and stock market participation, our findings strongly suggest that, 
compared to the ‘average German household’ (in 2009)111, (crowd)investors exhibit a signifi-
cantly higher level of financial literacy. In line with other cross-country evidence (see Lusardi 
and Mitchell 2014 for an overview), Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi (2011) show that the financial 
literacy score is higher for individuals aged between 35 and 50 years and thus the average sub-
ject in our sample. In contrast to other studies, the evidence presented in Panel B in Table 3, 
                                                     
109  In a multiple regression analysis that includes both took_survey and inexperienced (see Table 5), we show that 
having self-reported to be inexperienced has incremental explanatory power for the decision to enroll. 
110  See Appendix A8 for the question-level scores and a comparison with the findings of related studies. 
111  Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi (2011) rely their analysis on survey data from 2009. 
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however, does not suggest a statistically significant difference between male and female partic-
ipants.  
It appears that participants have had slightly more trouble answering the questions un-
derlying our advanced financial literacy score [mean (maximum) score = 1.65 (2.00)]. While 
most seem to have a general understanding of the relation between risk and return (94 percent 
of correct answers), ‘only’ 73 percent of participants answered the question on (differences in) 
the attributes of equity and debt correctly.112, 113  
The average inv_skill score [mean (maximum) score = 2.02 (4.00)] indicates that, while 
being generally financially literate, a large share of participants lack (start-up-related) invest-
ment knowledge. Slightly more than 62.3 percent of participants answered the numeracy114 
question correctly.115 
We find a positive association between participants’ self-assessed level of financial lit-
eracy, their age and investment activity (e.g., their number of start-ups, total investment amount 
and business club membership) on Companisto (see Panel B in Table 3). Also, male investors 
appear to be more confident regarding their financial literacy and financial education than fe-
male investors. The level of self-assessed financial education (literacy) is positively associated 
with participants’ level of (financial literacy and their level of) advanced financial literacy and 
investment skills suggesting that they are generally able to correctly self-assess their level of 
                                                     
112  For certain question types (e.g., check box tables, where more than one ‘check’ is required to answer the ques-
tion correctly), we calculate the share of correct answers (see Question 6 in Appendix A5 for a specific exam-
ple). Partially correct answers (our test scores) are therefore not restricted to integers. 
113  See Appendix A8 for the question-level scores. 
114  We acknowledge that the underlying question might not perfectly (solely) capture participants’ numerical 
skills, which is also reflected in its inconsistent use in the academic literature. While some related studies (e.g., 
Fernandes et al. 2014) use a comparable question to capture participants’ numerical skills, others (e.g., Krische 
2014) use it as a proxy for subjects’ “quantitative reasoning”. While we label the resulting score as “numeracy”, 
we regard it as a good proxy for participants’ general numerical and analytical skillset.   
115  Unfortunately, there was an inconsistency in the question wording that appears to have confused early ELT 
participants. If we only consider participants that took the ELT after we adjusted the question wording, we 
obtain a mean mean numeracy score of 78.7 % based on 267 observations. Given this problem, we exclude 
numeracy from our main regression analysis. 
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financial knowledge. In contrast to other studies (e.g., Krische 2014), we only find a statistically 
significant association between participants’ numerical skills and their level of advanced but 
not basic financial literacy. 
5.1.3 Determinants of Program Participation, Persistence and Performance 
Consistent with our results related to the likelihood of enrollment, we find that the pro-
pensity of working through the program (participated = 1) after completing the relevant parts 
of the ELT (enrolled = 1) is higher for active and business club investors and increasing in the 
number of start-ups and the total investment amount. However, while male investors are more 
likely to enroll, we do not find a statistically significant association between participation and 
gender (see Table 3).116  
The decision to participate in the financial education program appears to be neither as-
sociated with participants’ self-assessed financial literacy and education nor related to their 
(advanced) financial literacy score. However, the likelihood that subjects actually work through 
the program is increasing in their investment and numerical skills indicating that those who 
would benefit the most do not participate in the program. This is consistent with the evidence 
provided by Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) who find a positive association between retail inves-
tors’ demand for financial advice and their financial literacy.117   
[Table 4 about here] 
                                                     
116  This result might be driven by male investors who, compared to female investors, solely enrolled in the program 
in order to win one of the three grills. As there was no information provided on whether participation in the 
respective draw was restricted to subjects that actually participated in the program, respective investors would 
have had no clear incentive to access the program contents. While it is not surprising that more active investors 
are also more likely to follow the invitation to participate in the online financial education program, we are 
pleased to observe that those investors who appear to need it most (i.e., investors that self-reported to be inex-
perienced) also have a higher propensity of enrollment. 
117  However, the evidence on the relationship between retail investors’ demand for financial advice and their fi-
nancial literacy and investment competence is ambiguous. While some studies document a negative association 
(e.g., Hung and Yoong 2010; Kramer 2012), other studies (e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell 2011; Bachmann and 
Hens 2015) find a positive association, indicating that individuals who would potentially benefit the most are 
the least likely to seek professional financial advice. 
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 In line with these results, we further find a positive association between the persistence 
of program participation and both individuals’ self-assessed level of financial literacy and their 
advanced financial literacy score (see Panel B in Table 4). Moreover, our results indicate that 
business club membership and the accumulated investment amount on Companisto are posi-
tively associated participation persistence.  
 Consistent with expectations, we find that participants’ test performance is increasing 
in their pre-treatment levels of advanced financial literacy and numeracy. Moreover, we find a 
positive association between test performance and persistence which would again be consistent 
with prior evidence suggesting a positive association between program participation and finan-
cial literacy. This might, however, also indicate that our financial education program actually 
helps improving individuals’ test performance (i.e., financial literacy).118  
5.2 Multiple Regression Analysis  
 To test whether the presented correlations are robust to a multiple regression analysis, 
we run four separate regressions that differ in the dependent variable and (thus) the applied 
estimation method. 
[Table 5 about here] 
 We start our analysis by modelling the first decision that invitees must take with regard 
to (the intensity of) their participation in the program as a function of their personal de-
mographics and investment behavior on Companisto (see Column 1 in Table 5). As the decision 
to enroll (enrolled) is coded binary, we run a logistic regression and find that younger male 
investors, business club members and investors with stakes in more start-ups are more likely to 
                                                     
118  While we only consider unique questions for the calculation of persistence and performance, it should be noted 
that certain questions pools that are used in the (ELT and) METs are also part of the respective LET.  
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enroll. Moreover, we find a positive statically significant relation between enrolled and inexpe-
rienced indicating that investors that self-reported to have less than one year of experience with 
crowdinvesting and comparable investment forms are more likely to enroll.  
 Next, we analyze how the next decision that investors must take, namely whether or not 
they work through the contents of the education program and take the tests at the end of at least 
one module or level, is associated with investor attributes. We thus run another logistic regres-
sion with participated as dependent variable (see Column 2 in Table 5). While investor de-
mographics and their investment behavior do not seem to be associated with their propensity to 
participate in the program, we find that the likelihood of program participation is positively 
associated with individuals’ investment skills, while it is negatively associated with their self-
assessed level of financial education. While the former result indicates a general tendency of 
more knowledgeable investors to participate, the latter result is consistent with individuals that 
believe to need it the most also being more likely to work through the online financial education 
program.  
 Consistent with this evidence, an OLS regression with persistence as dependent variable 
yields a negative estimated coefficient on the self-assessed level of financial education (see 
Column 3 in Table 5). However, we find a positive association between persistence and the 
self-assessed level of financial literacy. Interestingly, our results show that while male investors 
are more likely to enroll, compared to female participants, they are less persistent in their par-
ticipation. In line with expectations, we find that business club members (i.e., rather active 
investors) are more persistent than other participants.  
 Finally, running an OLS regression with performance as dependent variable, we find a 
positive association between participants’ test performance and their level of advanced finan-
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cial literacy and investment skill, consistent with more financial literate investors (widely de-
fined) to perform better in our training program. While this result per se is hardly surprising, it 
lends some support to the robustness of our performance measure. We will explore the actual 
effect of our training program on the financial literacy of our subjects at later stages of our 
project. 
6 Conclusion 
 In this project, we investigate the effect of an online financial education program on 
crowdinvestors’ information and investment behavior by conducting a field experiment on 
Companisto, one of the largest German crowdinvesting portals. The education program trains 
‘basic’ and start-up-related investment knowledge. While the experiment is still ongoing, in this 
preliminary report, we depict the overall research design. Moreover, we explore the determi-
nants of program enrollment, participation, persistence and performance.  
Taken together, the empirical evidence presented in this preliminary report indicates 
that (crowd)investors exhibit a high level of ‘basic’ financial literacy. Moreover, we find that 
investors that self-report to be rather inexperienced with risk capital investments or that assess 
their own level of financial education to be low are more likely to enroll and are also more 
persistent participators of the program. However, in line with prior studies, this finding only 
manifests after controlling for an overall tendency of more financially literate and experienced 
investors to participate (intensively) in the education program. While the latter results are sim-
ilar to other studies that investigate the determinants of program uptake for voluntary financial 
literacy interventions, we believe that the surprisingly high level of basic financial literacy that 
we document helps to assess the overall efficiency of the crowdinvesting market and is relevant 
for developing the regulatory design of the crowdinvesting market. 
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As a next step, we will examine whether subjects’ financial literacy changes over their 
participation in the program. Finally, after the experiment is completed, we will analyze the 
program’s effect on investors’ information and investment behavior. 
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A Appendix 
A1 Variable Definitions 
 
Variable   Definition 
t  (If not differently specified:) June 14, 2017 
Investor Attributes 
agei,t  Age of investor i 
genderi,t  Gender of investor i 
countryi,t  Country of residency of investor i 
nr_startupsi,t  Number of unique start-ups investor i holds in her portfolio 
activei,t 
 Binary coded variable with 1 (0) indicating that investor i has (not) 
invested at least once on Companisto in the past 12 months, i.e., 
in the period June 15, 2016 to June 14, 2017 
bci,t 
 Binary coded variable with 1 (0) indicating that investor i is (not) 
a member of Companisto’s Business Club (membership is granted 
based on investors’ investment and forum activity) 
total_amounti,t  Total amount that investor i has invested 
took_surveyi,t 
 Binary coded variable with 1 (0) indicating that investor i has pro-
vided profile information on her general experience with (risk cap-
ital) investments   
inexperiencedi,t 
 Binary coded variable with 1 (0) indicating that investor i has less 
(more) than one year of experience with the “types of financial 
investments” offered on Companisto 
Program Participation Measures 
enrolledi 
 Binary coded variable with 1 (0) indicating that investor i has (not) 
provided (i.e., entered and saved) an answer to ELT questions 1 to 
11 
participatedi 
 Binary coded variable with 1 (0) indicating that investor i has (not) 
accessed at least one MET 
persistencei  
 Natural logarithm of the total number of unique questions that in-
vestors that participated (=1) in the education program has an-
swered (i.e., entered and saved) across all tests of the education 
program (i.e., including all METs and LETs) 
performancei 
 Percentage of correct answers to unique questions that investor i 
provided across all tests of the education program (i.e., including 
all METs and LETs)   
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A1     Variable Definitions (continued) 
Variable Definition 
Measured Concepts 
fin_lit_self_assessedi 
 Self-assessed level of financial literacy. Measured on a (standard-
ized) scale from (0) 1 to (1) 7; with a higher value indicating a 
higher level of self-assessed financial literacy  
fin_ed_self_assessedi 
 Self-assessed level of financial education. Measured on a (stand-
ardized) scale from (0) 1 to (1) 7; with a higher value indicating a 
higher level of self-assessed financial education 
fin_literacyi 
 Financial literacy score calculated as the unweighted sum of points 
gained from answering ELT questions 3 to 5; with false (correct) 
answers resulting in a value of 0 (1) 
adv_fin_liti 
 Advanced financial literacy score calculated as the unweighted 
sum of points gained from answering ELT questions 6 and 7; with 
false (correct) answers resulting in a value of 0 (1) 
inv_skillsi 
 Advanced financial literacy score calculated as the unweighted 
sum of points gained from answering ELT questions 8 to 11; with 
false (correct) answers resulting in a value of 0 (1) 
numeracyi 
 Binary coded variable with (0) 1 indicating that ELT question 12 
was (not) answered correctly 
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A2 Timeline of experiment 
Date Event Subsequent steps taken by HU119 
Mar 24, 2015 Kick-Off meeting with Companisto Preparation of financial education con-
cept  
Aug 25, 2015 Agreement on general concept for fi-
nancial education program (see Fig-
ure 2) with Companisto 
Preparation of exemplary scripts for 
first education modules  
Feb 24, 2016 Discussion of exemplary scripts for 
module contents with Companisto  
Project start – elaboration of (remain-
ing) module scripts 
Mar, 2016 Signing of collaboration contract  
Feb 2, 2017 Concluding discussion of contents  
(i.e., module scripts) of financial edu-
cation program  
Assistance in implementation of finan-
cial education program on Companisto 
web page 
Feb, 2017 Information structure of issuances on 
Companisto modified  
(start date of pre-period for diff-in-diff 
analyses therefore Mar 1, 2017) 
 
Jun 14, 2017 Sample selection (randomization)   
 Minimum investment amount on Com-
panisto raised from € 5 to € 100  
 
Jun 28, 2017 Invitation letters are sent to randomly 
selected “Business Club“ (i.e., the 
most active) investors 
 
Jun 30, 2017 Start of BETA-Test of Education Tool  
Jul 1, 2017 Invitation newsletter is sent (per email) 
to randomly selected group of inves-
tors  
(i.e., to all investors in treatment 
group) 
 
Aug 20, 2017 End of BETA-Test 
On Aug 21, link to evaluate BETA-
Test is sent per email to participants 
Analysis of factors associated with the 
intensity of participation (i.e., self-se-
lection) in(to) financial education pro-
gram 
Jan 1, 2018 Expected end of post-period for diff-in-
diff analysis (introduction of financial 
education program to all investors on 
Companisto) 
Analysis of effect of (invitation to par-
ticipate in) financial education pro-
gram on crowdinvestors information 
and investment behavior  
                                                     
119 Subsequent steps taken by the Humboldt University of Berlin (HU), i.e., by the authors of this study. 
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A3 Online Financial Education Program 
Before being able to access the contents of the online financial education program, each 
user must first participate in an “Entry-Level-Test” (ELT; see Appendix A4 for more detail on 
the ELT).  
Online Financial Education Program: Overview 
 
Notes: This figure displays a screenshot of the overview page of the online financial education program. 
The aim of the ELT is to collect information on selected user attributes (e.g., risk aver-
sion, financial education) including their level of basic financial literacy and start-up-invest-
ment-specific competence. After completing in the ELT, the user is directed to an overview 
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page where the structure and the different topics of the education tool are presented (see figure 
above). 
Entry-Level-Test (ELT) 
 
Notes: This figure displays a screenshot of a submitted ELT. Correct (wrong) answers are market green (red). 
In addition, a detailed explanation of the correct answer is provided. 
As the modules do not have to be selected in any specific order, participants can work 
through the financial education program according to their personal interests. To finish a level 
[i.e., receive a badge that is displayed in her profile (once the experiment is finished)], a user 
must first work through all three modules of a respective level and participate in the related 
“Module-End-Tests” (METs) that are included at the end of each module. Only then, the re-
spective “Level-End-Test” (LET) becomes accessible. If a participant answers certain questions 
of the ELT correctly (see Appendix A4 for more information on the ELT), she passes Level 1 
(i.e., receives a bronze badge) without having to take METs 1, 2 and 3 and LET 1.  
After submitting a test (ELT, MET or LET), investors receive a quick feedback (e.g., 
“Correct!”) for each question along with a detailed explanation of the correct answer which is 
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marked in green (see figure above). Participants can always go back to their test results. For the 
METs (and LETs) which investors can take as often as they want (until they pass the respective 
test), investors can access all previous test results. 
The tests comprise different question types: multiple choice questions with one or more 
answers, drag and drop questions as well as open numerical questions, where investors must 
enter the correct answer. Selected question pools that test for investors’ understanding of key 
concepts are included in various tests, the ELT, MET and/or LET. To be able to measure inves-
tors’ learning progress, i.e., the effect of the financial education program, the question pools 
used for the ELT (i.e., questions 3 to 11 of the ELT) are also included in the respective LETs. 
In total, the program comprises 154 questions that are grouped into 58 question pools.120 
At the end of each module, investors can test their newly acquired knowledge in a MET. 
Irrespective of whether the provided answers are correct or not, investors are able to take the 
respective LET only after having (worked through all three modules and having) answered all 
questions included in the three METs of each level. If investors do not finish a test, they can 
resume it where they stopped if they have saved their previous answers individually. 
For each MET, the (order of the) questions are (is) randomized. Already selected ques-
tions do not re-enter the draw unless all questions of a question pool have already been selected. 
In that case, all questions re-enter the question pool, i.e., are again considered in the randomi-
zation process. Depending on the respective module and the randomization, METs comprise 
two to six questions.  
To pass a LET and (thus) obtain a badge, investors must answer at least 50 percent of 
the test questions correctly. For each LET, the question order is fixed. The LETs include, among 
others, the same question pools as the ELT and therefore allow us to measure investors’ learning 
                                                     
120  Some question pools contain only one question (e.g., for eight ELT questions that are fixed and thus not ran-
domly drawn).  
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progress, i.e., the effect of the financial education program on their understanding of the meas-
ured concepts. For the first (second) [third] LET that investors pass they receive a bronze (sil-
ver) [gold] badge that is displayed to other investors (e.g., when they comment in the Forum, if 
they invest in firm). LET 1 (2) [3] comprises 9 (8) [10] questions with the question order being 
fixed. 
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A4 Entry-Level-Test (ELT) Design 
To measure investors’ level of financial literacy before participating in the financial 
education program, invited investors are required to participate in an Entry-Level-Test (ELT) 
that also includes questions on investors’ self-assessed financial literacy, their level of financial 
education, their numerical abilities as well as on their risk aversion and their time value of 
money. The question order of the ELT is fixed (see below). While questions 1 to 5 as well as 
questions 12 to 14 are the same for all participants, questions 6 to 11 are randomly selected out 
of a given question pool. 
Investors can save each question individually, enabling them to resume the test where 
they stopped it in case that they do not finish it right away. 
ELT: Measured Concepts 
1. Self-assessed financial literacy 
2. Self-assessed level of economic education 
  
(Basic) Financial literacy 
3. Interest 
4. Inflation  
5. Diversification  
 
Advanced financial literacy 
6. Equity vs. debt (question randomly selected) 
7. Risk and return (question randomly selected)  
 
(Start-up related) Investment skills 
8. Evaluating the business model and market  
(question randomly selected) 
9. Valuing firms (question randomly selected) 
10. Valuing start-ups (question randomly selected) 
11. Investment decision (question randomly selected) 
 
12. Numeracy  
13. Risk aversion 
14. Time preferences  
Notes: This figure displays the various concepts measured in the ELT. 
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A5 ELT Questions  
[in German / in English; correct answer(s) is (are) underscored] 
1. Self-assessed Financial Literacy (e.g., van Rooij et al. 2011) 
Wie würden Sie Ihr Finanzwissen bzw. Ihre Finanzkenntnisse auf einer Skala von 1 („keine 
Kenntnisse“) bis 7 („umfassende Kenntnisse“) beurteilen? [Multiple choice: (i) scale from 
1 meaning “Keine Kenntnisse” to 7 meaning “Umfassende Kenntnisse” or (ii) Keine An-
gabe] 
How would you assess your understanding of finance on a 7-point scale (1 means very 
low and 7 means very high)? [Multiple choice: (i) scale from 1 meaning “very low” to 
7 meaning “very high” or (ii) No answer] 
2. Economic education (e.g., van Rooij et al. 2011) 
Wie intensiv haben Sie sich im Rahmen Ihrer Ausbildung mit betriebswirtschaftlichen oder 
volkswirtschaftlichen Themen auseinandergesetzt? [Multiple choice: (i) scale from 1 mean-
ing “Gar nicht” to 7 meaning “Sehr intensiv” or (ii) Keine Angabe] 
How much of your education was devoted to topics in business or economics on a 7-
point scale (1 means very low and 7 means very high)? [Multiple choice: (i) scale from 
1 meaning “not at all” to 7 meaning “very intensive” or (ii) No answer] 
3. Interest (e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell 2011) 
Angenommen, Sie haben 100 Euro Guthaben auf Ihrem Sparkonto. Dieses Guthaben wird 
mit 2 Prozent pro Jahr verzinst und Sie lassen es 5 Jahre auf diesem Konto. Was meinen 
Sie: Wie viel Guthaben weist Ihr Sparkonto nach 5 Jahren auf? [Multiple Choice: (i) Mehr 
als 102 Euro; (ii) Genau 102 Euro; (iii) Weniger als 102 Euro; (iv) Keine Angabe] 
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Suppose you have 100 Euro in a savings account and the interest rate is 2 percent per 
year. After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the 
money to grow? [Multiple Choice: (i) More than 102 Euro; (ii) Exactly 102 Euro; (iii) 
Less than 102 Euro; (iv) No answer] 
4. Inflation (e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell 2011) 
Angenommen, Ihr Sparkonto wird mit einem Zinssatz von 1 Prozent pro Jahr verzinst und 
die Inflationsrate beträgt 2 Prozent pro Jahr. Wie viel werden Sie sich in einem Jahr mit 
Ihrem Sparkontoguthaben leisten können? [Multiple Choice: (i) Mehr als heute; (ii) Ge-
nauso viel wie heute; (iii) Weniger als heute; (iv) Keine Angabe] 
Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account is 1 percent per year and inflation 
is 2 percent per year. After one year, how much will you be able to buy with the money 
on your savings account? [Multiple Choice: (i) More than today; (ii) As much as today; 
(iii) Less than today; (iv) No answer] 
5. Diversification (e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell 2011) 
Ist die folgende Aussage richtig oder falsch: "Die Anlage in Aktien eines einzelnen Unter-
nehmens ist für gewöhnlich weniger riskant als die Beteiligung an einem Aktienfonds." 
[Multiple Choice: (i) Richtig; (ii) Falsch; (iii) Keine Angabe] 
Is the following statement true or false: “Buying stocks of a single company usually 
provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.” [Multiple Choice: (i) True; (ii) False; 
(iii) No answer] 
6. Equity vs. debt (self-developed; question is randomly selected out of a pool of questions 
that might differ in the wording and or question type, but test for the same concept) 
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Ordnern Sie in der Tabelle Eigenkapital (EK) und Fremdkapital (FK) die Charakteristika 
zu, die sie typischerweise aufweisen. 
[Multiple-Choice Tabelle, in welcher [x] die richtigen Antworten anzeigt] 
Merkmale Eigenkapital Fremdkapital 
Mitbestimmungsrechte X  
Zinsanspruch  X 
Gewinnbeteiligung X  
Vorrang im Insolvenzfall  X 
Feste Laufzeit  X 
Please match equity and debt with the characteristics that typically apply to them in 
the table.  
[Multiple choice table with [x] indicating the correct answers.] 
Characteristics Equity Debt 
Voting rights X  
Interest claims  X 
Profitsharing X  
Priority in case of insolvency  X 
Fixed maturity  X 
7. Risk and return (self-developed; question is randomly selected out of a pool of questions 
that might differ in the wording and or question type, but test for the same concept) 
Je niedriger das Risiko einer Anlage desto höher in der Regel deren Rendite. [Multiple 
Choice Wahr; Falsch; Keine Angabe] 
The lower the risk of an investment the higher its return. [True; False; No answer] 
8. Evaluating the business model and market (self-developed; question is randomly se-
lected out of a pool of questions that might differ in the wording and or question type, but 
test for the same concept) 
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Reicht die aktuelle Nachfrage nach seinem Produkt bereits aus, um dieses zu einem kosten-
deckenden Preis anzubieten, ist davon auszugehen, dass ein Start-up auch langfristig profi-
tabel sein wird. [Wahr; Falsch; Keine Angabe] 
It can be assumed that a start-up will be profitable in the long run if the current de-
mand for its product is sufficient to market it for a cost-covering price. [True; False; 
No answer] 
9. Valuing firms (self-developed; question is randomly selected out of a pool of questions that 
might differ in the wording and or question type, but test for the same concept) 
Im Rahmen einer Unternehmensbewertung ist es in der Regel sinnvoll auch subjektive Fak-
toren zu berücksichtigen. [Wahr; Falsch; Keine Angabe]  
When valuing a firm, it is generally useful to also consider subjective factors. [True; 
False; No answer]  
10. Valuing start-ups (self-developed; question is randomly selected out of a pool of questions 
that might differ in the wording and or question type, but test for the same concept) 
Das Discounted Cash Flow-Verfahren kann im Regelfall problemlos auf junge Unterneh-
men angewendet werden. [Wahr; Falsch; Keine Angabe] 
Usually, the discounted cash flow method can easily be applied to young businesses. 
[True; False; No answer] 
11. Investment decision (self-developed; question is randomly selected out of a pool of ques-
tions that might differ in the wording and or question type, but test for the same concept) 
Bei der Beurteilung des Erfolgspotentials eines Start-up-Investments sollten primär quanti-
tative Faktoren (d.h. Jahresabschlussinformationen und Finanzprognosen) herangezogen 
werden. [Wahr; Falsch; Keine Angabe] 
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When evaluating the success potential of a start-up investment, the primary focus should 
be put on quantitative factors (i.e. balance sheet information and financial forecasts). 
[True; False; No answer] 
12. Numeracy / quantitative reasoning (e.g., Frederick 2005, Krische et al. 2014, Fernandes 
et al. 2014) 
Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie gründen ein Start-up in einer alten Fabrikhalle. Gehen Sie davon 
aus, dass sich die Anzahl der Mitarbeiter bzw. Schreibtische jede Woche verdoppelt. Wenn 
es genau 24 Wochen dauert bis die Halle bis auf den letzten Quadratmeter mit Schreibti-
schen gefüllt ist und somit keinen Platz für neue Mitarbeiter bietet, wieviel Wochen dauert 
es dann, bis die Hälfte der Fabrikhalle mit Schreibtischen vollgestellt ist? [Multiple Choice: 
(i) 5 Wochen, (ii) 2 Wochen, (iii) 12 Wochen, (iv) 22 Wochen, (v) 18 Wochen, (vi) 14 
Wochen, (vii) 23 Wochen, (viii) Keine Angabe] 
You start a company in an old factory building. Assume that the number of employees 
and desks doubles every week. If it takes 24 weeks for the factory building to be occupied 
by desks and thus not offering any room for new employees, how long would it take for 
until half of the floor of the factory building is covered with desks? [Multiple Choice: 
(i) 5 weeks, (ii) 2 weeks, (iii) 12 weeks, (iv) 22 weeks, (v) 18 weeks, (vi) 14 weeks, (vii) 
23 weeks, (viii) No answer] 
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13. Risk aversion (e.g., Wölbert and Riedl 2013; Falk et al. 2016) 
Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie haben die Möglichkeit an einer Lotterie teilzunehmen, bei der ein 
Münzwurf darüber entscheidet, wieviel Geld Sie gewinnen: Bei Kopf erhalten Sie 100 Euro, 
während Sie bei Zahl leer ausgehen. Welchen Betrag wären Sie maximal bereit für die Teil-
nahme an der Lotterie zu bezahlen? [(i) [entry box]; with „Euro“ written next to it, i.e., 
[entry box] „Euro“, (ii) Keine Angabe] 
Imagine you have the choice to participate in a lottery in which a coin toss decides how 
much money you win: if it is heads, you get 100 Euro, if it is tails you get nothing. How 
much would you be willing to pay for participating in the lottery? [(i) [entry box]; with 
“Euro“ written next to it, i.e., [entry box] “Euro“, (ii) No answer ] 
14. Time preferences (e.g., Wölbert and Riedl 2013; Falk et al. 2016) 
Nehmen Sie an, Sie haben die Möglichkeit 100 Euro für einen Zeitraum von drei Jahren 
fest und sicher anzulegen. Sie müssen sich somit entscheiden, ob Sie die 100 Euro lieber 
heute zur Verfügung haben oder das Geld jemand anderem überlassen möchten, um es nach 
drei Jahren (samt Zinsen) zurück zu erhalten. Wie hoch müsste der Rückzahlungsbetrag 
nach drei Jahren mindestens ausfallen, damit Sie es vorziehen würden das Geld fest anzu-
legen? [(i) [entry box]; with „Euro“ written next to it, i.e., [entry box] „Euro“, (ii) Keine 
Angabe] 
Assume that you have the opportunity to invest 100 Euro over a period of three years 
for a fixed and safe return. You must decide whether you would rather have 100 Euro 
at your disposal now or invest it to get it back after three years (including the accumu-
lated interest). How high would the payback amount need to be for you to prefer invest-
ing the money? [(i) [entry box]; with “Euro“ written next to it, i.e., [entry box] “Euro“, 
(ii) No answer ] 
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A6 (News)Letter with invitation to BETA-Test  
On July 1, 2017, an invitation (see below for the original version) was sent per email to 
all 11,575 randomly selected investors. In addition, 889 members of the so-called “Business 
Club“ on Companisto (i.e., the most active investors) received this invitation letter per mail. 
 
Original (news)letter: 
 
 
 
Lieber Companist,  
als Companist müssen Sie kein Wirtschaftsexperte sein, um eine Investmententscheidung zu tref-
fen. Dennoch sollten Sie über das nötige Werkzeug verfügen, um die Chancen und Risiken von 
Startup-Investments kompetent beurteilen zu können. 
Um Sie hierbei gezielt zu unterstützen, haben wir in Zusammenarbeit mit Professor Joachim Gas-
sen und Nader Hemaidan von der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Humboldt-Universität 
zu Berlin (HU Berlin) ein maßgeschneidertes Investoren-Trainingsprogramm entwickelt, das In-
vestor Education Tool.  
Sie wurden zufällig ausgewählt, das neue Tool exklusiv vor Veröffentlichung online zu tes-
ten. Der Test startet am 3. Juli ab 10:00 Uhr.  
Über das Investor Training Tool  
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Das Tool ist in drei Level mit jeweils drei Modulen eingeteilt, die neben Investitionsgrundlagen die 
wesentlichen Methoden zur Analyse und Bewertung der Chancen und Risiken von Startups bein-
halten. 
Jedes Modul ist in sich abgeschlossen und beinhaltet interaktive Elemente und Kontrollfragen, da-
mit Sie Ihren Trainingsfortschritt überprüfen können. Mittels eines kurzen „Fitnesstests“ zu Beginn 
des Tools ermöglichen wir Ihnen einen optimalen Einstieg in unser Trainingstool und können ge-
meinsam mit der HU Berlin den Erfolg des Tools evaluieren. 
Am BETA-Test des HU Investor Education Tool teilnehmen 
Als Dankeschön ... 
… verlosen wir unter allen Teilnehmern des BETA-Tests drei Weber-Grills: den Performance De-
luxe Gourmet GBS®, den Original Kettle Premium™ Kugelgrill und einen Bar-B-Kettle® Kugelgrill. 
Für die Teilnahme am Gewinnspiel reicht die Angabe der E-Mail-Adresse am Ende des Tests. 
Für Fragen zum BETA-Test können Sie sich gerne an Andreas Riedel (Investor Relations) wenden: 
(…). 
Wir danken Ihnen für die Unterstützung! 
Tamo Zwinge und David Rhotert 
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English translation: 
Dear Companist, 
As a member of Companisto, you don’t need to be an expert in economics in order to make an 
investment decision. However, you should have the necessary know-how to competently assess 
the opportunities and risks associated with a startup-investment. 
In order to support you in doing so, we created a custom-made investor training in collaboration 
with professor Joachim Gassen and Nader Hemaidan of Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (HU Ber-
lin): the Investor Education Tool. 
You have been randomly selected to exclusively test this new tool online prior to its re-
lease. The test starts on July 3rd from 10am onwards. 
About the Investor Training Tool 
The tool is divided in three levels consisting of three modules. Topics covered are, besides basics 
of investing, essential methods to analyze and evaluate opportunities and risks of startups. 
Each module is self-contained and features interactive elements and check-up questions enabling 
you to track the progress of your training. Upon first usage of the tool, you take a quick ”Fitness- 
test“ which helps to get you started ideally and also allows us to evaluate the success of the tool 
together with HU Berlin. 
Participate in BETA-Test now 
To thank you ... 
… all participants of the BETA-Test will be entered into a prize draw for three Weber-Grills: one 
Performance Deluxe Gourmet GBS®, one Original Kettle Premium™ Charcoal Grill and a Bar-B-
Kettle® Charcoal Grill. To participate in the prize draw, just leave your email address at the end of 
the test. 
If you have any questions regarding the BETA-Test don’t hesitate to contact Andreas Riedel (In-
vestor Relations): (…). 
Thank you for your support! 
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A7 Program Evaluation Survey 
Program Evaluation Survey: Newsletter 
On August 21, 2017, a newsletter (see below for the original version) in which Compa-
nisto thanked investors for participating in the BETA-Test and asked them to evaluate the online 
financial education program was sent per email to all investors that participated in the BETA-
Test. 
Original newsletter: 
Lieber Companist, 
wie bereits angekündigt wurde der BETA-Test für das Investoren Training Tool am 20. August 
beendet. 
Wir möchten uns herzlich für Ihre Teilnahme bedanken. Auf Basis Ihres Feedbacks werden wir das 
Tool überarbeiten und anschließend für alle Companisten verfügbar machen. 
Sollten Sie sich im Rahmen der Schulung bereits ein Badge erarbeitet haben, erhalten Sie dieses 
natürlich, sobald das finale Tool online geht. 
Zum erfolgreichen Abschluss des BETA-Tests würde es uns sehr freuen, wenn Sie die Schulungsin-
halte kurz bewerten könnten. Bewerten Sie diese bitte losgelöst von etwaigen (technischen) 
Bugs und davon, ob Sie den Test komplett absolviert oder ihn unterbrochen haben. 
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Zur Bewertung des Training Tool BETA-Tests 
Die Gewinner ... 
... unserer Verlosung werden demnächst ermittelt und direkt über ihren Gewinn informiert. Wir 
wünschen Ihnen viel Glück bei der Ziehung. 
Für weitere Fragen zum Abschluss des BETA-Tests und dem weiteren Vorgehen können Sie sich 
gerne an Andreas Riedel (Investor Relations) wenden: (…). 
Mit besten Grüßen 
Tamo Zwinge und David Rhotert 
English translation: 
Dear Companist, 
As previously announced, the BETA-Test of the Investor Training Tool has been ended on Au-
gust 20. 
We would like to thank you for your participation. Based on your feedback, we will update the 
tool and then make it available to all Companists. 
If you have already obtained a badge during the training you will keep it when the final tool goes 
live. 
To successfully finalize the BETA-Test, you can help us by briefly evaluating the content of the 
training. Please make your evaluation independent of possible (technical) bugs and regardless 
whether you completed the test. 
To the evaluation of the Training Tool BETA-Test 
The winners ... 
... of our prize draw will be identified soon and contacted directly. Good luck! 
 192 
If you have any questions regarding the BETA-Test or the next steps please contact Andreas 
Riedel (Investor Relations): (…). 
Kind Regards, 
(…) 
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Program Evaluation Survey: Questions 
Participants that accessed the link to the feedback page were asked to answer several 
self-generated questions (see below), abstracting from any (technical) bugs [original / English].  
1. Ich habe mich intensiv mit den Schulungsinhalten auseinandergesetzt: [Skala: 1: Stimme 
voll zu ... 7: Stimme überhaupt nicht zu, 8: Keine Antwort] 
I have intensively dealt with the content of the training: [Scale: 1: Fully agree ... 7: 
Do not agree at all, 8: No answer] 
2. Der Schwierigkeitsgrad der Schulung ist... [Skala 1: 1: ...viel zu niedrig, 2: ... zu niedrig, 
3: ... etwas niedrig, 4: ... genau richtig, 5: ... etwas hoch, 6: ... zu hoch, 7: ... viel zu hoch, 
8: Keine Antwort] 
The difficulty of the training is... [Scale: 1: ...far too low, 2: ... too low, 3: ... quite low, 
4: ... just right, 5: ... quite high, 6: ... too high, 7: ... far too high, 8: No answer] 
3. Ich habe durch die Schulung etwas gelernt: [Skala: 1: Stimme voll zu ... 7: Stimme über-
haupt nicht zu, 8: Keine Antwort] 
I learned a lot from the training: [Scale: 1: Fully Agree ... 7: Do not agree at all, 8: 
No answer] 
4. Durch die Schulung fühle ich mich besser in der Lage, eine Investitionsentscheidung zu 
treffen: [Skala: 1: Stimme voll zu ... 7: Stimme überhaupt nicht zu, 8: Keine Antwort] 
Having participated in the training, I feel more confident to make an investment deci-
sion: [Scale: 1: Fully Agree ... 7: Do not agree at all, 8: No answer] 
5. Unerfahrenen Companisten würde ich zur Teilnahme an der Schulung raten: [Skala: 1: 
Stimme voll zu ... 7: Stimme überhaupt nicht zu, 8: Keine Antwort] 
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I would encourage less experienced investors on Companisto to participate in the 
training: [Scale: 1: Fully Agree ... 7: Do not agree at all, 8: No answer] 
6. Sonstiges Feedback:  
Further feedback: [Empty text field]
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A8 ELT Results 
 
Enrollment 
Sample 
Participation  
Sample 
van Rooij et al. (2011) 
Bucher-Koennen and 
Lusardi (2011) 
Data 
(N, year of survey, country) 
N = 462 N = 234 
N = 1,508  
(2005 and 2006, Netherlands) 
N = 1,059  
(2009, Germany) 
Self-assessed Skills 
[(Standardized) scale from (0) 1 to (1) 7]  
    
Financial Literacy 57% 58% 31.1%1  
Financial Education 54% 52%   
Financial Literacy     
Correct on Interest 99% 98% 90.8% 82.4% 
Correct on Inflation 99% 99% 82.6% 78.4% 
Correct on Diversification  97% 97% 60.8% 61.8% 
     
Advanced Financial Literacy     
Correct on Asset Class Attributes 72% 73%   
Correct on Risk and Return 93% 94%   
     
Investment Skills     
Correct on Business Model Evaluation 50% 54%   
Correct on Valuation 38% 38%   
Correct on Start-up Valuation 49% 56%   
Correct on Investment Decision 64% 66%   
     
Numeracy 62% 68%   
Notes: This table shows the average ELT results by test question for both the entry and the participation sample. In addition, for the questions underlying the financial 
literacy score (fin_literacy) the results of two related studies are provided. Please note that the results for ELT questions 13 (“Time Preferences”) and 14 (“Risk Aversion”) 
are not yet included in this preliminary version of the paper. See Appendix A5 for the exact wording of the ELT questions. 1 Self-computed based on provided data. 
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FIGURE 1 
Start-ups’ Information Environment on Companisto 
 
Notes: This figure displays the landing page of an issuance on Companisto. In this so-called “Summary”-
section, which includes a pitch video, investors are provided with general information on the business. In the 
other information sections, investors are provided with information on investments by other investors (“Com-
panists”), their expected return on investment (“Return Calculator”), regular information updates (“Updates”), 
a forum (“Discussion”), projected financial information (“Financial Data”) and the profiles and social media 
links of the members of the start-ups’ managing team (“Team”). 
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FIGURE 2 
Investor Education Program: Concept 
 
Entry-Level-Test (ELT) 
‘How, in What and Where to invest?’ 
Module-End-Test (MET) 1 
‘Return-risk-profile’  
MET 2 
‘Management of investment opportunities and -risks’ 
MET 3 
Level-End-Test (LET) 1 
‘Opportunities and risks of start-up-investments’ 
MET 4 
‘Evaluation of opportunities and risks on Companisto’ 
MET 5 
‘Analysis of business model and market’ 
MET 6 
LET 2 
‘Fundamentals of corporate valuation’ 
MET 7 
‘Valuing Start-ups‘ 
MET 8 
‘Investment decision‘ 
MET 9 
LET 3 
Notes: This figure displays the general concept of the investor education program. ELT (MET) [LET] is the 
abbreviation for Entry-Level-Test (Module-End-Test) [Level-End-Test].  
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FIGURE 3 
Identification Strategy 
 
Notes: This figure depicts the empirical strategy used to measure the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect, i.e., the effect of the randomized invitation to participate in the 
financial education program, on participants’ information and investment behavior. The ITT is measured through a difference-in-differences approach. Specifically, 
the ITT results from the difference between the intention to treat group (ITG) and control group (CG) in the change of investors’ information and investment behavior 
from the pre- to the post period. 
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FIGURE 4 
Time Structure of Experiment 
 
Notes: This figure displays the time structure of the experiment.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection and Composition 
 
Panel A: Sample selection process 
  Investors 
User data from Companisto  69,955 
less investors that do not (want to) receive a newsletter -3,305 
less investors that do not (want to) receive a letter -166 
less investors with no investments on Companisto -50,014 
less investors that are not registered as 'retail' investors -367 
less investors from a country other than Austria, Germany or Switzerland -662 
less investors with missing information (i.e., date of birth) -8 
Sample used for randomization 15,433 
Business Club (BC) members 1,174 
Other investors 14,259 
Treatment Group (i.e., ‘Beta-Testers’)  11,575 (75%) 
Control Group  3,858 (25%) 
 
Panel B: Randomization result 
Group Obs. age 
gender 
(male = 1) 
nr_startups active  bc  Austrian German Swiss 
Treatment 11,575 38.69 82.89% 3.25 33.09% 7.61% 5.81% 90.62% 3.58% 
Control 3,858 38.53 83.02% 3.24 33.75% 7.59% 5.83% 90.62% 3.55% 
Total 15,433 38.65 82.92% 3.25 33.25% 7.61% 5.81% 90.62% 3.57% 
Notes: This table shows the (steps taken to select the) sample used for the empirical analyses in this study. Specifically, in Panel A (B) the sample selection process 
(randomization result) is presented. See Appendix A1 for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics and Correlations – Treatment Sample (N=11,575) 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
enrolled 0.040 0.196 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
participated 0.020 0.141 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
age 38.69 11.58 18.32 29.90 36.20 46.36 96.45 
gender 0.829 0.377 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
nr_startups 3.250 5.482 1.000 1.000 1.000 3.000 82.000 
lnr_startups 0.656 0.865 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.099 4.407 
total_amount 2,074 8,581 4.000 100.0 350.0 1,373 500,000 
ltotal_amount 5.824 1.998 1.386 4.605 5.858 7.224 13.122 
active 0.331 0.471 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
bc 0.076 0.265 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
took_survey 0.423 0.494 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
inexperienced 0.027 0.161 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Panel B: Correlations 
N = 11,575 A B C D E F G H I J K L 
A enrolled  0.70 -0.01 0.06 0.16 0.18 0.09 0.14 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.10 
B participated 0.70  0.00 0.04 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.08 
C age -0.01 0.00  -0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.13 0.28 -0.03 0.15 -0.05 -0.02 
D gender 0.06 0.04 -0.08  0.11 0.17 0.06 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.14 0.04 
E nr_startups 0.16 0.13 -0.01 0.18  0.81 0.18 0.34 0.32 0.22 0.28 0.06 
F lnr_startups 0.16 0.13 -0.01 0.18 1.00  0.20 0.46 0.42 0.29 0.37 0.12 
G total_amount 0.14 0.11 0.29 0.15 0.46 0.46  0.41 0.11 0.34 0.09 0.02 
H ltotal_amount 0.14 0.11 0.29 0.15 0.46 0.46 1.00  0.30 0.47 0.28 0.09 
I active 0.21 0.16 -0.03 0.13 0.41 0.41 0.31 0.31  0.28 0.82 0.17 
J bc 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.07 0.27 0.27 0.44 0.44 0.28  0.26 0.10 
K took_survey 0.18 0.13 -0.06 0.14 0.36 0.36 0.29 0.29 0.82 0.26  0.19 
L inexperienced 0.10 0.08 -0.02 0.04 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.19  
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the investor and participation attributes for the treatment 
sample. Specifically, summary statistics (Panel A) and correlations (Panel B) are presented. In Panel B, Pearson's 
correlation coefficients are shown in the upper triangle while Spearman's rank correlations appear below the di-
agonal. Statistical significance at the 0.1 level using two-tailed tests is indicated in bold type. See Appendix A1 
for the variable definitions. 
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TABLE 3 
Summary Statistics and Correlations – Enrollment Sample (N=436) 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
participated 0.506 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
age 38.18 12.10 18.58 28.95 35.35 46.40 78.10 
gender 0.933 0.250 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
nr_startups 7.552 10.430 1.000 2.000 4.000 9.000 78.000 
lnr_startups 1.423 1.066 0.000 0.693 1.386 2.197 4.357 
total_amount 5,692 12,907 4.000 400.0 1,503 6,423 177,500 
ltotal_amount 7.196 1.980 1.386 5.991 7.315 8.767 12.087 
active 0.814 0.390 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
bc 0.327 0.470 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
fin_lit_self_assessed 0.573 0.222 0.000 0.500 0.667 0.667 1.000 
fin_ed_self_assessed 0.537 0.315 0.000 0.333 0.500 0.833 1.000 
fin_literacy 2.950 0.227 1.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 
adv_fin_literacy 1.654 0.387 0.000 1.500 1.750 2.000 2.000 
inv_skills 2.017 1.050 0.000 1.000 2.000 3.000 4.000 
numeracy 0.623 0.485 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
Summary Statistics and Correlations – Enrollment Sample 
 
Panel B: Correlations 
N = 462 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O 
A participated  0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.12 0.12 
B age 0.04  -0.13 -0.01 -0.06 0.15 0.23 -0.05 0.23 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.03 -0.09 0.05 
C gender -0.02 -0.12  0.11 0.15 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.20 0.16 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.10 
D nr_startups 0.10 -0.04 0.15  0.81 0.24 0.34 0.23 0.15 0.17 0.03 0.07 0.03 -0.06 0.06 
E lnr_startups 0.10 -0.04 0.15 1.00  0.32 0.54 0.37 0.33 0.20 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.05 0.08 
F total_amount 0.13 0.27 0.13 0.55 0.55  0.57 0.15 0.49 0.07 -0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.05 0.12 
G ltotal_amount 0.13 0.27 0.13 0.55 0.55 1.00  0.28 0.71 0.17 0.02 0.12 0.11 -0.03 0.12 
H active 0.10 -0.05 0.09 0.38 0.38 0.29 0.29  0.27 0.12 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.06 
I bc 0.12 0.25 0.09 0.36 0.36 0.78 0.78 0.27  0.15 0.00 0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.19 
J fin_lit_self_assessed 0.04 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.15  0.58 0.12 0.18 0.22 0.10 
K fin_ed_self_assessed -0.05 0.02 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.58  0.07 0.21 0.19 0.02 
L fin_literacy -0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.06  0.08 0.02 0.07 
M adv_fin_literacy 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.10 -0.01 0.07 0.24 0.26 0.05  0.11 0.02 
N inv_skills 0.12 -0.08 0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.23 0.18 0.02 0.17  0.06 
O numeracy 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.19 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.04  
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the investor and participation attributes for the entry sample. Specifically, summary statistics (Panel A) and 
correlations (Panel B) are presented. In Panel B, Pearson's correlation coefficients are shown in the upper triangle while Spearman's rank correlations appear below 
the diagonal. Statistical significance at the 0.1 level using two-tailed tests is indicated in bold type. See Appendix A1 for the variable definitions. 
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TABLE 4 
Summary Statistics and Correlations – Participation Sample (N=234) 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
persistence 2.863 1.206 1.099 1.609 2.996 4.290 4.727 
performance 0.792 0.116 0.333 0.734 0.806 0.870 1.000 
age 38.53 11.79 18.58 29.41 35.92 46.43 73.30 
gender 0.927 0.260 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
nr_startups 7.850 10.067 1.000 2.000 4.000 9.000 78.000 
lnr_startups 1.518 1.031 0.000 0.693 1.386 2.197 4.357 
total_amount 7,196 16,436 4.000 520.0 2,300 7,340 177,500 
ltotal_amount 7.451 1.966 1.386 6.253 7.740 8.901 12.087 
active 0.850 0.357 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
bc 0.380 0.487 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
fin_lit_self_assessed 0.582 0.223 0.000 0.500 0.667 0.667 1.000 
fin_ed_self_assessed 0.521 0.324 0.000 0.167 0.500 0.833 1.000 
fin_literacy 2.944 0.230 2.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 
adv_fin_literacy 1.661 0.406 0.000 1.425 1.750 2.000 2.000 
inv_skills 2.137 1.039 0.000 1.000 2.000 3.000 4.000 
numeracy 0.679 0.468 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
Summary Statistics and Correlations – Participation Sample 
 
Panel B: Correlations 
N = 234 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 
A persistence  0.16 0.09 -0.03 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.10 -0.03 0.19 0.14 -0.04 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.03 
B performance 0.09  0.00 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.17 0.13 0.10 
C age 0.10 -0.02  -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 0.16 0.24 -0.09 0.25 0.08 -0.02 0.08 -0.02 -0.11 0.09 
D gender -0.02 0.04 -0.06  0.15 0.22 0.10 0.26 0.21 0.19 0.29 0.17 0.08 0.21 0.12 0.05 
E nr_startups 0.07 -0.07 -0.05 0.23  0.82 0.25 0.37 0.21 0.18 0.11 -0.03 0.07 0.06 -0.06 0.04 
F lnr_startups 0.07 -0.07 -0.05 0.23 1.00  0.31 0.55 0.33 0.37 0.15 0.00 0.04 0.05 -0.09 0.03 
G total_amount 0.14 -0.05 0.27 0.24 0.55 0.55  0.57 0.13 0.46 0.03 -0.06 0.05 0.06 -0.11 0.09 
H ltotal_amount 0.14 -0.05 0.27 0.24 0.55 0.55 1.00  0.24 0.73 0.09 -0.02 0.07 0.10 -0.14 0.06 
I active -0.04 -0.10 -0.12 0.21 0.33 0.33 0.23 0.23  0.23 0.06 0.06 0.00 -0.04 0.07 -0.03 
J bc 0.18 0.02 0.25 0.19 0.39 0.39 0.81 0.81 0.23  0.09 -0.07 0.00 0.13 -0.07 0.16 
K fin_lit_self_assessed 0.13 0.03 0.14 0.24 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.08  0.57 0.08 0.20 0.31 0.09 
L fin_ed_self_assessed -0.04 0.07 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.06 -0.07 0.59  0.01 0.28 0.20 0.02 
M fin_literacy 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.01  -0.02 -0.08 -0.01 
N adv_fin_literacy 0.20 0.19 0.05 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.11 -0.03 0.09 0.26 0.33 -0.01  0.17 0.05 
O inv_skills 0.03 0.10 -0.09 0.11 -0.09 -0.09 -0.13 -0.13 0.07 -0.08 0.31 0.19 -0.07 0.22  0.04 
P numeracy 0.03 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.10 -0.03 0.16 0.09 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.04  
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the investor and participation attributes for the participation sample. Specifically, summary statistics 
(Panel A) and correlations (Panel B) are presented. In Panel B, Pearson's correlation coefficients are shown in the upper triangle while Spearman's rank correlations 
appear below the diagonal. Statistical significance at the 0.1 level using two-tailed tests is indicated in bold type. See Appendix A1 for the variable definitions. 
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TABLE 5 
Regression Results 
  
 Dependent variable 
  
 Enrolled Participated Persistence Performance 
 logistic logistic OLS OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
age -0.011** 0.003 0.004 0.0001 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.001) 
     
gender 0.465** -0.423 -0.586* 0.008 
 (0.195) (0.405) (0.325) (0.032) 
     
lnr_startups 0.282*** 0.054 0.074 0.001 
 (0.057) (0.115) (0.095) (0.009) 
     
ltotal_amount 0.061 0.091 -0.053 -0.007 
 (0.040) (0.081) (0.066) (0.007) 
     
active 1.371*** 0.285 -0.110 -0.029 
 (0.239) (0.272) (0.234) (0.023) 
     
bc 0.870*** 0.121 0.513** 0.035 
 (0.150) (0.299) (0.237) (0.024) 
     
took_survey 0.363    
 (0.261)    
     
inexperienced 0.625***    
 (0.175)    
     
fin_lit_self_assessed  0.545 1.265*** -0.043 
  (0.562) (0.455) (0.045) 
     
fin_ed_self_assessed  -0.682* -0.630** 0.014 
  (0.386) (0.298) (0.030) 
     
fin_literacy  -0.366 0.162 0.053 
  (0.432) (0.335) (0.033) 
     
adv_fin_literacy  0.097 0.585*** 0.039* 
  (0.260) (0.202) (0.020) 
     
inv_skills  0.251*** -0.027 0.016** 
  (0.097) (0.082) (0.008) 
     
Constant & Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 11,575 462 234 234 
McFadden Pseudo R² 0.169 0.041   
Adjusted R2   0.087 0.033 
Notes: This table reports the results of multiple regression analyses that differ with regard to the de-
pendent variable and (thus) the employed regression method. Column 1 (2) presents the results of a 
logistic regression with enrolled (participated) as dependent variable. Column 3 (4) presents the results 
of an OLS regression with persistence (performance) as dependent variable. ***, **, * indicate statis-
tical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. See Appendix A1 for the 
variable definitions. 
 
